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PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
IMPLICATIONS OF ELECTRICITY
PRODUCTION
Lance Noel* & Jeremy Firestone**
ABSTRACT
The public trust doctrine is a powerful legal tool in property law that re-
quires the sovereign, as a trustee, to protect and manage natural resources. His-
torically, the public trust doctrine has been used in relationship to navigable
waterways and wildlife management. Despite electricity production’s impact on
those two areas and the comparatively smaller impacts of renewable energy, elec-
tricity production has garnered very little public trust doctrine attention.
This Article examines how electricity production implicates the public trust
doctrine, primarily through the lens of four states—California, Wisconsin, Ha-
waii, and New Jersey—and how it would potentially apply to each state’s electric-
ity planning and policies. As illustrated in the four case studies, the public trust
doctrine can serve the following four purposes: (1) as a tool for citizens to force
states to act on renewable electricity development; (2) as a legal defense for states
to validate actions encouraging renewable electricity development; (3) as a means
for courts to more closely scrutinize electricity decisions made by the state; and (4)
as an opportunity for state agencies to supplement and guide imperfect statutes.
Together, these four purposes of the public trust can ensure reasonable and timely
development of renewable electricity as well as sufficient protection of trust
resources.
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INTRODUCTION
The public trust doctrine is a key aspect of property law that places
natural resources in the hands of the sovereign, which holds such resources
in trust on behalf of the public. As trustees, states have a fiduciary duty to
conserve and maintain natural resources for future generations. The doc-
trine is a unique mechanism for environmental protection that both burdens
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and empowers states to regulate these resources. Originally, the public trust
doctrine was used to guarantee public title to submerged lands, but has
since evolved to require states to properly manage and allocate natural re-
sources, such as water and wildlife, in accordance with the public interest.
While electricity production does not implicate title to submerged lands, it
clearly affects water and wildlife resources.
Electricity production has a large impact on the environment and on
public trust resources. While all types of electricity production damage the
environment, conventional electricity, including coal, nuclear, and natural
gas generation, has had a particularly large impact compared to renewable
electricity, particularly solar and wind. Despite the environmental benefits
of renewable energy, the shift from conventional electricity to the more
environmentally benign renewable electricity has been slow and uneven.
This Article explores the application of the public trust doctrine to elec-
tricity production and considers how utilizing this theory might further in-
centivize state action promoting renewable energy implementation. We
propose that applying the public trust doctrine on a state-by-state basis to
protect water and wildlife resources impacted by electricity production
presents a stronger legal argument than previous attempts to apply the pub-
lic trust doctrine directly to climate change and electricity production.
The Article focuses on how the public trust doctrine could be opera-
tionalized in the context of electricity production in four states: California,
Wisconsin, Hawaii, and New Jersey. First, we provide an overview of the
Article’s central argument. Then, we offer a general history of the public
trust doctrine and a brief overview of the environmental impacts of electric-
ity production. Finally, after presenting the four state case studies, the Arti-
cle concludes by examining the broader role the public trust doctrine can
play for citizens, courts, and state agencies in safeguarding natural resources
from the harmful effects of electricity production.
I. APPLICATIONS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
TO ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION
As discussed below, electricity production has clear impacts on public
trust resources, such as water and wildlife.1 Furthermore, it is evident that
trustees, including states and potentially the federal government, have du-
ties under the public trust doctrine that directly apply to the generation of
electricity. Electricity production impacts do not concern questions of ti-
tle—they only concern usufructuary rights subject to the public trust doc-
1. See infra Part IV.
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trine.2 Thus, in applying the doctrine, the question is whether the “use” of
water and wildlife is acceptable within the parameters of the public trust
doctrine according to the public interest, not whether the sovereign owner-
ship of these resources is being infringed upon.3
In the context of electricity policy decisions, we argue that states must
apply three principles emanating from the public trust doctrine to fulfill
their duties as trustees of water and wildlife resources.4 First, states must
develop a comprehensive, long-term plan regarding the allocation of wild-
life and water to the electricity sector.5 Second, states must act on their
affirmative public trust duties to minimize harm to wildlife6 and water re-
sources to the maximum extent feasible.7 Finally, states must ensure that
the use of wildlife and water does not substantially impair the public inter-
est and is both reasonable and beneficial.8 If electricity producers unneces-
sarily harm trust resources, states have a fiduciary obligation to sue for
remuneration for the loss of trust resources and to enjoin actions that con-
tinue to damage trust resources.9
Current electricity production policy fails to adhere to the basic re-
quirements of the public trust doctrine in several ways. First, while the
public trust doctrine requires consideration of wildlife interests irrespective
of their economic merit, wildlife law, as it relates to electricity production,
focuses primarily on the monetized benefits of commercially and recreation-
ally important wildlife.10 Second, states allow conventional electricity pro-
2. There are different state responsibilities regarding the title to public trust resources
and the regulation of the use of public trust resources. See infra Part III.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Section II.A. It is important to note that while these duties are distilled
from the implications of current public trust case law, none directly apply this framework to
electricity production, and as such an application of these principles to state regulation of
electricity production would be novel.
5. See United Plainsman Assoc. v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm’n, 247
N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976); see also In re Matters of Water Use Permit (Waiahole I), 9 P.3d
409, 455 (Haw. 2000).
6. It should be noted that the wildlife aspect of the public trust doctrine is not as
universally accepted as the water aspect of the public trust. See infra Section III.B.
7. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983); see also
Waiahole I, 9 P.3d at 456.
8. See Waiahole I, 9 P.3d at 450–51.
9. See State Dep’t of Fisheries v. Gillette, 621 P.2d 764, 767 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
10. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (EPA), DOC. NO. 821-R-14-001, ECONOMIC ANAL-
YSIS FOR THE FINAL SECTION 316(B) EXISTING FACILITIES RULE 8-2 (2014) (calculating the benefits
of reducing fish deaths of a closed-cycle CWIS exclusively on the use and non-use value of
commercially and recreationally harvested fish). Indeed, many of the federal laws governing
wildlife impacts are validated by calculating the costs of the regulation and comparing that to
the monetized benefits of commercially and recreationally important wildlife, and often ig-
noring wildlife that are non-commercial or non-recreational. See infra Part IV.B.
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duction to use and harm both wildlife and water at practically no cost,
disregarding their duty to seek remuneration for the diminution of wildlife
resources.11 Furthermore, states fail to adequately consider the relative ben-
efits of renewable electricity production on trust resources in comparison to
conventional electricity production. As a consequence of these failures, re-
newable sources are undervalued and under-implemented. By under-imple-
menting renewable energy, states have been abdicating their fiduciary
duties to protect public trust resources.
Recognition of public trust principles in the electricity sector could pro-
vide a means for states to advance wildlife and water mitigation policies.
For example, states could require that thermal power plants retrofit their
cooling water intake systems to minimize fish deaths.12 They could also
require entities to consider bat mortality mitigation policies at wind
farms.13 Essentially, the public trust doctrine both allows and compels states
to continually supervise and mitigate electricity production’s impacts on
state resources.14
States can also apply the public trust doctrine as a legal defense for both
aggressive renewable electricity policies and requirements for conventional
electricity wildlife and water mitigation policies.15 When conventional elec-
tricity producers object to the economic costs of compliance with state and
federal regulations, the public trust doctrine can provide a legal basis for
consideration of non-economic values.16 The fiduciary duty to prevent im-
pairment to trust resources based on feasibility rather than cost effective-
ness gives the states more leeway to justify regulatory intervention based on
non-market environmental costs and benefits.17
Beyond the ability of states to infuse electricity policy and planning
with trust principles, the public trust doctrine can provide private individu-
als with a tool to ensure that state agencies adhere to their duties and pro-
tect those wildlife and water resources that are currently unprotected and
impacted by conventional electricity. In states that have public support for,
11. Gillette, 621 P.2d at 767.
12. See infra Subsection V.B.4.
13. Wind energy has non-trivial impacts on bats. Mitigation techniques are available
but not legally required. See infra notes 184–200 and accompanying text.
14. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 727–28 (Cal. 1983).
15. See infra Subsection V.A.4.
16. Compare Entergy, Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2008) (upholding
EPA’s reliance on a cost-benefit analysis for regulations of cooling-water intake structures
under the Clean Water Act, even though the cost-benefit analysis did not account for non-
market values), with Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 719 (finding that the public trust doc-
trine requires protection of recreational and ecological values, such as scenic views, air pu-
rity, and habitat).
17. See infra Subsection V.A.4.a.
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yet limited development of, renewable electricity, citizens can also utilize
the public trust doctrine to spur state action to implement renewable elec-
tricity technology.18
Despite the substantial environmental impacts of electricity production,
and its importance in the context of climate change, there has been practi-
cally no application of the public trust doctrine to electricity production.
The case closest resembling this application, Alec L. v. Jackson, along with a
string of other decisions, comprise a recent effort to use the atmospheric
aspect of the public trust doctrine to force the federal government and
states to act on climate change.19 This movement is known as atmospheric
trust litigation.20 Because the atmosphere is incapable of private ownership,
atmospheric resources seem most “susceptible of treatment as a foundational
public trust resource.”21 However, these recent efforts to use the public
trust doctrine to mitigate climate change have not made significant pro-
gress,22 due to uncertainty of whether the public trust doctrine includes the
atmosphere in its res or even applies to the federal government.23 Further-
more, these efforts neglect to consider the water and wildlife impacts of
climate change.24 Thus, no case has presented a comprehensive application
18. See infra Subsection V.B.4.
19. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Alec L. ex rel.
Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY
CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
376–78 (2013) (detailing some state cases attempting to use the public trust doctrine and the
atmospheric trust to force states to act on climate change).
20. See generally Mary Christina Wood & Dan Galpern, Atmospheric Recovery Litigation:
Making the Fossil Fuel Industry Pay to Restore a Viable Climate System, 45 ENVTL. L. 259, 263
(2015) (discussing “Atmospheric Trust Litigation” where plaintiffs seek “judicial orders re-
quiring governments to develop climate recovery plans that reduce emissions within their
jurisdictions”).
21. Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & Charting Its
Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 679 (2012).
22. Though the state versions of Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 11, originally made some
progress, they have not yet resulted in any significant changes in either the public trust
doctrines of those states or in their climate change policies. See Caroline Cress, It’s Time to
Let Go: Why the Atmospheric Trust Won’t Help the World Breathe Easier, 99 N.C. L. REV. 236,
261–64 (2013) (noting that many of the state cases have been dismissed, while the others are
pending review).
23. See infra note 40 for a description of res. As discussed below in Section III.C, it is
uncertain whether the federal government has any public trust responsibilities, and the cur-
rent case law is conflicting on the issue.
24. From a different perspective, one could view Alec L.’s purpose as bringing attention
to climate change exclusively, regardless of other public trust resources. So perhaps it is
unsurprising that the plaintiffs in Alec L. focused exclusively on the “air resource” as their
central strategy, rather than peripheral, albeit more concrete, trust resources. See 863 F.
Supp. 2d at 13–14.
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of the public trust doctrine that weaves together the water and wildlife
impacts of all forms of electricity production.
This Article proposes that a better public trust argument would focus
specifically on electricity production. Electricity production, while damag-
ing air resources, also damages nearly every other public trust resource both
during generation25 and through the emission of conventional pollutants
and greenhouse gases (GHGs).26 Direct impacts from electricity production
to water and wildlife are clear public trust violations of a state’s responsibil-
ity as trustee of the public interest. Climate change mitigation could occur
within state jurisdictions without addressing any questions regarding the
existence of a federal trust doctrine. Applying a state’s public trust doctrine
to impacts of electricity production water and wildlife resources, therefore,
presents a stronger legal argument than has been proposed to date in atmos-
pheric trust litigation cases.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
A. Substance of the Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine places a fiduciary duty on states to act as
trustees on behalf of the public to protect all public trust resources located
within the state. The duties and rights the doctrine imposes on states are
intrinsic to state sovereignty—they may only be alienated by the “destruc-
tion of the sovereign.”27 The three major principles of the public trust doc-
trine, summarized by Joseph Sax, are:
1) Certain natural resources are too important to the public to be
privately owned.
2) Public access to these resources must be guaranteed by the state.
3) The government is required to protect and manage these re-
sources for the benefit of the general public, rather than a pri-
vate minority.28
The essence of a state’s duty under the public trust doctrine is to af-
firmatively protect and control public natural resources,29 promote reasona-
25. See infra Sections IV.A–B.
26. See infra Section IV.C.
27. United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981).
28. CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERGENERATIONAL TRUSTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 40
(1999) (citations omitted) (summarizing and analyzing Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine
in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 485 (1970)).
29. See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 336 A.2d 750,
758 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev’d on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976) (hold-
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ble public access to these resources,30 and “seek damages for injury to the
object of its trust”31 from private individuals.
In addition to the state’s duty to preserve and protect public access and
enjoyment of public trust resources, the state “cannot destroy or alienate the
public’s right or abdicate its control of public trust resources” without a
compelling purpose.32 Furthermore, the state has the responsibility to con-
sider any action that will affect the public rights and uses of trust lands as a
matter of general public interest, and should only permit such actions if the
state has fully considered the public interest.33
Beyond these considerations, the state can alienate control over a public
trust resource only if doing so does not “substantially impair the public
interest” in the trust resource.34 The state is burdened with an inalienable
duty to protect and preserve public resources and to prevent transfer or sale
of resources that substantially impair the public’s interest.35
B. History of the Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine first appeared in the Roman Institutes of Justin-
ian,36 which laid the foundation for the doctrine in England and subse-
quently, the United States. Under the Roman code, the doctrine granted the
state trusteeship over all things that could not be owned by any individual,
including “the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the sea shore.”37
These environmental properties were classified as communally owned re-
sources, or res communis.38 The Roman code also discussed wildlife. Until
capture, animals, including birds and fish, had no owner and were classified
ing that a state’s interest in protecting waterways gives rise to standing to challenge pollution
to a waterway).
30. Charles Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source
and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 462 (1989) (concluding that “the right
of the public to obtain access [to public trust waters and resources] . . . is the essence of the
public trust doctrine”).
31. State Dep’t of Fisheries v. Gillette, 621 P.2d 764, 767 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
32. Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to Include
Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723, 726 (1989).
33. See Sax, supra note 28, at 531.
34. See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
35. Id. at 452–53. It is important to note that this does not prevent the state from
alienation of public trust resources in cases that could damage environmental resources, so
long as it promotes, or at least does not impair, the broadly-defined public interest. For
example, California courts found that drilling for oil does not impair the public interest, but
rather promotes the public interest, and thus does not violate the public trust doctrine. See
infra notes 225–26 and associated text.
36. See INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 35 (J.B. Moyle trans., Oxford 1913).
37. See id.
38. Id. at 35–36.
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as res nullius.39 Compared to many modern iterations, the public trust doc-
trine found in the Institutes of Justinian had an expansive res40 and included
many environmental resources now seen as controversial, such as air.41
When England incorporated the public trust doctrine into English
common law, an important progression in the doctrine occurred—ownership
of res communis was conferred upon the sovereign Crown rather than the
general community.42 Counterintuitively, this transfer of ownership had the
effect of limiting the Crown’s power by bounding the Crown to act only “for
the benefit of the public.”43 In addition, the scope of the English public
trust doctrine was largely limited to tidal water resources.44
When the United States became an independent nation, the English
public trust doctrine was incorporated into United States law. The rights
and duties granted to the Crown were transferred to the individual states.45
Though American cases expanded the public trust doctrine beyond tidal
waters into freshwater,46 the scope of the American public trust doctrine
was, for the most part, relatively narrow compared to the original Roman
39. See id. at 35–37 (distinguishing wildlife, which was individually owned, from water
resources, which were communally owned).
40. Res is the corpus of resources protected by the public trust doctrine. Thus, a public
trust doctrine with a more expansive res implies that that trust doctrine includes and protects
more resources. BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 19, at 7, 376.
41. This is especially true due to litigation associated with public trust doctrine’s appli-
cation to climate change. See Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d
sub nom. Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (denying
applications of the public trust doctrine to the federal government in respect to climate
change mitigation). Other courts have been more hesitant to apply the public trust doctrine
to the air. See, e.g., Bosner-Lain v. Texas Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, 438 S.W.3d 887, 890
(Tex. Ct. App. 2014).
42. For a description of the public trust doctrine in England, see MATTHEW HALE,
A TREATISE RELATIVE TO THE MARITIME LAW OF ENGLAND (London, 1787). See also Jan Stevens,
The Public Trust: A Sovereign’s Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People’s Environmental Right, 14
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 196 (1980). Though the public trust doctrine in England was rela-
tively limited in practice, it was theoretically more expansive than implied. For example,
Stevens argues that, despite American interpretation of the English public trust doctrine, the
King’s ownership expanded beyond tidal waters. Id. at 201; see also BLUMM & WOOD, supra
note 19, at 195 (discussing the King’s ownership of various types of wildlife).
43. Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 412–13 (1842) (finding that the Crown’s
sovereignty over natural resources was limited by the Magna Carta); see also Arnold v.
Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 3 (1821) (concluding that “the king . . . is restrained by Magna Charta” in
his power to grant a fishery to a private individual).
44. See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435, 458 (1892).
45. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 2.
46. See Stevens, supra note 42, at 201. Navigability based on the ebb and flows of the
tide “was early rejected in states with large navigable freshwater rivers and lakes where it
simply made no sense, especially as steamboats capable of passage upriver were developed.”
Id.
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public trust doctrine. Most cases limited application of the doctrine to sub-
merged lands, rivers, and game wildlife.47
The seminal case in early public trust doctrine jurisprudence was Illinois
Central Railroad v. Illinois.48 Decided in 1892, the case considered whether
the bed of Lake Michigan fell within the purview of the public trust doc-
trine.49 The Illinois legislature granted and subsequently revoked a substan-
tial portion of the Chicago harbor to a private company, Illinois Central
Railroad Company.50 The Supreme Court held that the state did not have
the authority to alienate these lands, a public trust resource, to a private
company because “trusts connected with public property, or property of a
special character, . . . cannot be placed entirely beyond the direction and
control of the State.”51 The Court added that public trust resources can only
be alienated from the state if such alienation either promotes or does not
substantially impair the public’s interest in the resource.52 This two-part
“substantial impairment” test became a hallmark of public trust doctrine
cases.53
In the decades after Illinois Central, there was little evolution of the
public trust doctrine. In 1970, the public trust doctrine returned to the spot-
light when Joseph Sax wrote an influential article arguing that the doctrine
was a powerful tool that could be used by environmental policy makers.54
The revival of the public trust doctrine has resulted in a res that has
rapidly expanded beyond the traditional American corpus. Applications of
the public trust doctrine have increased in the decades since Sax’s article.
47. See, e.g., Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. at 413–14 (holding that public navigable lands
cannot be conferred to private individuals); Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 458 (invalidating under the
public trust doctrine a state’s land grant of submerged lands to a private company); Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 528 (1896) (holding that the state, as a trustee, has the right to
regulate the common right to hunt wildlife for the benefit of the people); Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at
3 (holding that public submerged lands could not be converted into private property); Car-
son v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, 494–95 (Pa. 1810) (holding that the State owns the Susquehanna
River and the associated fisheries; private owners of the banks have no claim to ownership of
the fisheries).
48. Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452; see also Sax, supra note 28, at 489 (discussing Illinois
Central as the lodestar American public trust doctrine case).
49. Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 433–37.
50. Id. at 389–90.
51. Id. at 453–54.
52. Id. at 453.
53. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 47 (1894); see also Stevens, supra note 42, at 212.
54. Sax, supra note 28, at 474. In many ways, Joseph Sax revived the public trust doc-
trine in 1970 with his seminal article. Since its publication, Sax’s article “is perhaps the most
heavily-cited law review article” and has “had a catalytic effect among courts and environ-
mental policymakers throughout the country.” See Frank, supra note 21, at 667. R
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA104.txt unknown Seq: 11  4-JAN-16 9:52
Fall 2015] Public Trust Doctrine Implications of Electricity Production 179
Depending on the state, the doctrine has been applied to groundwater,55
non-game wildlife,56 air quality,57 and general ecosystem benefits.58 Fur-
thermore, recent scholarship has considered the application of the public
trust doctrine in novel areas, including the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ)59 and the atmosphere.60
III. THE SCOPE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
AND ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION
The public trust doctrine varies both in scope and in character across
different ecosystems, landforms, and legal jurisdictions. As it applies to
electricity production, the doctrine principally implicates three protected
resources: state waters, wildlife, and federal waters. Similarly, prevalent
forms of electricity production vary across different ecosystems and juris-
dictions. Each distinct type of energy production, given its unique impacts
on trust resources, will be subject to different applications of the public
trust doctrine. Conventional electricity production, including generation
from coal, nuclear and natural gas, is commonly found adjacent to state-
controlled navigable water bodies such as rivers, estuaries, or the open
ocean for cooling.61 In contrast, onshore wind and solar energy production
is rarely located next to water.62 Thus, while conventional electricity pro-
duction implicates public trust water resources, land-based renewable elec-
55. See Waiahole I, 9 P.3d 409, 447 (Haw. 2000).
56. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. FPL Grp., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 596–97 (Ct.
App. 2008).
57. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 718–19 (Cal. 1983).
58. See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).
59. See, e.g., Mary Turnipseed et al., The Silver Anniversary of the United States’ Exclusive
Economic Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse and the Possibility of a Blue Water
Public Trust Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2009). The EEZ is a maritime zone, ranging from
the end of the territorial sea (12 nautical miles from the shore of sovereign territory) out to
200 nautical miles, where the federal government has exclusive sovereign rights to resources.
See id. at 5. The federal government also generally controls the territorial sea beyond three
nautical miles of the shoreline (with states generally controlling sea up to three miles). Id.
Any future reference in this Article to the EEZ includes federal territorial sea waters. While
the EEZ applies to all coastal states, this Article is concerned with the EEZ’s jurisdictional
implications within the United States. See Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303,
1311–1315, 1331–1356a; Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States of America, Presiden-
tial Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 14, 1983).
60. See, e.g., Wood & Galpern, supra note 20.
61. Energy Info. Admin. (EIA), U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Energy Mapping System,
U.S. STATES: STATE PROFILES AND ENERGY ESTIMATES, http://www.eia.gov/state/maps.cfm (last
visited Nov. 11, 2015).
62. Id. Because wind and solar do not require cooling water, there is no operational
reason to locate these technologies adjacent to water resources.
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tricity (i.e., onshore wind and solar) generally implicates only the wildlife
aspects of the public trust doctrine.63 Finally, offshore wind is often in-
stalled on the continental shelf in areas beyond state jurisdictional waters.64
Thus, to the extent the public trust doctrine applies to offshore wind, it
would either be based on the existence of a federal public trust or the exten-
sion of state jurisdiction into federal waters and the wildlife that exist
therein, including the EEZ.65
A. State Waters
State waters, including tidal waters and navigable rivers, were the origi-
nal focus of the public trust doctrine,66 as these resources were highly val-
ued for commercial transportation and sustenance from fisheries.67 Early
cases principally concerned title ownership of navigable rivers because peo-
ple sought to privatize these resources.68 In these early cases, American
courts rejected both private and federal claims to the title ownership of
submerged lands.69  Instead, the courts ruled that ownership rights to rivers
must be held by the State “in trust for the people of the State.”70 Beyond
63. See infra Section IV.B.
64. MARC SCHWARTZ ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB, ASSESSMENT OF OFFSHORE WIND
ENERGY RESOURCES FOR THE UNITED STATES 10–12 (2010), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/
45889.pdf. Offshore wind could be installed within 3 miles of the coastline, and thus remain
in state jurisdiction. However, this Article will focus on wind located within the EEZ, given
its substantially higher potential capacity.
65. Hope M. Babcock, Grotius, Ocean Fish Ranching, and the Public Trust Doctrine: Ride
‘em Charlie Tuna, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 6 (2007); see also infra Section III.C.
66. Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, art. IV, 1 Stat. 50
(1789), reprinted in 1 U.S.C. LI, LV (2012) [hereinafter Northwest Ordinance]; see, e.g., Mat-
thew J. Festa, Property and Republicanism in the Northwest Ordinance, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 409, 461
(2013) (crediting the Northwest Ordinance with helping to establish the public trust
doctrine).
67. See Festa, supra note 66, at 461–62.
68. See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 408 (1842) (saying the defend-
ants claimed exclusive rights to harvest oysters); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 10 (1821)
(saying the plaintiffs claimed exclusive rights to harvest oysters); Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn.
475, 483 (Pa. 1810) (saying the plaintiffs have exclusive rights to the fisheries in the Susque-
hanna River opposite their property).
69. See, e.g., Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 230 (1845) (holding that the right over the
shores and soils of navigable resources belongs exclusively to the states, not the federal gov-
ernment); Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 30 (concluding that the rights to fisheries are vested in the
state). In Shively v. Bowlby, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that the federal government
does have the authority to dispose of territorial submerged lands in limited situations (to
promote commerce and navigation between states and nations or to fulfill international obli-
gations) but has constrained this power by the equal footing doctrine. 152 U.S. 1, 47–50
(1894).
70. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
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authorizing the state’s title to these resources, the courts qualified this own-
ership with an inalienable duty to the public to maintain and prevent im-
pairment of the public’s interest in the waters held under trust.71
The extent of the “public interest,” and state’s obligations with respect
to that interest, are much more vague and depend on the use of public trust
waters. The scope of a state’s duty to protect such public interests was first
addressed in a 1976 case out of North Dakota, United Plainsmen Association.72
In that case, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the State Water Conser-
vation Commission and the State Engineer in an attempt to prevent the
issuance of a water allocation permit to a coal fired plant.73 The court found
that while there were no mandatory planning responsibilities under statu-
tory law, the public trust doctrine requires, at a minimum, the state to de-
termine the potential effects of water allocations on both present water
supply and future water needs.74 Thus, the power of the state to alienate
public trust resources is burdened by some proof of consideration of the
public trust implications.
The import of a state’s duties under the public trust doctrine was fur-
ther elucidated by the California Supreme Court in the 1983 National Audu-
bon Society case.75 The National Audubon Society sought to enjoin the
diversions of water from the rivers that feed Mono Lake, which had caused
a nearly 30% decrease in the surface area of the lake and concomitant signif-
icant declines in local and migratory wildlife populations due to new access
by predators.76 The plaintiffs claimed the diversions were impairing the
public interest in Mono Lake, particularly its recreational and ecological
value.77 While recreational and ecological values were not considered tradi-
tional aspects of the public trust doctrine, the California Supreme Court
agreed that the public trust doctrine protects “the scenic views of the lake
and its shore, the purity of the air, and the use of the lake for nesting and
feeding by birds.”78 Furthermore, the public trust doctrine places not only a
sovereign authority in the hands of the state, but also burdens the state with
71. See id.; see also supra notes 51–52 and associated text. Moreover, in Justice Fields’ R
broadly written opinion in Illinois Central, he was careful to maintain the trust’s applicability
to any property of a special character, and not just lands under navigable waters. See 146 U.S.
at 454.
72. United Plainsman Assoc. v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm’n, 247 N.W.2d
457 (N.D. 1976).
73. Id. at 459.
74. Id. at 462.
75. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
76. Id. at 714–15.
77. Id. at 711–12.
78. Id. at 719. In fact, the Court went on to include local air quality as part of the trust
resources that must be considered in this decision (since dropping water levels exposed silt
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA104.txt unknown Seq: 14  4-JAN-16 9:52
182 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 5:1
an affirmative duty to “attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any
harm to those interests.”79 The court held that the state must include public
trust values in its planning and allocation of water resources, show the costs
and benefits of any decision regarding trust resources, and continually su-
pervise water allocations.80 As a result, the court ruled that the state had
failed to properly consider the impact of the water diversions on the public’s
interest in Mono Lake.81
Finally, in 2000, the Supreme Court of Hawaii explained the role of
long-term planning in meeting a state’s public trust responsibilities when it
adjudicated a controversy over water allocation permits within the Waiahole
Ditch System on the Hawaiian island of Oahu.82 In 1992, the Hawaiian
Commission on Water Resources Management (CWRM) designated five
aquifer systems as ground water management areas that required all existing
users to apply for use permits within a year.83 The CWRM allocated availa-
ble water mostly favoring agricultural uses over in-stream flow restora-
tion.84 The court held that the public trust doctrine gives the state both the
“authority and duty to preserve the rights of present and future generations
in the waters of the state”85 and “also requires planning and decisionmaking
from a global, long-term perspective.”86 As a result, the state is compelled
“to consider the cumulative impact of existing and proposed diversions on
trust purposes and to implement reasonable measures to mitigate this im-
pact, including use of alternative sources.”87 Moreover, the Commission
must designate the in-stream flow protection standards before it authorizes
off-stream diversions—otherwise it would be impossible to know if diver-
from the lake bottom, which raised respiratory and other health concerns when the silt be-
came airborne). Id. at 716, 719.
79. Id. at 712. The court rejected the Water Board’s argument that it lacked authority to
adjust previously permitted water allocations and that it was required to grant the domestic
use request. Id. at 714, 723.
80. Id. at 722–28. Moreover, National Audubon Society implies that water allocation
decisions are continually ripe for review under the public trust doctrine. Id. at 722, 728
(noting that the state is burdened with a duty to continually supervise the taking and use of
water, even when the use has been long thought to be free of the trust, and a duty to take
action to feasibly protect trust resources if necessary).
81. Id. at 728–29.
82. Waiahole I, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000).
83. Id. at 423.
84. Id. at 428–30.
85. Id. at 453.
86. Id. at 455.
87. Id.; see also id. at 501–02 (highlighting the importance of alternative water sources
and directing the two parties to show that there was no practical alternative to their proposed
diversion).
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sions are detrimental to public in-stream uses.88 In addition, the court also
incorporated a reasonable-beneficial use test as an aspect of the public trust
doctrine, stating that any proposed use of water must be consistent with the
public interest in these waters and must not be wasteful or unnecessary.89
Over the last forty years, the public usufructuary right and associated
duty of the state to protect the public interest in the public trust waters has
been slowly evolving towards three key ideas. First, the state must plan
water trust resource allocation in a way that is comprehensive, intergenera-
tional, and global.90 Second, as the trustee for the public, the state has an
affirmative duty to continually look for ways to minimize harm to water
resources.91 Lastly, for permitted uses of water resources, the state must
ensure that each use is reasonable and beneficial, i.e., not wasteful.92
The application of these three ideas to the effects of electricity produc-
tion on water resources93 is clear—states must have a comprehensive plan
regarding allocation of water for electricity production. For example, states
should continually look for feasible ways to minimize the harm caused by
electricity production and ensure that water allocated to electricity produc-
tion plants does not substantially impair the water’s beneficial use to society
and does not unreasonably waste water. This comprehensive planning re-
sponsibility falls within the jurisdiction of a state’s public trust doctrine
powers and duties, not as a matter of title or sovereign ownership, but
rather as the part of a state’s duty to protect the public interest in the
usufructuary rights of state waters.
B. State Wildlife Resources
Electricity production also significantly impacts wildlife. Today, there
is considerable overlap between the water and wildlife applications of the
public trust doctrine. However, the trust doctrine governing state wildlife
resources evolved as a separate doctrine. Like title ownership of submerged
lands, early application of the public trust doctrine to wildlife can be traced
to England. Several English cases decreed royal ownership of various forms
of wildlife, including oysters, salmon, swans, and whales.94 Likewise, the
88. See id. at 460.
89. See id. at 472–73 (discussing the definition of a reasonable use, including the pur-
pose of the use, its economic value, the potential damages to society, and potential mitiga-
tion of waste or harm).
90. United Plainsmen Ass’n v. State Water Conservation Comm’n, 247 N.W.2d 457,
462 (N.D. 1976); see also Waiahole I, 9 P.3d at 455.
91. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).
92. Waiahole I, 9 P.3d at 472–73.
93. See sources cited infra note 160 and associated text.
94. BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 19, at 195.
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right to use wildlife, namely fish and oysters, was integral to the earliest
American public trust cases,95 although these early controversies focused on
the public’s right to commerce rather than wildlife per se.
Wildlife was not explicitly incorporated into the American public trust
doctrine until Geer v. Connecticut in 1896.96 In that case, the plaintiff was
charged with violating a state statute that made transport of wild game
birds beyond state lines unlawful, even though he had killed the birds le-
gally.97 The plaintiff sued Connecticut, claiming that the statute violated
the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.98 The U.S. Supreme Court
disagreed, affirming that the right to take wild animals has always been
“subject to the control of the law-giving power [of the state].”99 The Court
held that wild game belongs to the people in their collective sovereign ca-
pacity and that this ownership of wildlife is held by the state as a trustee for
the benefit of the people.100 As a result, the right of a private individual to
take wildlife is qualified by the power and duty of the state to protect and
conserve wildlife for the common benefit.101
Typical of early cases, Geer describes the authority of the state to regu-
late trust resources. Yet, although the Court anchored Geer on the “sover-
eign ownership” theory of wildlife, the wildlife trust at that time was
disconnected from the other aspects of the public trust doctrine.102 In fact,
though Geer is one of the cornerstones of establishing the wildlife aspect of
the public trust doctrine and was decided only four years after Illinois Cen-
tral, it does not cite that seminal case.103
95. See Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367 (1842); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1
(1821); Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810).
96. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1896).
97. This law, along with similar statues in other states, was enacted in response to the
decimation of game birds by market hunters. See Michael Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The
Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35
ENVTL. L. 673, 696 (2005).
98. Geer, 161 U.S. at 521–22.
99. Id. at 522.
100. Id. at 529.
101. Id. at 529–30.
102. See supra notes 66-71 and associated text. The “sovereign ownership” of wildlife
closely mirrors the language in public trust doctrine cases holding that the state owns title to
navigable waters as an aspect of its sovereignty. See Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367,
410–11 (1842) (connecting sovereign ownership to the public trust). As such, it is conceivable
that the Geer court could have made the same connection to the public trust doctrine.
103. While the court in Geer did not cite Illinois Central, the language of Geer parallels
Illinois Central, especially regarding the inherent sovereignty of the state to regulate common
trust resources as an exercise of its police power. Compare Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 459 (1892) (“The soil under navigable waters being held by the people of the state in
trust for the common use and as a portion of their inherent sovereignty, any act of legislation
concerning their use affects the public welfare. It is therefore appropriately within the exer-
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Despite Geer’s importance, its “sovereign ownership” theory was ques-
tioned starting with Missouri v. Holland104 and eventually abandoned in
Hughes v. Oklahoma.105 First, a series of early cases “destroyed the argument
that state ownership of wildlife superseded federal species legislation.”106 In
Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court held that a state’s authority to regu-
late wildlife was subject to the paramount federal treaty power.107 Subse-
quently, in Hunt v. United States, the Supreme Court considered a state
challenge to a federal program of killing and removing excess deer on fed-
eral lands.108 The Court held that the federal power to protect its land was
paramount to all state statues.109 Finally, the Supreme Court constrained
state authority to discriminate in the issuance of fishing licenses under the
Equal Protection Clause in Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission.110 While
none of these cases explicitly overturned Geer, they paved the way for Geer’s
Commerce Clause rationale to be overruled.111
This would occur in Hughes v. Oklahoma.112 Under similar facts to Geer,
the Court in Hughes held that state power to regulate the possession of
wildlife is subject to the paramount powers of the federal government, in-
cluding under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.113 The Court
was careful to reaffirm the state’s power to conserve and protect wild ani-
mals, insofar as such actions do not interfere with interstate commerce.114
Importantly, the Hughes Court also characterized the sovereign owner-
ship theory as “no more than a 19th-century legal fiction ‘expressing the
cise of the police power of the state.”), with Geer, 161 U.S. at 534 (“It is, perhaps, accurate to
say that the ownership of the sovereign authority is in trust for all the people of the state;
and hence, by implication, it is the duty of the legislature to enact such laws as will best
preserve the subject of the trust, and secure its beneficial use in the future to the people of
the state.”).
104. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432–34 (1920).
105. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
106. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 97, at 703.
107. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434–35. The court also questioned the state’s sovereign owner-
ship over migratory birds because no one truly possesses wild animals, and “possession is the
beginning of ownership.” Id. at 432–34.
108. Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
109. Id. at 100.
110. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
111. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 97, at 703–04. As further examples of the U.S. Su-
preme Court undermining the ownership theory, the authors also cite Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385 (1948) (holding that state ownership of wildlife is subject to the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution) and Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529
(1976) (holding that state ownership of wildlife is subject to the power under the Property
Clause to protect wildlife on federal lands). Id. at 702–03.
112. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
113. Id. at 335–36.
114. Id.
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importance to its people that a State have a power to preserve and regulate
the exploitation of an important resource.’ ”115 While states clearly have
broad powers and discretion to conserve wildlife,116 the nature of the wild-
life trust is distinct from the trust in submerged lands and their waters.
Wildlife is an example of res nullius, implying the impossibility of true own-
ership.117 Because a state does not own title to wild animals, it can only
regulate the usufruct rights in wildlife.118
Perhaps due to the difficult characteristics of the property aspects of
wildlife, few cases directly address the state’s duties and obligations with
respect to wildlife under the public trust doctrine.119 Despite nearly univer-
sal statutory claims of public trust ownership of wildlife,120 few states have
declared any corresponding, affirmative duties in their statutes.121 However,
as the public interest in wildlife has evolved, case law has frequently focused
on the state’s ability and duty to seek remuneration for the diminution of
wildlife resources.122
Remuneration based on trust principles was first developed in New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. Jersey Central Power & Light
Co.123 In that case, a nuclear power plant operator had found a potentially
hazardous leak, resulting in a relatively sudden shutdown and interruption
in the discharge of hot water into a nearby creek.124 The resulting decrease
in the water temperature killed over 500,000 menhaden fish.125 The state
115. Id. at 335 (quoting Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977)
(citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948))).
116. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 97, at 711.
117. See INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 36, at 35–37.
118. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 97, at 711.
119. Id. at 714.
120. Michael Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 6 UTAH L. REV.
1437, 1462 (2013). The only exceptions are Delaware and Nebraska. Id. Indeed, in spite of
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979), most state courts have embraced states’ au-
thority and duty to protect wildlife resources as trustees of the public while still relying on
the sovereign ownership theory by either distinguishing Hughes, due to an absence of federal
controversy, or simply ignoring Hughes entirely. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 97, at
707–08. Blumm and Ritchie also note that “[r]ecent scholarly commentary overwhelmingly
confirms this interpretation.” Id. at 706. Moreover, a recent U.S. Supreme Court case
breathed new life into the state’s ownership of ferae naturae wildlife, possibly reopening the
sovereign ownership theory. See Horne v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2015).
121. Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 120, at 1465.
122. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 97, at 715.
123. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 336 A.2d 750 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev’d on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976) (holding that the
plaintiffs had failed to show proximate causation and a federal statute preempted public trust
doctrine claims).
124. Id. at 753.
125. Id.
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sued the power plant under the public trust doctrine, seeking compensatory
damages for the deaths of the menhaden,126 while the nuclear plant opera-
tors objected, saying that “the State does not have a proprietary right to fish
in its waters sufficient to support an action for compensatory damages.”127
The New Jersey court found that “the State had the right and the fiduciary
duty to seek damages of all wild life which are part of the public trust . . . .
[I]t is questionable whether anyone but the State can be considered the
proper party to sue for recovery of damages.”128 Not only does the state
have the authority to sue for compensation, but its sole proprietary interest
in wildlife burdens it with a duty to do so under the public trust doctrine.
The state’s responsibilities to seek remuneration under the public trust
doctrine was also distinguished from the “sovereign ownership” theory in In
re Steuart Transportation Co.129 Steuart had caused a significant oil spill, re-
sulting in the death of approximately 30,000 migratory birds.130 Steuart
filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that, because the state of
Virginia did not own the migratory waterfowl, it could not recover damages
for their loss.131 While the district court agreed that Virginia did not own
the migratory birds, under the public trust doctrine, it concluded that Vir-
ginia had the “right and the duty to protect and preserve the public’s inter-
est in natural wildlife resources” that derive not “from ownership of the
resources but from a duty owing to the people.”132 Thus, regardless of any
state claim to “sovereign ownership,” each state has a separate duty to the
people to protect the public interest in wildlife.
Although case law is scant on the issue of whether a state’s fiduciary
duties go beyond remuneration,133 much of the academic commentary sug-
gests that the scope of the fiduciary duty under the wildlife trust is the
same as under the public trust in water resources.134 It follows that a state
126. Id. at 758–59.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980).
130. Id. at 39.
131. Id. at 39.
132. Id. at 39–40.
133. Owsichek v. State, 763 P.2d 488, 496 (Alaska 1988) (describing the state’s duty as
requiring it to prohibit monopolization of wildlife resources); see also Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. FPL Grp., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 601–02 (Ct. App. 2008).
134. Because wildlife, like water, has no owner in its natural state and ownership is an
aspect of sovereignty, “the common interest in wildlife is sufficiently like the common inter-
est in water to justify similar public trust doctrine protection for wildlife.” Meyers, supra
note 32, at 728–29. Indeed, Blumm and Paulsen recently argued that “the public trust in
wildlife has a solid historical foundation and therefore [is] likely to be . . . employed by an
increasing number of courts in the coming years.” Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 120, at 1466.
The authors based their argument on the states’ nearly unanimous assertion of ownership of
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must: (1) comprehensively plan the “allocation” of wildlife; (2) minimize
harm to wildlife resources when feasible; and (3) ensure that “uses” of wild-
life are reasonable, beneficial, and do not substantially impair the public
interest.135 Specifically, before any further allocation of wildlife, a state
must first have an intergenerational, comprehensive plan that specifically
addresses how to minimize impacts to wildlife from electricity production.
A state must also continually ensure that any actions that impact wildlife
are both reasonable and beneficial, implying that electricity production can-
not needlessly kill wildlife.
C. Federal Waters and Wildlife Resources
The last potential application of the public trust doctrine to electricity
production relates to federal jurisdiction over public waters and wildlife.
Unlike state governments, however, it is uncertain whether the federal gov-
ernment has any common law trust duties to protect water and wildlife
beyond statutory requirements.
To the extent there is a federal public trust doctrine, it could impact
electricity production in three ways—impacts from offshore wind turbine
installations in federal jurisdictional waters, including the EEZ; climate
change impacts from conventional electricity production; and the co-trus-
teeship of water and wildlife resources that concurrently fall under both
state and federal jurisdiction.136 While the public trust doctrine is usually
associated with state common law, there are currently two bases for public
trust doctrine application to the EEZ (and thus to wildlife): “(1) the public
domain nature of the EEZ to which the federal common law might apply
and (2) the potential extension of state common law beyond state waters.”137
The source of federal public trust doctrine jurisprudence can be traced
to Illinois Central.138 Although Illinois Central concerned waters held in trust
by a state, the opinion’s language suggests that the Supreme Court was
basing the rule on “federal law universally applicable to all state legisla-
wildlife, the historic connection of early public trust doctrine cases to fishery resources and
public access thereto, and the increasing public interest in wildlife. Id.
135. It should be noted that none of these tests have been explicitly applied to wildlife,
but there is also no reason to think that these duties could not or should not apply to
wildlife. In fact, the cases that developed these tests, such as Waiahole I, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw.
2000), and Nattional Audubon Society. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), discuss wild-
life as a trust resource peripherally, and do not distinguish wildlife resources from other
public trust resources to which these tests do apply.
136. See Frank, supra note 21, at 680. R
137. Babcock, supra note 65, at 6.
138. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435, 458 (1892).
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tures.”139 Furthermore, beyond binding state actions, “the Court made it
clear that the trust derives from federal law,”140 implying that public trust
doctrine duties are a matter of federal law.
Any such federal public trust doctrine is markedly different and the
federal government’s responsibilities much more ambiguous than those of
its state counterparts. Scholarly commentary suggests that the federal pub-
lic trust doctrine serves as a baseline of sorts, guaranteeing basic public
interests such as public access to trust resources and preventing states from
abrogating the public trust entirely.141 It is then up to each state individu-
ally to define the scope of its public trust doctrine.142
The federal public trust is most likely to be implicated when “uniquely
federal interests” are present, such as where the authority and duties of the
federal government “as a sovereign are intimately involved.”143 While fed-
eral courts have not directly relied upon the public trust doctrine, from
about 1888 through 1970, there are eighteen opinions in federal public land
law that use trust language when describing the role of the federal
government.144
Many early public trust cases embraced a theory of co-trusteeship, in
which states and the federal government share in “the right and the duty to
protect and preserve the public’s interest in natural wildlife resources.”145
These cases did not distinguish between the rights and duties of state and
federal governments but instead emphasized that all sovereigns are endowed
with and burdened by the public trust.146 Further, the District Court of
139. Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Re-
sources Law: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 639 & n.37 (1986)
(noting the lack of any limiting principle and the court’s general references to a “state,”
rather than Illinois specifically, throughout the opinion).
140. Wilkinson, supra note 30, at 454 (emphasis added) (citing Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at
435).
141. Id. at 462–64 (noting that states have regularly operated on the assumption that
they are bound to keep navigable waters open to the public “as a matter of national law”); see
also Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L.
& POL’Y 281, 303 (2014) (arguing that the public trust doctrine has constitutional force, and
that the U.S. Supreme Court would not allow states to abdicate the public trust entirely).
142. Wilkinson, supra note 30. For example, while the federal government held land in
trust for new states under the equal footing doctrine, it was up to each state to develop the
usufructuary and title rights associated with these lands according to each state’s view of
justice. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894).
143. Babcock, supra note 65, at 58 (citations omitted).
144. Charles Wilkinson, The Public Trust in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 278,
281 (1980–1981).
145. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980); see also United
States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981).
146. Id. at 39. The court did reference two potential distinctions: (1) state rights and
duties might be preempted by federal powers, and (2) states have additional duties under the
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Massachusetts found that the federal government implements its public
trust duties through Congress in its capacity as trustee.147 The court rea-
soned that, based on the dual sovereignty of state and federal governments,
the trust over the property “is administered jointly by the state and federal
governments,” and “neither sovereign may alienate this land free and clear
of the public trust.”148 Therefore, the court dictated the strongest language
considering the existence of a federal public trust doctrine, indicating that
as an aspect of sovereignty the only way for the federal government to not
have a public trust duty is “by the destruction of the sovereign.”149
More recently, courts have rejected the proposition that the federal
government has public trust powers and duties similar to states. First, in
PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, a case regarding a state’s claim to title
under the equal footing doctrine to riverbeds to which the federal govern-
ment also claimed title, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “the public
trust doctrine remains a matter of state law . . . . [T]he contours of that
public trust do not depend upon the Constitution.”150 In Alec L. v. Jackson, a
federal district court considered a claim that the federal government was
violating its fiduciary duty under the public trust doctrine by failing to take
action to mitigate climate change, thus damaging the atmosphere, which the
plaintiffs claimed was a public trust resource.151 The court denied the appli-
cation of the public trust doctrine to the federal government, relying on the
Supreme Court’s reasoning that the public trust doctrine is a matter of state
law that does not depend on the U.S. Constitution.152 Though the plaintiffs
argued that this was merely a dictum, the court rejected this claim and
found that even if it were not a holding, U.S. Supreme Court dicta are
generally treated as authoritative.153 Furthermore, the Alec L. court cited
language from a D.C. Circuit court case that also suggested that the public
trust doctrine was a creature of state law.154 The Alec L. court held that even
parens patria doctrine. Id. at 39–40. Other than these distinctions, the court concluded that
both governments had the same responsibilities under the public trust doctrine. Id.
147. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. at 123.
148. Id. at 124. The joint responsibility language insinuates that the federal government,
based on its public trust duty, must also protect the public interests in these lands.
149. Id.
150. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012).
151. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 12 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Alec L. ex
rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  The D.C. Circuit briefly af-
firmed the district court’s opinion on largely the same grounds, without providing much
further analysis.
152. Id. at 15 (citing PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1235).
153. Id.
154. Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Air Florida, 750 F.2d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir.
1984)). It should be noted that citing Air Florida is questionable since the D.C. Circuit
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if there was some type of federal public trust doctrine, it has since been
subsumed by the Clean Air Act, or other applicable federal regulations.155
There are still unresolved inconsistencies regarding the federal trust
obligations under the public trust doctrine described in the early case law
and the rejection of any federal responsibility in Alec L. The court in Alec L.
did not address any of the federal court opinions finding applications of the
public trust doctrine to the federal government due to the system of dual
sovereignty. Consequently, the reasoning in Alec L. remains in conflict with
the co-trusteeship theory found in earlier cases.
In sum, public trust theory has regarded a trustee’s duties and responsi-
bilities as an aspect of sovereignty, implying that the federal government
has public trust obligations as part of its sovereignty. Case law suggests that
at best, the federal government is a co-trustee of wildlife and water re-
sources and has an obligation to protect uniquely federal interests in these
resources. On the other hand, a cogent argument could be made that the
common law responsibilities of the federal government have been subsumed
by statutory law. In this Article, we assume that the federal government has
only basic public trust responsibilities that are shared with states and that
the federal trust protects only the most basic public interests in federal
water and wildlife resources.
IV. ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Electricity production, in all of its potential forms, has a myriad of
environmental impacts, including direct impacts to water ecosystems, wild-
life mortality, and climate change. Conventional electricity production (i.e.,
electricity produced from coal, nuclear, and natural gas) accounted for 86%
of the electricity generated in the United States in 2014.156 This Article
explicitly refrained from ruling on the application of the public trust doctrine to the federal
government: “We emphasize that we imply no opinion regarding . . . the applicability of the
public trust doctrine to the federal government.” Air Florida, 750 F.2d at 1084.
155. Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 17. However, this ignores other case law suggesting that
the public trust doctrine can never be subsumed, see Waiahole I, 9 P.3d 409, 442 (Haw.
2000), and scholarship examining the relationship between common law and statutory law,
see Hope Babcock, The Public Trust Doctrine: What a Tall Tale They Tell, 61 S.C. L. REV. 393,
405 (2009) (“One function of common law in a statutory legal regime is to fill gaps left in the
legal framework.”). Because the court refused to apply the public trust doctrine to the federal
government, it did not directly decide whether the atmosphere is a trust resource. However,
the court decided that the determinations of appropriate levels of atmospheric carbon diox-
ide “are best left to the federal agencies that are better equipped” than the courts to make
these determinations. Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 17.
156. Energy Info. Admin. (EIA), U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Net Generation from Electricity
Plants for All Sectors, Annual, ELECTRICITY DATA BROWSER, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/
browser (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (use the bottom right “Annual” button to retrieve annual
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restricts its discussion of renewable electricity to onshore and offshore wind
and solar photovoltaic.157 We chose these three because they are currently
among the most prevalent forms of renewable electricity production158 as
well as the focus of future large-scale renewable energy implementation.159
Conventional electricity poses a substantial threat to the environment,
which renewable electricity can mitigate. On the other hand, renewable
electricity has separate impacts to the environment as well, which put dif-
ferent environmental values in conflict.
A. Water Ecosystem Impacts
Conventional electricity generation’s first impact to the environment is
to water body quality and health. Since conventional electricity creates elec-
tricity by heating water and then passing steam through a turbine, cooling
data for electricity generation by sector) (reporting that in 2014, total generation was 4.093
billion megawatt hours, with 1.586 billion from coal, 1.112 billion from natural gas, and 0.797
billion from nuclear). As an aside, many of the same arguments in this Article can be made
regarding hydroelectric power. Though hydroelectric power was left out of this summary
since it contributes substantially less electricity than other conventional electricity sources,
see id. (providing data demonstrating that conventional hydroelectricity accounted for 6% of
2014 generation), hydroelectricity substantially impairs trust resources, especially fish and
large scale ecosystem modification, see Dan Tarlock, Hydro Law and the Future of Hydroelectric
Power Generation in the United States, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1723, 1735–45 (2012). The public trust
doctrine could be applied to hydroelectricity during Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) relicensing decisions. Id. at 1752, 1757.
157. In addition to these sources, another potential renewable electricity technology is
hydrokinetic energy, including wave, tidal and current electricity projects. Generally, these
projects would be placed on the seafloor, within state jurisdiction, and would have the poten-
tial to cause negative environmental impacts. Consequently, an application of the public trust
doctrine to hydrokinetic renewable electricity sources is appropriate. However, these tech-
nologies were not considered in this Article as they are not yet commercially viable and have
limited national maximum capacity. See Jeffrey Thaler & Patrick Lyons, The Seas Are Chang-
ing: It’s Time to Use Ocean-Based Renewable Energy, the Public Trust Doctrine, and a Green
Thumb to Protect Seas from Our Changing Climate, 19 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 241, 277 (2014)
(reporting that ocean hydrokinetic projects might achieve up to 80 to 90 GW of maximum
capacity); PETER ASMUS & CLINT WHEELOCK, PIKE RESEARCH, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: HYDROKI-
NETIC AND OCEAN ENERGY 2 (2012), http://www.navigantresearch.com/wp-assets/uploads/2012
/02/HYDRO-12-Executive-Summary.pdf (“To make an analogy to the wind industry,
[marine and hydokinetic power] is where wind was in the mid-1970s.”).
158. Onshore wind currently is the largest renewable electricity provider in the U.S.,
with 4.3% of overall 2015 electricity production, through August. See Energy Info. Admin.
(EIA), U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Net Generation from Electricity Plants for All Sectors, Monthly,
ELECTRICITY DATA BROWSER, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser (last visited Nov. 11,
2015) (calculated by adding together all generation values for “Wind” and “All fuels” from
January to August 2015, then converting to a percentage).
159. See, e.g., Cory Budischak et al., Cost-Minimized Combinations of Wind Power, Solar
Power and Electrochemical Storage, Power the Grid Up to 99.9% of the Time, 225 J. POWER
SOURCES 60 (2013).
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water is required to prevent extra heat from interfering with the plant’s
operations. Cooling water intake systems (CWIS) are used to implement
the required cooling and fall into two categories: open-cycle and closed-
cycle.160 Open-cycle CWIS withdraws significant amounts of water per kil-
owatt-hour (kWh),161 consumes a portion of that water, and returns the
remainder at a lower water quality, due to higher temperature, lower dis-
solved oxygen content, and presence of biocides such as chlorine.162 Closed-
cycle CWIS, the less common and more expensive technique, greatly
reduces these water-quality impacts but consumes greater quantities of
water.163  As of 2014, of the conventional power plants surveyed, 27% em-
ployed closed-cycle CWIS and 63% open-cycle CWIS.164
Conventional electricity also can impact water quality through cata-
strophic fuel spills.165 Additionally, water quality is also routinely degraded
during the other stages of the life cycle of conventional fuel. The life cycle
160. Olivia Odom Green, Energy v. Water, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 353, 358–59 (2010).
161. KRISTEN AYERT ET AL., UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, FRESHWATER USE BY U.S. POWER
PLANTS: ELECTRICITY’S THIRST FOR A PRECIOUS RESOURCE 13 (2011), http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/
default/files/attach/2014/08/ew3-freshwater-use-by-us-power-plants-exec-sum.pdf; see also
Regina McCormack & Lance Noel, Mitigation of Electricity Production Externalities Im-
posed on Water Resources and Fishing Industries in the Delaware River Estuary and Impli-
cations for Offshore Wind Energy Policy 13–14 (2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://
www.udel.edu/MAST/873/AP%20Proposals/Regina%20McCormack%20-AP%20Final%20Pa
per.pdf. Open-cycle CWIS can withdraw anywhere from 57 to 839 gallons per kWh. Id. at
14.
162. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOC. NO. 821-R-11-002, ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC
BENEFITS ANALYSIS FOR PROPOSED SECTION 316(B) EXISTING FACILITIES RULE 2–5 (2011). The EPA
details that CWIS can lead to hypoxia, decreasing distribution, growth rates, and nutrition
cycles of fish and macroinvertebrates. Id. In addition, “toxic pollutants, such as metals, poly-
cyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), pesticides, biofouling chemicals, or chlorine” are rou-
tinely found in CWIS effluents, which have “greatly altered biological communities due to
chronic impacts on viability, growth reproduction, and resistance to other stressors.” Id.
163. See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., CLOSED-CYCLE SYSTEM RETROFIT STUDY: CAPITAL AND
PERFORMANCE COST ESTIMATES 7–30 (2011) (“While once-through [CWIS] . . . withdraw large
quantities of water, they return all of the withdrawn water back to the source (or at least to
nearby natural waterbodies). A recirculated cooling system, while withdrawing far less water,
is designed to cool by evaporating . . . [up to] 50 to 80% of the intake flow . . . .”).  Reducing
water withdrawals will also decrease CWIS’s impacts to water quality by reducing dissolved
oxygen impacts and chlorine emissions. See Odom, supra note 160, at 371.
164. U.S. EVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 10, at 2A-15, 2A-16. It should be noted that this
analysis only focused on certain facilities, which represented less than half of the nation’s
electricity capacity and 9% of total facilities. Id. at 1-2 to 1-3. The overall CWIS mix of all
the nation’s conventional electricity plants may differ from the reported numbers. See JOAN
F. BARBER ET AL., U.S. DEP ’T OF INTERIOR, ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2005
38 (2005) (noting that of all power plants, 8% employed closed-cycle CWIS, and 93% used
open-cycle CWIS).
165. Laura Ruhl, et al., Environmental Impacts of Coal Ash Spill in Kingston Tennessee: An
18-Month Survey, 44 ENVTL. SCI. TECHNOL. 9272 (2010); see also J.D. Peles et al., Ecological
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impacts of coal, for example, include water quality degradation from acid
mine drainage166 and mountaintop mining.167 Uranium mining and milling
for nuclear power plants consumes a significant amount of water.168 Natural
gas extraction by hydraulic fracturing can contaminate local ground and sur-
face waters with unsafe levels of heavy metals such as arsenic, selenium,
strontium, and barium.169
In contrast, renewable electricity production has very limited impacts
on water. Other than the minimal water required to manufacture the steel,
silicon, and concrete used in wind turbines and solar panels, the lifecycle
water consumption is orders of magnitude less than for conventional fuel
sources.170 Thus, switching from conventional electricity sources to renewa-
ble electricity would significantly benefit water body health.
B. Wildlife Mortality
The wildlife impacts of electricity production are widespread and sub-
stantial, impacting fish and aquatic organisms as well as birds and bats. Both
conventional and renewable electricity have direct impacts on wildlife, in-
cluding fatalities from CWIS, collision mortality, and mercury bioaccumu-
lation. While comparisons of wildlife impacts across electricity types are
appropriate and necessary, the intrinsic inequality of weighing the death of
one species against the death of another species complicates such compari-
sons.  Differences in lifetime and reproduction rates imply that one fatality
can have different population impacts across various types of wildlife. Nev-
ertheless, the scientific literature attests that renewable energy is substan-
tially less detrimental to wildlife.
Half-Life of 137Cs in Fish from a Stream Contaminated by Nuclear Reactor Effluents, 263 SCI. TOTAL
ENV’T 255, 256 (2000).
166. D. Barrie Johnson & Kevin B. Halberg, Acid Mine Drainage Reduction Remediation
Options: A Review, 338 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 3 (2005), http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/circ1204/pdf/circu
lar1204.pdf.
167. KATHERINE PAYBINS ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER QUALITY IN THE KANAWHA-
NEW RIVER BASIN: WEST VIRGINIA, VIRGINIA, AND NORTH CAROLINA 1996–1998, at 21 (2005),
http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/circ1204/pdf/circular1204.pdf.
168. Gavin Mudd & Mark Diesendorf, Sustainability of Uranium Mining and Milling:
Toward Quantifying Resources and Eco-Efficiency, 42 ENVTL. SCI. TECHNOL. 2624, 2628 (2007).
These processes can consume 12,000 to 760,000 gallons per ton of usable uranium. Id. at
2628 tbl.1 (reporting water consumption ranging from 46.2 kL/ton to 8207 kL/ton for vari-
ous mining projects).
169. Brian E. Fontenot et al., An Evaluation of Water Quality in Private Drinking Water
Wells Near Natural Gas Extraction Sites in the Barnett Shale Formation, 47 ENVTL. SCI. TECHNOL.
10,032, 10,034–36 (2013).
170. Vasilis Fthenakis & Hyung Chul Kim, Life-Cycle Uses of Water in U.S. Electricity
Generation, 14 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 2039, 2045 (2010).
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The most direct impacts of conventional electricity production include
fatalities from the water cooling process and mercury bioaccumulation.
First, water withdrawals for CWIS operations cause the impingement and
entrainment (I&E) of aquatic organisms, with each power plant’s CWIS
killing at least hundreds of thousands of fish per gigawatt-hour (GWh).171
Due the lack of effective rulemaking by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA),172 I&E remains prevalent, and as one commentator has
noted, thermoelectric power plants and their CWIS “are the largest single
predator of our nation’s waters.”173
Second, conventional electricity production impacts birds, fish, and
other aquatic organisms through mercury emissions and bioaccumulation.
Of particular concern is the mercury bioaccumulation from coal generation,
which emits over half of all the mercury in the United States.174 In 2005,
the average freshwater fish had a mercury concentration of 0.23 μg/g ,175
and over 30% of the locations studied had fish tissue mercury concentra-
tions over the EPA advisory level for protection of human health of 0.30
μg/g .176 Fishery consumption advisories, 80% of which were issued due to
171. McCormack & Noel, supra note 161, at 14. Impingement refers to the mortality of
fish that are caught against the cooling water intake screen, whereas entrainment refers to
the mortality of fish and their eggs as a result of passing through the intake screen, often as a
result of exposure to extreme heat. Id. at 2.
172. See Green, supra note 160, at 367; see generally Cronin v. Browner, 898 F. Supp.
1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); ConocoPhillips v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 612 F.3d 822, 825 (5th
Cir. 2010) (suggesting that “effective rulemaking . . . has been elusive” with regard to I&E).
173. Green, supra note 160, at 368 (citation omitted). Furthermore, the current regula-
tion of I&E ignores non-commercial and non-recreational important species, essentially dis-
regarding 98.2% of fish species impacted. See id. at 369.
174. David Schmeltz et al., MercNet: A National Monitoring Network to Assess Responses to
Changing Mercury Emissions in the United States, 20 ECOTOXICOLOGY 1713, 1716 (2011) (sug-
gesting a national-scale monitoring program of mercury emissions). In the United States,
coal-fired power plants are currently the largest single source of mercury emissions. Id. at
1714; see also National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-
Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-
Fired Electricity Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Com-
mercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units (“MATS rule”), 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9359 (Feb.
16, 2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 60, 63) (determining that the rule requiring mercury
reductions only considered technology costs and health co-benefits, not impacts to wildlife).
But see MARC HOUYOUX & MADELEINE STRUM, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NO. EPA-HQ-OAR-
2009-0234, MEMORANDUM: EMISSIONS OVERVIEW: HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS IN SUPPORT OF THE
FINAL MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS STANDARD 13 (2011) (detailing the plans to reduce coal and oil
power plants’ portion of overall mercury emissions from 42% down to 17%).
175. Ann Chalmers et al., Mercury Trends in Fish from Rivers and Lakes in the United
States, 1969–2005, 175 ENVTL. MONITOR ASSESSMENT 175, 177 (2011).
176. Id. at 183.
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mercury contamination,177 limit humans’ use of natural resources by causing
people to eat other types of fish that are safe or forego eating fish at all.178
Various species of songbirds across the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast
have also been put at risk due to mercury,179 which has decreased popula-
tions by as much as 20%.180 Throughout the Northeast United States, mer-
cury bioaccumulation levels in songbirds “are high enough to cause
detrimental effects to populations.”181 Fish-eating birds are also substan-
tially impacted. Reproduction rates for the common loon, for example,
could decrease as much as 50% due to current mercury levels in fish,182 and
14 to 27% of bald eagles studied in the Great Lakes region are at risk of
neurological impairment due to mercury contamination in their diet.183
Likewise, a study of mercury in bats on the east coast of the United
States found that 81% of all adult bats sampled near point sources had un-
safe mercury levels.184 In addition, the five bat species that are listed, pend-
177. David C. Evers et al., Mercury in the Great Lakes Region: Bioaccumulation, Spatiotem-
poral Patterns, Ecological Risks and Policy, 20 ECOTOXICOLOGY 1487, 1489 (2011). Citing the EPA,
the authors find that these consumption advisories covered 16.8 million lake acres and 1.3
million river miles. Id.
178. See generally U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Mercury Levels in Commercial Fish and
Shellfish (1990–2010), FOOD (last updated Oct. 8, 2014) http://www.fda.gov/food/food-
borneillnesscontaminants/metals/ucm115644.htm (advising against any consumption of king
mackerel, sharks, swordfish, and tile fish due to their high mercury concentrations).
179. BIODIVERSITY RES. INST., MERCURY CONTAMINATION WITHIN TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS IN
NEW ENGLAND AND MID-ATLANTIC STATES: PROFILES OF SOIL, INVERTEBRATES, SONGBIRDS, AND BATS
29–57 (Jan. 27, 2012). These birds are impacted by mercury bioaccumulation as a result of
ingesting of mercury in their food. Id. at 29. Several species, such as the Rusty Blackbird,
have had populations decline by 90%. Mercury bioaccumulation is one of several reasons for
such a decline. Id. at 35–36.
180. Claire W. Varian-Ramos, Mercury Reduces Avian Reproductive Success and Imposes
Selection: An Experimental Study with Adult- or Lifetime-Exposure in Zebra Finch, 9 PLOS
ONE 1, 2 (2014). The authors conducted an experiment to determine the effects of different
mercury levels on songbirds and found that depending on the mercury concentration, zebra
finches, a model songbird, produced 16 to 50% less offspring than a control group, and in
reality the population impacts will be variable based on geographic location and species. Id.
at 4.
181. BIODIVERSITY RES. INST., supra note 179, at 11.
182. David Evers et al., Adverse Effects from Environmental Mercury Loads on Breeding
Common Loons, 17 ECOTOXICOLOGY 69, 70 (2007). However the authors concluded that only
sixteen percent of individual birds had mercury levels that posed threats, though this does
not include the possibility of mercury “hot spots” that could be causing populations sinks. Id.
at 78.
183. Jennifer Rutkiewicz et al., Mercury Exposure and Neurochemical Impacts in Bald Ea-
gles Across Several Great Lakes States, 20 ECOTOXICOLOGY 1669, 1674 (2011). The authors base
these percentages on other thresholds found in the literature but encourage further research
into thresholds specific to bald eagles. Id.
184. David Yates et al., Mercury in Bats from the Northeastern United States, 23 ECOTOX-
ICOLOGY 45, 53 (2014).
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ing, or under consideration as endangered under the Endangered Species
Act (ESA), all had elevated mercury concentrations, a potential cause for
concern.185 In comparison, the three bats impacted most by wind turbines186
are all listed as “Least Concern” in the International Union for Conserva-
tion of Nature’s (IUCN) Red List.187 Lastly, it should be noted that mer-
cury bioaccumulation can cause consequential, albeit non-lethal, impacts on
various other mammals, including river otters,188 beavers,189 and Florida
panthers.190
185. See id. Since there has been little historical research into the behaviors of bats, the
authors are careful to note that the many potential adverse impacts of mercury on bats, such
as limited reproduction success, decreased survival rates, and other neurological implications
need to be investigated further and validated in future research, though these would be the
expected impacts to physiologically similar species. Id.
186. Paul M. Cryan, Wind Turbines as Landscape Impediments to the Migratory Connectivity
of Bats, 41 ENVTL. L. 355, 364 (2011). These three species are the hoary bat, the eastern red
bat, and the silver haired bat. Id.
187. See Int’l Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Lasiurus cinereus, THE RED LIST
OF THREATENED SPECIES, http://www.iucnredlist.org/details/11345/0 (last visited Oct. 11, 2015)
(hoary bat); IUCN, Lasiurus borealis, THE RED LIST OF THREATENED SPECIES, http://www.iuc-
nredlist.org/details/11347/0 (last visited Oct. 11, 2015) (eastern red bat); IUCN, Lasionycteris
noctivagans, THE RED LIST OF THREATENED SPECIES, http://www.iucnredlist.org/details/11339/0
(last visited Oct. 11, 2015) (silver haired bat). On the other hand, the Indiana Bat, which is
widespread along the Midwest’s wind resources, can create obstacles to wind energy develop-
ment due to its endangered status, even though it is not often impacted by collision mortal-
ity, requiring wind developers to undertake mitigation or curtailment efforts. See Kirsten S.
Balzer, Bats and Breezes Take on Federal Policy: The Windy Effects of Animal Welfare Institute
v. Beech Ridge Energy LLC, 22 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 225 (2011).
188. William Stansley et al., Mercury and Halogenated Organic Contaminants in River Ot-
ters (Lontra Canadensis) in New Jersey, USA, 29 ENVTL. TOXICOLOGY & CHEMISTRY 2235,
2238–39 (2010); Jonathan M. Sleeman et al., Mercury Poisoning in a Free-Living Northern
River Otter (Lontra canadensis), 46 J. WILDLIFE DISEASES 1035 (2010) (finding the highest re-
corded mercury concentration in any land mammal, 150 μg/g, in the brain samples). But see
Peter Dornbos et al., Mercury Exposure and Neurochemical Biomarkers in Multiple Brain Regions
of Wisconsin River Otters (Lontra canadensis), 22 ECOTOXICOLOGY 469, 471, 473–74 (2013) (find-
ing that average mercury concentrations of river otter in the Wisconsin area are significantly
less than historical averages).
189. Brenda Gail Bergman & Joseph K. Bump, Mercury in Aquatic Forage of Large Herbi-
vores: Impact of Environmental Conditions, Assessment of Health Threats, and Implications for
Transfer Across Ecosystem Compartments, 479–80 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 66, 74 (2014). The authors
went on to criticize the EPA’s threshold for beavers, since the beavers studied had concentra-
tions well below the agency’s lethal level, but exceeded the EPA’s reference dose for humans,
which the authors suggested would cause neurological damage to the beavers such that it
would affect the senses “that the animals depend upon for survival.” Id.
190. J. Newman et al., Historical and Other Patterns of Monomethyl and Inorganic Mercury
in the Florida Panther (Puma concolor coryi), 48 ARCHIVE ENVTL. CONTAMINATION TOXICOLOGY 75,
79 (2004) (investigating Florida Panther samples from museum collections and finding much
higher concentrations of mercury after 1990 compared to before 1990). But see Marc G.
Barron et al., Retrospective and Current Risks of Mercury to Panthers in Florida Everglades, 13
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA104.txt unknown Seq: 30  4-JAN-16 9:52
198 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 5:1
The most significant wildlife impact of renewable electricity is collision
mortality,191 as birds and bats often collide with wind turbines and solar
towers.192 It was recently estimated that approximately 234,000 birds col-
lide with wind farms per year in the United States.193 However, the magni-
tude of these impacts is substantially less than that of other sources of
anthropogenic avian mortality,194 and there is evidence that wind energy
does not pose any population risks to bird species.195 Moreover, while it is
estimated that land-based and offshore wind turbines cause anywhere from
0.24 to 1.79 bird deaths per GWh of energy produced,196 in comparison,
ECOTOXICOLOGY 223, 227 (2004) (finding only a 4.6% chance that mercury concentrations are
high enough in any Florida Panther to cause death).
191. S.R. Loss et al., Estimates of Bird Collision Mortality at Wind Facilities in the Contigu-
ous United States, 168 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 201, 202 (2013). While less significant than
collision mortality, land transformations from renewable energy development can also im-
pact wildlife through habitat displacement and disruption. However, when including the
lifecycle impacts of conventional electricity (e.g., mining and transportation of fuel), the
magnitude of land transformation for renewable energy has been found to be approximately
equal to that of conventional energy development. See Vasilis Fthenakis & Hyung Chul Kim,
Land Use and Electricity Generation: A Life-Cycle Analysis, 13 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY
REV. 1465, 1469, 1466–68 (2009). However, the analysis presented in Fthenakis & Kim
includes the entire lifecycle of conventional electricity, and much of the land transformation
would occur beyond the individual states discussed in this Article. Id.
192. Other forms of solar power, such as rooftop photovoltaic do not pose significant
collision risks to wildlife. See Damon Turney & Vasilis Fthenakis, Environmental Impacts
From the Installation and Operation of Large-Scale Solar Power Plants, 15 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINA-
BLE ENERGY REV. 3261, 3265–66 (2011).
193. Loss et al., supra note 191, at 205.
194. See Meredith Blaydes Lilley & Jeremy Firestone, Wind Power, Wildlife, and the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act: A Way Forward, 38 ENVTL. L. 1167, 1172 (2008) (summarizing the
literature of anthropogenic avian mortality). For example, building collisions, motor vehicle
collisions, power line collisions, and domesticated cats each kill nearly 100 million birds each
year. Id. at 1172 tbl.1.
195. J. Ryan Zimmerling et al., Canadian Estimate of Bird Mortality due to Collisions and
Direct Habitat Loss Associated with Wind Turbine Developments, 8 AVIAN CONSERVATION & ECOL-
OGY 10, 15 (2013) (finding that Canadian wind farms killed less than 0.07 to 0.12% of any
bird species per year); see also M. Wing Goodale & Anita Milman, Cumulative Adverse Effects
of Offshore Wind Energy Development on Wildlife, J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. ONLINE 1, 8 (Nov.
14, 2014), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09640568.2014.973483 (noting the
lack of evidence that direct collision mortality and habitat loss or displacement caused by
offshore wind has impacted population levels of birds).
196. See Benjamin Sovacool, The Avian and Wildlife Costs of Fossil Fuels and Nuclear
Power, 9 J. INTEGRATIVE ENVTL. SCI. 255, 260 (2012) (estimating that wind power kills 0.26
birds per GWh per year); see also McCormack & Noel, supra note 161, at 18 (summarizing the
literature of bird mortality from European offshore wind farms). The higher estimate of 1.79
bird deaths per GWh was calculated using total bird deaths from Loss et al., supra note 191,
and EIA wind production figures, see EIA, supra note 156. Bird mortality per turbine varies
significantly depending on where the wind turbine was sited. Loss et al., supra note 191, at
204 tbl.2.
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coal kills an estimated 0.2 to 9.36 birds per GWh and nuclear plants kill an
estimated 0.638 birds per GWh.197
Bat impacts of renewable power generation are less understood, espe-
cially as the details of bat migration and behavior remain almost entirely
unknown.198 Approximately 600,000 bats were killed nationwide by wind
turbines in 2012, equating to approximately 3.5 bats killed per GWh.199
Mitigation measures could, at relatively low cost, decrease such fatalities
anywhere from forty to ninety percent.200
While onshore wind and solar have no known impacts on aquatic life,
offshore wind can have moderate to minor effects on fish behavior during
construction.201 Most substantially, the noise from construction can cause
either temporary or permanent hearing damage to marine mammals.202
Nevertheless, with proper mitigation efforts, it is expected that noise im-
pacts can be reduced to levels below thresholds that would cause even tem-
porary hearing damage.203
197. Sovacool, supra note 196, at 261. Professor Sovacool’s higher estimate for coal con-
siders the impacts of climate change on bird populations. Id. at 258–59 tbl.2. It is important
to note that climate change is the most serious threat to bird populations, but the numbers
Sovacool calculates for climate change-related deaths are highly speculative. Sovacool also
attributes the bird deaths due to climate change, 9.16 deaths per GWh, to natural gas and oil
as well. Id. at 261.
198. Cryan, supra note 186, at 360.
199. Mark A. Hayes, Bats Killed in Large Numbers at United States Wind Energy Facilities,
63 BIOSCIENCE 975, 977 (2013). Like avian mortality, the magnitude of bat collisions varies
significantly with geography, with the highest death rates occurring in the Appalachian re-
gion. Cf. Manuela M.P. Huso & Dan Dalthorp, A Comment on “Bats Killed in Large Numbers
at United States Wind Energy Facilities”, 64 BIOSCIENCES 546, 547 (2014) (criticizing the meth-
odology utilized in Hayes, supra, as not statistically representing the seasonal variation of the
impacts or current wind farm practices and concluding that “[g]iven the shortcomings of the
available data, an accurate estimate of total bat fatality is not currently possible”).
200. Cryan, supra note 186, at 369. However, Cryan notes that there is no legal mecha-
nism to require such curtailment methods. Id. at 368–69.
201. CHRISTINA MEULLER-BLENKLE ET AL., COWRIE, REF: FISH 06-08, EFFECTS OF PILE-DRIV-
ING NOISE ON THE BEHAVIOR OF MARINE FISH (2010). It should also be noted that offshore wind
construction also poses potential threats to sea turtles, but such threats have not been studied
as extensively as fish or marine mammals. Goodale & Milman, supra note 195, at 5.
202. See SVEN KOSCHINSKI & KARIN LU¨DEMANN, DEVELOPMENT OF NOISE MITIGATION MEA-
SURES IN OFFSHORE WIND FARM CONSTRUCTION 2013, at 89 (2013) (discussing ways to mitigate
noise impacts to avoid hearing damage in marine mammals).
203. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., (NOAA), DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING
THE EFFECTS OF ANTHROPOGENIC SOUND ON MARINE MAMMALS: ACOUSTIC THRESHOLD LEVELS FOR
ONSET OF PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY THRESHOLD SHIFTS 17, 20 (2013). According to this report,
assuming proper mitigation, as discussed in KOSCHINSKI & LU¨DEMANN, supra note 202, at
15–23, 30–37, offshore wind construction can avoid Level B harassment, the temporary hear-
ing damage threshold, under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1362 (18)(A)(i)–(ii)  (2013) (defining “harassment”); see also KOSCHINSKI & LU¨DEMANN,
supra note 202, at 89.
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Offshore wind also provides a potential artificial reef effect while farms
are in operation.204 While the actual benefits of artificial reefs are far from
certain,205 many studies have concluded that there is some evidence of a
local artificial reef effect.206 As offshore wind development continues and
the artificial reef effect matures, offshore wind farms “may provide long-
term benefits by enhancing local ecosystem services.”207
C. Climate Change
Perhaps the most significant impact of conventional electricity produc-
tion is its contribution to global climate change, a threat which can be
largely mitigated by transitioning to renewable energy. Recent surveys of
global wildlife populations suggest a dire situation, as populations are al-
ready rapidly decreasing and extinction rates are significantly higher than
historical averages.208 While there are other causes of wildlife population
decline and extinction, it is expected that climate change will become the
most important driver of both extinction rates and population decline.209
Climate change will have far-reaching impacts on the environment and will
impair wildlife populations in various ways, creating new problems and ex-
acerbating existing problems for terrestrial wildlife.210 Likewise, climate
204. Olivia Langhammer, Artificial Reef Effect in Relation to Offshore Renewable Energy
Conversion: State of the Art, 2012 SCI. WORLD J. 1, 4 (finding that offshore wind can create a
net of 650–677 square meters of new habitat per turbine). Purposefully designed artificial
reefs in scour protection could result in a tripling to quadrupling of net habitat and expected
biomass created. Id. at 4 tbl.1.
205. See H.J. Lindeboom et al., Short Term Ecological Effects of an Offshore Wind Farm in
the Dutch Coastal Zone; a Compilation, 6 ENVTL. RES. LETTER 1, 11 (2011).
206. Mathias H. Andersson & Marcus C. O¨hman, Fish and Sessile Assemblages Associated
with Wind-Turbine Constructions in the Baltic Sea, 61 MARINE & FRESHWATER RES. 642, 648
(2010); see also MUSEUM, ROYAL BELGIAN INST. OF NAT. SCIENCES, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF
OFFSHORE WIND FARMS IN THE BELGIAN PART OF THE NORTH SEA 161 (Steven Degrear et al. eds.,
2013), http://odnature.naturalsciences.be/winmonbe2013/report; J.T. Reubens et al., The
Ecology of Benthopelagic Fishes at Offshore Wind Farms: A Synthesis of 4 Years of Research, 727
HYDROBIOLOGIA 121, 130 (2014). Ruebens et al. could not conclude that there was production
of fish on a regional scale and suggested against allowing commercial fishing within the wind
farm. Id. at 133. In addition, the main benefit to fish in the wind farm area may be due to the
prohibition of commercial fishing activities rather than the artificial reef effect. Id. at 130.
207. Lena Bergstro¨mm et al., Effects of an Offshore Wind Farm on Temporal and Spatial
Patterns in the Demersal Community, 485 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 199, 208 (2013).
208. See generally Richard Dirzo et al., Defaunation in the Anthropocene, 345 SCI. 401
(2014).
209. Id. at 403; see also Ce´line Bellard et al., Impacts of Climate Change on the Future of
Biodiversity, 15 ECOLOGY LETTERS 365 (2012).
210. See, e.g., Catheryn H. Greenberg et al., Climate Change and Wildlife in the Southern
United States: Potential Effects and Management Options, in CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTION AND
MITIGATION MANAGEMENT OPTIONS: A GUIDE FOR NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGERS IN SOUTHERN
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change will also impact ocean systems: increasing water temperatures will
cause significant declines in cold water fish, and increasing water acidity
will decrease coral and invertebrate productivity in North America.211
While the wildlife impacts of climate change are highly uncertain and
dependent on the magnitude of increased temperatures, some estimates pre-
dict that from one to eighty percent of all global species may go extinct,
with an average extinction estimate between twenty and thirty percent.212
Combined with other wildlife impacts, worst-case scenarios lead to “extinc-
tion rates that would qualify as the sixth mass extinction in the history of
the earth.”213 Climate change, if not mitigated, obviously poses substantial
population threats to all species.
Additionally, climate change will also impair the availability and quality
of water resources. Surface freshwater resources, such as lakes and rivers,
will be dramatically diminished as temperatures increase and overall precip-
itation decreases, causing water level drops and reductions in stream flows
and limiting overall availability of water resources.214 As precipitation and
temperatures become more extreme, increases in dissolved organic carbon
are expected to impact freshwater quality, causing higher acidity, greater
toxicity, and lower dissolved oxygen levels.215 Furthermore, as climate
change causes sea levels to rise, groundwater resources may be impacted
through saltwater intrusion.216
FOREST ECOSYSTEMS 390 (James M. Vose & Kier D. Klepzig eds., 2014) (noting that a 2 degree
Celsius increase would result in the almost complete loss of shorebirds in Texas by 2100); see
also id. at 399–411 (providing various case studies on how climate change will reduce the
range and populations of small mammals, birds, and amphibians in the Southern United
States).
211. Working Grp. II, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Part B: Regional
Aspects, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 1443, 1459 (V.R.
Barros et al. eds., 2014).
212. WORKING GRP. II, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 242 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 2007) (reviewing 78
articles, each with variable extinction estimates); see also S.L. Pimm et al., The Biodiversity of
Species and Their Rates of Extinction, Distribution, and Protection, 344 SCI. 1,246,752-1,
1,246,752-5 (2014) (estimating a loss of 10 to 14% of species, but citing high uncertainty).
213. Bellard et al., supra note 209, at 375.
214. Noah D. Hall & Brett B. Stuntz, Climate Change and Great Lakes Water Resources:
Avoiding Future Conflicts with Conservation, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 639, 647–51 (2008); see also
Working Grp. II, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Part A: Global and Sectoral
Aspects, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 361–411 (C.B. Field
et al. eds., 2014).
215. P.G. Whitehead et al., A Review of the Potential Impacts of Climate Change on Surface
Water Quality, 54 HYDROLOGICAL SCI. J. 101, 101 (2009).
216. Holly A. Michael et al., Global Assessment of Vulnerability to Sea-Level Rise in Topog-
raphy-Limited and Recharge-Limited Coastal Groundwater Systems, 49 WATER RESOURCES RES.,
2228, 2228 (2013).
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D. Environmental Impacts Synthesis
In conclusion, the environmental impacts of electricity production are
diverse and complex. Renewable energy is not without its impacts and can
place differing environmental values in conflict with each other, such as the
protection of migrating birds and the mitigation of climate change. Never-
theless, the scientific literature attests that renewable energy is substantially
less detrimental to wildlife, water resources, and the general environment in
comparison to conventional energy. Given its displacement of conventional
electricity, renewable energy has the potential to reduce the various wildlife
and other environmental impacts caused by conventional energy. Because
wildlife impacts are complex and nuanced, laws and regulations on the issue
should likewise be nuanced and flexible, while also being comprehensive.
Although current wildlife laws governing electricity production at times
provide stringent rules, they typically only focus on a single issue and do
not weave the negative impacts and benefits together. As such, current envi-
ronmental laws fail to provide adequate protection from the impacts of elec-
tricity production in their full context. It is here that the public trust
doctrine can provide a more flexible and comprehensive approach that prop-
erly protects all wildlife and water resources and encourages the develop-
ment of renewable electricity. In the case studies below, we demonstrate
that the public trust doctrine is an effective means to regulate the wildlife
and environmental impacts of electricity production.
V. STATE CASE STUDIES
This Part analyzes four individual states to demonstrate the potential
application of the public trust doctrine to protect natural resources and en-
courage renewable energy development. As discussed above, the contours of
the public trust doctrine differ across states. Likewise, each state has a dis-
parate energy mix, regulatory framework, and approach to renewable energy
development. Nonetheless, as shown above, it is clear that the application of
the public trust doctrine to the impacts of electricity production is an ap-
propriate and helpful tool for advancing renewable energy development.
This Part explores the application of the public trust doctrine to electricity
production in California, Wisconsin, Hawaii, and New Jersey. These four
states were selected because each has a well-developed, distinct public trust
doctrine; each relies on a distinct fuel mix for electricity generation; and
each has divergent renewable electricity policies.
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A. California
1. Current Electricity System
California’s largest single source of electricity is natural gas, accounting
for 60% of annual in-state generation.217After natural gas, renewable elec-
tricity sources, including land-based wind, geothermal, and solar, are collec-
tively the second most abundant source of generation, comprising 20% of
total generation.218 The remaining 20% is produced by hydroelectric and
nuclear power plants.219 California generates less than 1% of its in-state gen-
eration from coal.220
2. Public Trust Doctrine in California
Since statehood, California courts have continually faced public trust
doctrine issues. The California Supreme Court first held that alienation of
lands under navigable waters is subject to the state’s paramount authority221
and that the state is required to act as trustee “for the benefit of the peo-
ple.”222 Likewise, early California case law acknowledged the state’s author-
ity to protect and preserve wildlife for the public good.223 Furthermore, the
217. Cal. Energy Comm’n, Total Electricity System Power, ENERGY ALMANAC (Sept. 25
2014), http://energyalmanac.ca.gov/electricity/total_system_power.html. It should be noted
that California imports nearly a third of the electricity consumed within the state, from both
conventional and renewable electricity sources. Id. However since it is generated outside of
the state, we assume that this generation would fall outside the jurisdiction of the California
public trust doctrine. However, there could be public trust implications when deciding to
import electricity, such as relying on climate change-inducing fuels, which will in turn im-
pact California trust resources.
218. Id.
219. Id. While this Article does not focus on hydroelectricity, the public trust doctrine
can be readily applied to California’s hydroelectric system and its substantial environmental
impacts on water and fish resources. See Tarlock, supra note 156; see also Sarah E. Null et al.,
Optimizing the Dammed: Water Supply Losses and Fish Habitat Gains from Dam Removal in
California, 136 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 121, 127 (2014) (removal of certain dams would present
considerable fish habitat gains for Chinook salmon and steelhead trout, with only small
reductions of water deliveries and hydroelectric generation).
220. Cal. Energy Comm’n, supra note 217.
221. Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 365, 372 (1867).
222. People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152, 1159 (Cal. 1884).
223. See Ex parte Maier, 37 P. 402, 404 (Cal. 1894) (wildlife belongs to the people of the
state in their collective and sovereign capacity). But see People v. Brady, 286 Cal. Rptr. 19,
22 (Ct. App. 1991) (state does not truly “own” wildlife such that an illegal take of fish
equates to grand theft); Moerman v. State, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 332–33 (Ct. App. 1993)
(California does not truly own nor control wildlife, thus damages resulting from wildlife
restoration cannot constitute a taking).
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public’s right to wildlife is not tied to the navigability of waters and extends
to all wildlife, on both public and private property.224
Despite setting out the paramount authorities of the state and recogniz-
ing the public’s right in trust resources in early cases, the state of California
did not shy away from utilizing the state’s trust resources so long as their
use benefitted the general public. California courts have found that various
non-environmental uses are consistent with the public interest. For exam-
ple, drilling for oil is a valid use of trust waters because such use furthers
the public’s interest in commerce.225 The California Supreme Court views
the public trust doctrine as a way to maximize benefits to the state, constru-
ing the purpose of the trust “with liberality to the end of benefitting all the
people of the state.”226 The court has emphasized that the state, when deter-
mining the best means to serve the general welfare through the utilization
of navigable waters, must be cognizant of the changes in the public interest
as society modernizes and scientific knowledge develops.227
In addition to the common law public trust doctrine, California has
recognized trust duties in its constitution and statues. The California Con-
stitution states that water must be used for a beneficial purpose to the ful-
lest extent possible and must not be wasted or used in an unreasonable
way.228 Likewise, state ownership of tidal lands below the high water mark
has been codified,229 as has the state’s trust responsibility to wildlife.230
Early adoption of an expansive and liberal public trust doctrine, includ-
ing the codification of public trust concepts in statutes and the state consti-
tution, has laid the foundation for further expansion of the doctrine in
California as a tool for environmental protection. California, recognizing
that the public trust doctrine is “sufficiently flexible to encompass changing
224. See People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374, 401 (Cal. 1897).
225. See Boone v. Kinsbury, 273 P. 797, 812 (Cal. 1928). The Court, before ruling on
the validity of deeming oil production as a trust value, assumed that oil-drilling operations
would not seriously injure or destroy fish and aquatic wildlife. Id. at 816. Therefore, had the
court found that there was substantial or unnecessary damage to fish or aquatic wildlife, it
may have considered oil drilling to be an invalid use of public trust lands.
226. Colberg v. California, 432 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1967) (reviewing previous public trust
cases that had included using trust waters to build railroads, develop oil and gas interests,
and reclaim land impacted by recent flooding, before holding that building a bridge over
navigable waters was an acceptable use within the public interest).
227. Id. at 12.
228. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (“It is hereby declared that . . . the water resources of the
State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the
waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that the
conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial
use thereof in the interest of the people and for the public welfare.”).
229. CAL. CIV. CODE § 670 (West 2007).
230. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 711.7 (West 2013).
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public needs,”231 became among the first states to explicitly protect ecologi-
cal processes for the benefit of the public.232 Moreover, courts have deter-
mined that recreational and ecological public rights are paramount to
privately-held riparian rights,233 requiring the state to affirmatively protect
these interests to the maximum extent possible.234
Although the state’s declarations of ecological values have been exclu-
sively connected to navigable waters, courts have also protected navigable
waters when they are affected by the diversion of water from non-navigable
tributaries.235 Likewise, cognizant of the impacts that are peripherally, but
indisputably, connected to navigable waters, courts have forbidden the dis-
charge of debris in non-navigable streams under the public trust doctrine
because of the risk that such debris would travel downstream and obstruct
navigable waters.236 On the other hand, courts have refrained from applying
the public trust doctrine in cases where there is an insufficient nexus to
navigable waters.237 In a recent case regarding the impact of groundwater
diversions on navigable waters, the court was careful to ground its applica-
tion of the public trust doctrine to navigable waters.238 The court clarified
that it did not find that “groundwater itself is a resource protected by the
public trust doctrine,”239 but rather, only the navigable water impacted by
the diversions was so protected.240 Thus, the California public trust doc-
trine does not apply to all waters of the state; rather, it applies to navigable
waters or waters that are sufficiently related to navigable waters.241
231. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).
232. Id. (holding that the public trust doctrine includes preservation of tidelands as
“ecological units for scientific study”).
233. California v. Superior Court, 625 P.2d 239, 251 (Cal. 1981) (“[T]he public’s rights
are not confined to commerce, navigation, and fishing, but include recreational uses and the
right to preserve the tidelands in their natural state.”). On the other hand, the court also
ruled that the public trust doctrine no longer burdens lands that have long since been re-
claimed, but only the tidal portions thereof. See City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606
P.2d 362, 374 (Cal. 1983).
234. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).
235. See generally id. at 720–21.
236. See, e.g., People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152, 1155–56 (Cal. 1884).
237. Golden Feather Cmty. Ass’n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Ct.
App. 1989). While the Court refuted the public trust claim, it was sure to note that when
there is a public interest, “the state has broad powers to protect those interests, even where
otherwise nonpublic trust properties are affected.” Id. at 843.
238. Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. 34-2010-80000583, 2014
WL 8843074, at *8 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 15, 2014).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 9.
241. The courts have not addressed what constitutes a sufficient nexus to navigable
water. However, the essence of the public trust doctrine is public access to waters for naviga-
tion and fisheries. Thus, the criteria for determining this sufficient nexus would likely be
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On the other hand, the wildlife trust is not qualified: any impact to
wildlife, direct or indirect, merits consideration under the public trust doc-
trine. In a recent case regarding the wildlife impacts of land-based wind
energy, the California Court of Appeals clarified that the public trust doc-
trine encompasses the protection and preservation of wildlife regardless of
its relation to submerged lands.242 In dicta, without ruling on the adequacy
of the state agency’s efforts, the court found that the state agency had not
ignored the highly complex and value-laden aspects of wind turbines, spe-
cifically the impacts to birdlife.243 While it was clear that the agency had
performed the basic duties of planning trust resources, the court left it to
further proceedings to determine whether the agency adequately minimized
harm to wildlife resources, as required by the public trust doctrine.244
In this first public trust application to the wildlife impacts of electricity
production in California, the court was mindful to weigh the common law
and statutory wildlife trust interests, while noting the “strong public inter-
est in allowing for the development through the harnessing of wind
power.”245 One commentator argues that this litigation increased knowledge
of avian mortality and that improved wind turbine technology “may lead to
greater protection of the birds while still allowing wind energy to develop
into a significant source of power for the future.”246 Yet despite the public
trust application to wind energy and the learning opportunities gained, the
wildlife public trust doctrine has yet to be applied to conventional electric-
ity production, even though those impacts are more substantial.247 In sum,
there is a stark absence of comparison between electricity production
tied to how the non-navigable waters would affect the navigation of and the fisheries in
navigable waters. See Golden Feather, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
242. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. FPL Grp., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 599 (Ct. App.
2008).
243. Id. at 606–07. Despite this important declaration of the public trust application to
wildlife, the court dismissed the case, ruling that the plaintiff had sued the wrong party and
should have sued the state trustee instead of the private operator of the wind farm. Id. at
602.
244. Id. at 606–07. Though it would depend on the specific definition of feasible, it
would appear that repowering the site with newer models of turbines would be a cost-effec-
tive mitigation policy since they would increase electricity production, and thus revenue,
while simultaneously decreasing avian mortality given slower rotational speeds. Id. at 592; see
also Kathryn Wiens, Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc.: Encouraging
Wind Energy Production While Protecting the Public Trust, 32 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 389,
391 (2008–2009) (saying the FPL Group’s reliance on older turbines killed an unnecessarily
high amount of birds for the same energy as compared to newer designs of turbines).
245. Wiens, supra note 244, at 393.
246. Id. at 394.
247. See supra Sections IV.B–C.
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sources and the state’s duty to plan and protect public trust resources to the
maximum extent possible.
3. Overview of Current California Electricity Laws
California has developed a comprehensive electricity policy framework
that promotes development of renewable energy and attempts to mitigate
the impacts of conventional electricity. First, California is required by state
law to conduct a periodic assessment of the energy industry.248 Using these
assessments, the state must establish energy policies that protect the envi-
ronment,249 which includes developing and promoting renewable energy
generation and climate change mitigation technologies.250 Yet none of these
statutes, which are some of the most progressive nationwide, connect the
state’s public trust responsibilities to electricity production.
California, like many states, has a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS)
that requires a certain amount of electricity to come from renewable energy
sources.251 As of 2013, 20% of all electricity sold in California must be gen-
erated by renewable sources.252 By 2020, 33% of all electricity sales must be
renewable.253 The definition of renewable encompasses many technologies,
including “biomass, solar thermal, photovoltaic, wind, geothermal, fuel cells
using renewable fuels, small hydroelectric generation of 30 megawatts or
less, digester gas, municipal solid waste conversion, landfill gas, ocean wave,
ocean thermal, or tidal currents, and any additions or enhancements to the
facility using that technology.”254 These represent technologies that have
renewable sources of fuel but do not necessarily minimize damages to pub-
lic trust resources,255 and California law does not currently connect the
objectives of renewable electricity implementation to the state’s public trust
duties.
California has implemented progressive environmental programs to re-
duce the state’s carbon footprint and increase energy efficiency. The most
significant California renewable energy law is Assembly Bill 32, the Global
Warming Solutions Act (AB 32).256 AB 32 aims to reduce GHG emissions
248. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25,301(a) (West 2007).
249. Id.; see also id. § 25,303(b) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
250. Id. § 25,305(a)–(d) (West 2007).
251. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.15(b)(2)(B) (West 2004 & Supp. 2015).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25,741(a)(1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
255. For example, hydroelectric plants obviously have impacts to local water resources,
though they reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Tarlock, supra note 156, at 1735–38.
256. California Global Warming Solutions Act (A.B. 32), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 38,500–38,599 (West 2014).
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to 1990 levels by 2020 and 80% below 1990 levels by 2050.257 The Act gives
the California Air Resources Board (CARB) broad authority to implement
reductions of GHG emissions from all sectors, but especially electricity
production.258
Since AB 32’s enactment in 2006, CARB has implemented several new
policies to reduce the electricity sector’s contribution to climate change, in-
cluding a cap-and-trade program and the Million Solar Roofs Program, and
incorporated existing renewable energy policies such as the RPS.259 In
brief, the cap-and-trade program allocates a certain amount of GHG al-
lowances to the electricity production sector.260 Participants in the sector
then must reduce their emissions or purchase additional GHG allowances at
quarterly auctions.261 CARB has updated the scoping plan, but the policies
remain largely unchanged, with recent focus on mitigation plans beyond
2020.262
As a result of these regulations, California has significantly incentivized
renewable energy to meet the ambitious emission target of 80% below 1990
GHG levels by 2050.263 Since 2010, California has added 8.3 GW of renew-
able generation capacity in order to comply with these regulations,264 but
the electricity sector still faces a considerable GHG reduction target for
2020.265 Moreover, from 2020 until 2050, the annual GHG reduction will
be five times the current annual rate, with fewer allowances.266
Despite California’s leadership in climate change mitigation, considera-
tion of wildlife is noticeably absent in California’s renewable energy poli-
cies. Unlike the state’s response to climate change, California’s rules on
CWIS only meet the minimum, but do not exceed, federal requirements
under section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act (CWA).267 Despite the poten-
257. Id. § 38,550 (West 2014).
258. Id. §§ 38,560, 38,560.5, 38,562 (West 2014).
259. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN 30–53 (2008). However, many of
these efforts are rightly not related to electricity, including focuses on transportation and
agriculture.
260. See id. at 30.
261. Id.
262. CAL. AIR RES. BD., FIRST UPDATE TO THE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN 93–100 (2014).
263. See generally Michael Hanemann, California’s New Greenhouse Gas Laws, 2 REV.
ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 114 (2008) (summarizing and describing the history and implications
of AB 32).
264. CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 262, at 40. Of the 8.3 GW installed, large-scale
centralized renewable energy projects account for 3.9 GW and distributed renewable energy
projects account for the remaining 4.4. GW. Id.
265. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95,481 (2015).
266. CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 262, at 33.
267. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 2922 (2015) (establishing rules that implement best
technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact, as required by the federal
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tial co-benefits of integrating aggressive climate change policies with wild-
life protection required under the public trust doctrine, these two remain
disconnected in California law.
In conclusion, California is undeniably a leader in renewable energy
and climate change mitigation policy, actively promoting and implementing
renewable energy for the betterment of the environment. However, energy
policies remain unconnected to the state’s robust public trust doctrine.
Thus, California is derogating its affirmative duty to consider and minimize
all potential impacts to public trust resources.
4. Applications of the Public Trust Doctrine in California
There are two potential applications of the public trust doctrine to cur-
rent California energy policy: (1) utilizing the duties under the public trust
to defend against legal challenges of California’s renewable energy efforts,
and (2) expanding the scope of renewable energy laws to further protect
wildlife and encourage more development of renewable electricity.
California’s substantial efforts to mitigate climate change have not been
without their controversies and criticisms. California’s seminal climate
change law, AB 32, has been challenged by both industry and environmental
groups.268 The public trust doctrine can be used to navigate and help re-
solve these issues.
a. Using the Public Trust Doctrine to Defend
Environmental Initiatives Already Underway
First, California could use the public trust doctrine to defend against
in-state challenges to its cap-and-trade program. Currently, ninety percent
of electricity emissions allowances are given away by the state for free,269
suggesting that electricity production has not been burdened by these regu-
lations. However, the electricity sector will face more stringent GHG re-
ductions as CARB continues to enact regulations in accordance with their
ambitious goal of eighty percent reduction below 1990 levels. These more
stringent regulations may generate additional political and legal challenges
from in-state electricity producers.
Clean Water Act § 316(b)); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (2013) (establishing the best tech-
nology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact standard). By not enacting
more stringent rules on CWIS, fish and other aquatic wildlife will continue to be impacted.
See supra notes 161–63 and associated text.
268. See, e.g., Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65 (Ct.
App. 2012); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2014).
269. Steven Ferrey, Courts Cap the “Trade”: Regulation of Competitive Markets When Courts
Overturn State and Federal Cap-and-Trade Regulation, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 691, 708 (2014).
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If CARB connects the dots between climate change and the public trust
doctrine, it could defend against most challenges posed to climate change
regulation by relying on the state’s duty to protect trust resources whenever
feasible.270 Since climate change undoubtedly negatively impacts trust re-
sources, the public trust doctrine further authorizes—indeed mandates—
CARB to take action to mitigate these impacts to the extent feasible. Thus,
if faced with legal challenges, CARB could utilize the public trust doctrine
to validate its further implementation of the statutory requirements of AB
32.
b. Using the Public Trust Doctrine to Incentivize Future
Renewable Energy Development
Going a step further, the public trust doctrine offers a tool for citizens
to incentivize renewable energy development. Citizen groups have brought
several legal challenges against CARB regarding AB 32 implementation.
First, in Association of Irritated Residents v. California Air Resources Board, an
environmental justice citizen group argued that CARB’s scoping plan did
not achieve the maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective reduc-
tion of carbon emissions and that the plan unfairly burdened already
overburdened communities.271 Despite the potential for further reductions
and the inequalities of the plan, the California Superior Court ruled that
CARB was well within the bounds of reason when developing the plans and
rejected the citizen group’s claim.272
Similarly, in Citizens Climate Lobby v. California Air Resources Board, an-
other citizen group sued CARB seeking to invalidate the proposed use of
carbon offset credits.273 The plaintiffs questioned whether these offsets pro-
vided emissions reductions beyond what would otherwise have occurred.274
Again, the California Superior Court denied the citizen group’s claim, find-
ing that the standards set forth by CARB were reasonable and within the
authority granted to it by legislation.275 In both of these cases, citizen
270. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).
271. Ass’n of Irritated Residents, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 70–71. Specifically, the plaintiffs, Asso-
ciation of Irritated Residents, argued that CARB failed to decrease health impacts to low-
income communities. Id. at 79–80.
272. Id. at 81.
273. Citizens Climate Lobby v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., CGC-12-519554, 2013 WL 861396
(Cal. Super. Jan. 25, 2013). An offset credit is a tradable instrument representing a reduction
of GHG emissions from an uncapped source that is purchased by a capped source in order to
meet the cap requirement in California’s cap-and-trade program. This allows a capped source
to purchase a reduction in GHG emissions from a third party rather than reduce their own
emissions.
274. Id. at *7.
275. Id. at *33.
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groups sought to force CARB to implement further, more tangible environ-
mental protections that would arguably have been justified or compelled by
the public trust doctrine, if that issue had been raised.
While the goals of AB 32 are lofty, the actual bill is quite brief and
gives CARB wide-ranging discretion to implement climate change emis-
sions reductions,276 resulting judicial deference to the expertise of CARB.277
As a result, without the public trust doctrine in their quiver, these decisions
reveal that environmentalists may have little recourse to challenge CARB’s
decisions in front of the judiciary.278 Given that California courts have fre-
quently deferred to CARB, one can see “why environmental justice advo-
cates feel aggrieved.”279
Instead of challenging the administrative reasonableness of AB 32’s im-
plementation, environmental citizen groups may find more success utilizing
the principles of the public trust doctrine. Though California courts have
previously recognized public health as a protected resource in public trust
doctrine decisions,280 citizen groups may be able to gain additional, and
potentially better, recourse by arguing that climate change threatens recrea-
tional and environmental resources that are held in trust by California for
its citizens to enjoy.
If successful, this litigation could have the co-benefit of reducing health
effects of conventional generation and ensuring further climate change miti-
gation. For example, citizen groups could utilize the public trust doctrine to
challenge a peripheral, though connected issue: open-cycle CWIS. In Cali-
fornia, 16.5% of 2014 generation occurred in plants employing open-cycle
CWIS.281 These are usually among the oldest, most-polluting, and least-
276. Ann E. Carlson, Regulatory Capacity and State Environmental Leadership: California’s
Climate Policy, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. LAW REV. 63, 68 (2013).
277. See, e.g., Ass’n of Irritated Residents, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 72; Citizens Climate Lobby,
2013 WL 861396, at *22–23; Penni Takade, Association of Irritated Residents v. California
Air Resources Board: Climate Change and Environmental Justice, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 573, 581
(2013).
278. Takade, supra note 277, at 581–82 (concluding that environmentalists in Ass’n of
Irritated Residents were unlikely to have the court find a violation against CARB, noting the
lawsuit was an “uphill battle from the state”).
279. Id. at 582.
280. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 716 (Cal. 1983)
(recognizing the impact to human health from airborne silt matter from dry riverbeds while
also recognizing the air as a traditional trust resource).
281. The authors calculated this percentage by determining the generation for individual
plants that utilize open-cycle CWIS. Water Res. Control Bd., Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Thermal Discharges - Cooling Water Intake Structures, OCEAN STANDARDS – CWA § 316(B) REGU-
LATION (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/ocean/cwa
316/powerplants/ (listing plants that utilize open-cycle CWIS); U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, EN-
ERGY INFO. ADMIN., 2014: FORM EIA-923 (2014), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia923/
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efficient power plants. Since open-cycle CWIS processes have such a dra-
matic effect on trust resources and there are a myriad of feasible alterna-
tives,282 citizen groups could sue the state to force these electricity
producers to go beyond the standards of the Clean Water Act section 316(b)
to a standard based on the reasonable use provision under the public trust
doctrine.
If CARB requires these plants to mitigate harms they cause to public
trust resources, this will increase their operating costs, potentially forcing
some plants to shut down or making renewable electricity more cost com-
petitive.283 Both of these options would indirectly decrease health impacts
and mitigate climate change. Though this course of action does not directly
coincide with the previous efforts of these citizen groups, the public trust
doctrine offers another avenue of recourse for their voices to be heard.
The public trust doctrine can be utilized by California as a legal defense
and by citizen groups as a tool to encourage the further development of
renewable electricity. Because California has pioneered other creative cli-
mate change mitigation policies, the public trust doctrine has been largely
forgotten; however, the doctrine has great potential to help environmental
initiatives in the state and should not be overlooked.
B. Wisconsin
1. Current Electricity System
Wisconsin’s energy portfolio provides a sharp contrast to California.
Wisconsin relies heavily on coal as its main source of fuel for electricity. In
2012, Wisconsin used coal for 54% of its electricity generation, followed by
natural gas and nuclear, which comprised 12.8% and 15.3% of annual genera-
tion, respectively.284 Renewable energy, comprised mostly of wind and bio-
mass, totaled about 1.9% of annual generation.285  Because Wisconsin uses
(click on the “ZIP” button for 2014: EIA-923 data on the right side of the page) (providing
excel files with 2014 generation data for individual plants). Of the 16.5%, half of this genera-
tion uses nuclear as a fuel source, and the other half uses natural gas. See id. (specifying
generation for individual plants by type of fuel used).
282. These alternatives could include either closed-cycle CWIS or air drying.
283. McCormack & Noel, supra note 161, at 17. Of course, in addition to the CWIS
argument, the citizen groups could also add undue health impacts to their argument under
the public trust doctrine, though there is less legal basis for it.
284. WIS. STATE ENERGY OFFICE, 2013 WISCONSIN ENERGY STATISTICS 9, 26 (2013), http://
www.stateenergyoffice.wi.gov/section_detail.asp?linkcatid=2847&linkid=1451&locid=160.
Note that in 2012, Wisconsin imported about 15.4% of its generation needs. Id.
285. Id. Hydroelectricity provides about 0.6% of Wisconsin’s generation needs. Id. at 5,
9, 26 (reporting that hydro accounted for approximately 32.1% of renewable production,
which in turn accounted for 1.9% of generation for electricity and electric utilities).
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conventional electricity for more than 89% of its generation,286 the Wiscon-
sin grid is quite carbon intensive, which has had substantial impacts on local
wildlife. For example, Wisconsin’s reliance on coal has led to high levels of
mercury bioaccumulation in the Great Lakes region, exceeding human and
ecological risk thresholds.287 Despite significant regional reductions in mer-
cury emissions, especially from sources other than coal, bioaccumulation of
mercury continues to increase, threatening walleye, lake trout, northern
pike, common loons, and bald eagle nestlings in and around the Great
Lakes region.288 Likewise, coal and natural gas have had significant impacts
on water resources through their CWISs and substantially contribute to
climate change.289
2. Public Trust Doctrine in Wisconsin
Wisconsin is bordered by Lake Superior and Lake Michigan and has
more than 15,000 inland lakes and 12,000 rivers.290 Given the abundance of
water resources, it is unsurprising that the public trust doctrine has played a
central role in protecting Wisconsin’s water quality.291 Wisconsin’s public
trust doctrine has roots in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which ac-
knowledged the importance of public access to navigable waters.292 Upon
statehood, the Northwest Ordinance was incorporated into the Wisconsin
Constitution: “the river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading into
the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and carrying places between the same,
shall be common highways and forever free.”293 This constitutional provi-
sion gives authority to the state to regulate navigable waters and imposes a
duty on the state to preserve and promote rights to use trust property.294
286. Id.
287. Evers et al., supra note 177, at 1495. Furthermore, the highest such concentrations
are generally found in Lake Superior. See id. at 1493.
288. Id.
289. See supra Section IV.A.
290. Gabe Johnson-Karp, That the Waters Shall Be Forever Free: Navigating Wisconsin’s
Obligation Under the Public Trust Doctrine and the Great Lakes Compact, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 415,
415 (2010).
291. Id. at 416 (citing Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan, Comment, The Evolution of the Public
Trust Doctrine and the Degradation of Trust Resources: Courts, Trustees and Political Power in
Wisconsin, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 135, 141–42 (2000)).
292. Northwest Ordinance, art. IV, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789), reprinted in 1 U.S.C., LI, LV
(2012).
293. WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
294. Scanlan, supra note 291, at 141–42 (citing Muench v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 53
N.W.2d 514, 512 (Wis. 1952) and City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820, 830 (Wis.
1927)).
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Beyond the original constitutional incorporation of the doctrine, the
state of Wisconsin has codified several aspects of the public trust doctrine
into its statutes. These include the state’s right to regulate navigation for
the public interest;295 the state’s right to protect and regulate state lands and
fisheries;296 state title to all wildlife, which allows Wisconsin to regulate its
enjoyment, use, disposition, and conservation;297 and the right and duty to
“protect, maintain and improve” water quality, especially in navigable
waters.298
As a result of the broad powers of the state set forth in both the state
constitution and in state statutes, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has
wrestled with the contours of the state’s public trust doctrine.299 For exam-
ple, the Court has grappled with the conflict between private riparian rights
and public rights in navigable water. In early cases, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court clarified the state’s title in navigable waters, employing a navigabil-
ity-in-fact test300 and stating that the state held this title in trust for the
public to protect navigation and fishing in these waters.301 Citing Illinois
Central Railroad v. Illinois, the court also held that riparian rights include
constructing a landing or wharf, but these rights are subject to the statutes
and regulations as the state may promulgate to protect the public’s rights.302
The court first addressed the conflict between riparian rights and public
trust rights in Willow River Club v. Wade.303 The court rejected the plain-
tiff’s claim of title to fish taken by a trespasser from a river flowing through
the plaintiff’s land, holding that “the public should have the right to fish in
all the public navigable waters of the state.”304 This right to fish and hunt
has since been rigorously protected by the Wisconsin courts as “incident to
the right of navigation.”305
295. WIS. STAT. §§ 30.01–30.99 (2013–2014).
296. Id. § 23.11 (2013–2014).
297. Id. § 29.011 (2013–2014).
298. Id. §§ 281.11–281.12, 281.31 (2013–2014). Section 281.31 specifically directs the
state to protect navigable waters, as required by the public trust doctrine. Id. § 281.31.
299. Sax, supra note 28, at 509.
300. See Diedrich v. Nw. Union Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 248, 262–63 (1877). It should be
noted that while riparian title ends at the bank for lakes, Wisconsin courts have held that
riparian owners hold title to lands underneath rivers and streams, though subject to the
public trust doctrine. See Willow River Club v. Wade, 76 N.W. 273, 281 (Wis. 1898).
301. McLennan v. Prentice, 55 N.W. 764, 770 (Wis. 1893) (holding that the state’s title
in navigable waters was subject to the paramount authority of Congress).
302. Id. (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)).
303. Willow River Club, 76 N.W. at 273.
304. Id. at 277.
305. E.g., Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 819 (Wis. 1914).
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Likewise, Wisconsin courts have recognized the state’s title in wildlife
and acknowledged Wisconsin’s broad authority in wildlife regulation, not-
ing, “[T]he state holds title to the wild animals in trust for the people.”306
In addition, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the regulation and
conservation of wild animals is a uniquely statewide interest under the trust
doctrine, as opposed to a merely local concern.307 Thus, as the protector of
the public rights in waterways and wildlife, the state has paramount author-
ity above both local governments and private riparian owners.
Beyond affirming the state’s authority to protect public trust resources,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court also documented the duty associated with
these resources. The Court held that the public trust doctrine is not pas-
sive.308 Rather, it “requires the law-making body to act in all cases where
action is necessary, not only to preserve the trust but to promote it.”309
However, the state’s duty to continually protect and promote the public
interest does not prevent the development or alteration of trust re-
sources.310 The state is not required to keep trust resources in the same
condition as they existed prior to the advent of the white civilization in
Wisconsin as long as these developments improve the public interest.311
One unique aspect of the Wisconsin public trust doctrine is that “scenic
beauty” has been incorporated as a protected trust resource. In Muench v.
Public Service Commission, a private citizen sought judicial review of the per-
mit for the construction and operation of a hydroelectric dam, arguing that
the dam would negatively impact the public’s recreation and scenic enjoy-
ment of the navigable river.312 The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that
the public has the right to enjoy navigable streams for all recreational pur-
poses, “including the enjoyment of scenic beauty, [which] is a legal right
that is entitled to all the protection which is given financial rights.”313
In addition to scenic beauty, the court has recognized and protected all
public uses of water, including pleasure boating, sailing, fishing, swimming,
306. Krenz v. Nichols, 222 N.W. 300, 303 (Wis. 1928).
307. Monka v. State Conservation Comm’n, 231 N.W. 273 (Wis. 1930).
308. City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820, 830 (Wis. 1927).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 832. In fact, the state is required to improve trust resources to maximize
benefits to the public. Id. at 931.
312. Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 515 (Wis. 1952).
313. Id. at 522.
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hunting, and skating.314 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has also explicitly
extended the public trust to water quality.315
Despite these protections, the court has not forbidden all encroach-
ments on public trust lands.316 To navigate the potential conflicts of pre-
serving the public interest in trust resources with the duty to promote
development in accordance with the public interest, Wisconsin courts de-
vised a five-point guide:
1) Public bodies will control the use of the area;
2) The area will be devoted to the public purposes and open to the
public;
3) The diminution of the public trust resource will be very small
compared with the whole of the public trust resource;
4) No one of the public uses of the resource will be destroyed or
greatly impaired; and
5) The disappointment of those members of the public who may
desire to use the public trust resource who no longer can will be
negligible when compared with the greater convenience to be
afforded those members of the public who would benefit.317
Moreover, the public trust can be a tool used by Wisconsin to avoid
regulatory takings.318 Under Wisconsin takings law, a land taken for public
benefit is compensable whereas land regulated to avoid public harm is
not.319 The eradication of pollution and prevention of further pollution is
314. State v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71, 74 (Wis. 1957).
315. Reuter v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 168 N.W.2d 860, 861 (Wis. 1969) (recognizing that
the public’s interest in sailing, rowing, canoeing, bathing, fishing, hunting, skating, and other
public purposes would be impaired by water pollution).
316. These encroachments have included construction of auditoriums, civic centers,
parking lots, and highways. See id.; see also City of Madison v. State, 83 N.W.2d 674, 679
(Wis. 1957).
317. Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 19 (Ill. 1970) (citing and summariz-
ing City of Madison, 83 N.W.2d at 680 and Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d at 73–74). The
Wisconsin courts have yet to rule on the implications of only partially sufficing these five
points. However, the cases cited imply that if these five points are demonstrated, it is likely
not a violation of the public trust doctrine. However, failing to demonstrate all five points
may not preclude a court from declining to find a violation of the public trust doctrine.
318. See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–29 (1992) (finding
that background principles of state or federal law that are antecedent to property rights can
be used as a defense against takings claims). Essentially, the state can use the public trust
doctrine, a background principle of state law antecedent to property rights, to prevent harm
from a trust resources without constituting a regulatory taking.
319. Just v. Marinette, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767–68 (Wis. 1972); see Lucas, 505 U.S., at
1024–32 (discussing the implications of conferring benefits or preventing harms on regula-
tory takings).
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not, in a legal sense, “benefit-securing” in that it simply maintains the natu-
ral status quo of the environment.320 Rather, such efforts prevent a harm to
the public interest, suggesting that no compensation is due.
Additionally, the Court extended the public trust from navigable rivers
to those non-navigable waters connected to navigable waters,321 much as
California did in the National Audubon Society.322 As a result, the court em-
phasized that the active trust duty of the state “requires the state not only to
promote navigation but also to protect and preserve waters for fishing, recre-
ation and scenic beauty.”323 The court confirmed this more expansive view
of the public trust doctrine by displacing the common enemy doctrine with
the reasonable-use rule regarding riparian water use and management,324
holding that riparian rights are subject to the public trust doctrine.325 On
remand, it warned the lower court that the economic social utility of land
development was to be given far less value than it had historically been
accorded.326
Under public trust analysis, state agencies are required to go beyond
any statutory presumption to determine what constitutes a “reasonable use”
in light of each situation’s particular facts.327 Though Wisconsin has always
cautiously weighed private riparian rights against the interests of the public,
recent cases reflect growing concern over the environmental and recrea-
tional interests of the public. In Lake Beulah Management District v. Depart-
ment of Natural Resources, for example, the Lake Beulah Management
District challenged a decision by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Re-
sources (WDNR) to issue a permit for a groundwater well, arguing that the
groundwater diversions would have an adverse impact on nearby wetlands
and navigable surface waters.328 The court reiterated the comprehensive
320. Just, 201 N.W.2d at 768.
321. Id.
322. See generally Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983);
supra Subsection V.A.2.
323. Just, 201 N.W.2d at 768 (emphasis added).
324. Briefly, the common enemy doctrine is a common law doctrine that authorizes a
landowner to fight surface waters in whatever way the owner deems appropriate, and if an
adjacent landowner’s property is damaged, there would be no cause of action. See State v.
Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407, 411–12 (Wis. 1974).
325. Id. at 417–18.
326. Id. at 417.
327. Hilton v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 717 N.W.2d 166, 174 (Wis. 2006). Wisconsin statutes
would normally have entitled the riparian owner to construct a wharf without requiring a
permit, see WIS. STAT. § 30.12(1g)(f) (2013–2014), but the court held that the public trust
doctrine required additional protection of trust resources from the agency. Hilton, 717
N.W.2d at 174.
328. Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 799 N.W.2d 73 (Wis. 2011).
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statutory and constitutional trust responsibilities of the WDNR.329 Similar
to the recent California public trust case regarding groundwater,330 the
Wisconsin court held that the state, as trustee, is required to consider any
action that potentially impacts navigable waters.331 In order to comply with
its duty as trustee, the WDNR “must consider the environmental im-
pact . . . when presented with sufficient concrete, scientific evidence of
potential harm to waters of the state.”332
Generally, Wisconsin courts have required trustees to show that they
have considered all relevant public and policy interests in trust resources, as
long as there is a scientific connection between the action and the potential
impact on the trust. Courts have generally deferred to the trustee in cases
where the trustee has acted to protect public trust resources; conversely, the
court has closely scrutinized any proposed trustee action that appeared to
jeopardize trust resources.333 However, the progressive trend in the Wis-
consin public trust case law came to a halt in a recent case, Rock-Koshkonong
Lake District v. Department of Natural Resources, which considered the bene-
fits of dam rehabilitation to non-navigable wetland ecosystems.334 The reha-
bilitation improved water quality of the lake but also restricted riparian
access to the lake.335 The Lake District petitioned the WDNR to consider
the economic interests of the residents, but the WNDR rejected the peti-
tion, citing its duties under the public trust doctrine.336 Despite the court’s
tendency to affirm WDNR orders that aim to protect the public interest,
the court closely scrutinized the WDNR decision.337 First, the court found
that the decision was not entitled to “great weight” deference.338 Second,
the court ruled that the WDNR had incorrectly relied on the public trust
doctrine when considering the water quality of non-navigable private wet-
lands, stating the doctrine solely applies to navigable waters, and instead
should have utilized its police powers to regulate water quality of these
329. Id.
330. See Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. 34-2010-80000583,
2014 WL 8843074, at *8 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 15, 2014).
331. Lake Beulah, 799 N.W.2d at 76.
332. Id. The court, however, concluded that this evidence had not been properly intro-
duced procedurally, and thus the WDNR did not have sufficient scientific evidence that the
groundwater well would impact navigable waters. Id. at 77.
333. Scanlan, supra note 291, at 140–47.
334. Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 833 N.W.2d 800 (Wis. 2013).
335. Id. at 808–10.
336. Id. at 812.
337. Christian Eickelberg, Rock-Koshkonong Lake District and the Surprise Narrowing of
Wisconsin’s Public Trust Doctrine, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 38, 55 (2014) (saying that court’s lack of
deference to the WDNR was “novel and inconsistent with its precedents”).
338. Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist., 833 N.W.2d at 815.
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wetlands.339 In light of this decision, the future application of the Wiscon-
sin public trust doctrine is uncertain. This case conflicts with previous
precedents and calls into question the historical and expansive role the trust
has played in Wisconsin.
3. Overview of Current Wisconsin Electricity Laws
Wisconsin law encouraging renewable energy is limited. Most electric-
ity planning and policymaking is delegated to the Wisconsin Public Service
Commission (WPSC). The WPSC is required to develop a strategic energy
assessment every two years. In this assessment, the WPSC must “identify
and describe existing and planned generating facilities that use renewable
sources of energy.”340 Before constructing a new electricity facility, the util-
ity must gain a certificate from the state.341
Additionally, Wisconsin has a goal that “to the extent that it is cost-
effective and technically feasible, all new installed capacity for electric gen-
eration in the state be based on renewable energy resources.”342 Further-
more, the state has created a hierarchy for pursuing new energy generation
under the Energy Priorities Law (EPL).343 The relevant part of the EPL
states:
(4) Priorities. In meeting energy demands, the policy of the state
is that, to the extent cost-effective and technically feasible, options
be considered based on the following priorities, in the order listed:
(a) Energy conservation and efficiency
(b) Noncombustible renewable energy resources
(c) Combustible renewable energy resources
(d) Nonrenewable combustible energy sources, in the order listed:
1. Natural gas
339. Id. at 821–23. However, this appears to ignore the precedents set in Just v. Mari-
nette, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972), and Lake Beulah Management District v. Department of
Natural Resources, 799 N.W.2d 73 (Wis. 2011), both of which argue that the state has the
authority and duty to consider all potential impacts to navigable waters, including non-
navigable private wetlands, under the public trust doctrine. Indeed, one scholar argues that
this precedent does “a disservice to Wisconsin’s protection of public trust resources.” See
Eickelberg, supra note 337, at 65.
340. WIS. STAT. § 196.491(2)(a)(9) (2013–2014).
341. There are two types of certificates, which depend, among other things, on the size
of the project. To protect the ratepayers, these certificates require the applicant to show
analysis of the project and are required before construction of any new electricity facility. See
id. §§ 196.49, 196.491(3) (2013–2014). The certificates are also often a point of litigation. See
infra Subsection V.B.4.
342. WIS. STAT. § 1.12(3)(b) (2013–2014).
343. Id. § 1.12(4).
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2. Oil or coal with sulfur content less than 1%
3. All other carbon-based fuels.344
Though the EPL stresses the priority of renewable generation, it is up
to the WPSC to determine if renewable energy resources are both “cost-
effective” and “technically feasible” when planning new electricity develop-
ment.345 As discussed below, due to the WPSC’s discretion, the EPL has
not always led to the selection of renewable energy or incentivized its
development.
Like California and many other states, Wisconsin has an RPS. How-
ever, the goals of Wisconsin’s RPS are significantly less ambitious than Cal-
ifornia’s, with a modest requirement that renewable energy amount to at
least 10% of all electricity consumed in the state by 2015.346 For both the
RPS and the EPL, renewable technology includes renewable-sourced fuel
cells, tidal and wave power, solar thermal and photovoltaic, wind power,
geothermal, biomass, and waste fuel.347 Finally, the WPSC is statutorily
forbidden from imposing any other requirements to increase any electricity
provider’s renewable energy sales beyond the 10% mandate.348
Wisconsin does not have any comprehensive climate change or renewa-
ble energy legislation, as is the case in California. Furthermore, over the
past decade, Wisconsin has failed to take any significant steps toward devel-
oping a renewable energy strategy.349 While many of the statutes pertaining
to the WPSC require that the Commission consider the public interest,350
both the WPSC and the courts have interpreted the statutory language to
mean protection of ratepayers.351 Such a narrow construction of interests,
primarily in terms of electricity costs, excludes other matters important to
344. Id.
345. See, e.g., Clean Wis., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 700 N.W.2d 768, 809–10 (Wis.
2005).
346. WIS. STAT. § 196.378(2) (2013–2014). Moreover, legacy hydroelectricity and renew-
ables already comprised about 6% of total generation each year from 1990 to 2004. See WIS.
STATE ENERGY OFFICE, 2013 WISCONSIN ENERGY STATISTICS BOOK 58 (2013), http://www.state
energyoffice.wi.gov/subcategory.asp?linksubcatid=3691&linkcatid=2847&linkid=1451&locid
=160.
347. WIS. STAT. § 196.378(1)(h).
348. Id. § 196.378(4m).
349. Marvin C. Bynum II, Testing the Waters: Assessing Wisconsin’s Regulatory Climate for
Offshore Wind Projects, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1533, 1573 (2010).
350. See WIS. STAT. § 196.49(3)(a) (2013–2014) (requiring “plans, specifications, and es-
timated costs of any proposed project which will . . . materially affect the public interest”);
see also id. § 196.491(3)(d)(3) (2013–2014)  (requiring the WPSC to find that the design of
the project is in the public interest to issue a certificate).
351. See, e.g., Wis. Indus. Energy Grps. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 819 N.W.2d 240, 253
(Wis. 2012).
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the public, including public health, climate, and trust resources. Thus, the
trustee’s fiduciary obligations to protect public water and wildlife resources
remain largely disconnected from the WPSC’s electricity planning and per-
mitting responsibilities. By connecting the state’s well-developed public
trust doctrine to electricity planning and policy, the state of Wisconsin and
its citizens can encourage renewable energy beyond the state’s currently
lackluster regime.
4. Applications of the Public Trust Doctrine in Wisconsin
Because Wisconsin’s renewable energy laws are underdeveloped, there
is an opportunity for the public trust doctrine to spur renewable energy
development. Specifically, citizens could cite WDNR’s broad authority and
general duty under the public trust doctrine to influence WPSC’s electricity
decisionmaking process and encourage further development of renewable
energy. Both the WPSC and the Wisconsin Supreme Court, when review-
ing WPSC orders, appear to have either not considered or not been cogni-
zant of the environmental and trust resource benefits that accrue from
increased renewable electricity production.
In the few legal challenges to recent WPSC electricity decisions, courts
have neither recognized the larger social and public trust benefits of renew-
able electricity development nor the consequences of continued conven-
tional electricity production. Notably, in 2005, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court was faced with a WPSC decision to grant the Wisconsin Electric
Corporation (WEC) a certificate to begin construction on two large coal-
fired plants on the shores of Lake Michigan.352 Clean Wisconsin, a citizen’s
group, appealed the WPSC approval, arguing that the certificate application
was incomplete and that the WPSC did not properly give priority to non-
coal sources of electricity, especially under the EPL.353 The WPSC argued
that the conditional approval was valid because it was conditioned on
WDNR approval of permits.354 Despite coal-fired generation being the
EPL’s lowest priority, its selection was valid because all higher priority
technologies were either not “cost-effective” or not “technologically
feasible.”355
The court concluded that the WPSC decisions are to be accorded “great
weight” (the highest level of deference under Wisconsin law) so that Clean
Wisconsin had the burden to demonstrate that there was “no rational basis”
352. Clean Wis., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 700 N.W.2d 768, 788 (Wis. 2005).
353. Id. at 812.
354. Id. at 844.
355. Id. at 813–14.
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for the WPSC order.356 The court’s deference to the WPSC made Clean
Wisconsin’s challenge an uphill battle. By contrast, courts have historically
given WDNR little to no deference when the WDNR makes a decision that
appears to impair public trust resources.357 In spite of potential harms to
the environment and the public, the court deferred to the WPSC and up-
held the administrative decision.358 As a result, the court affirmed the
WPSC’s determination that neither land-based nor offshore wind would be
able to replace the two coal-fired plants.359
Of particular interest in Clean Wisconsin was the challenge to WPSC’s
approval of the WEC’s open-cycle CWIS. The WPSC found that despite
the fact that one billion gallons of water were withdrawn per day and mil-
lions of aquatic organisms were killed, open-cycle CWIS would have “incon-
sequential” impacts on Lake Michigan’s ecosystem.360 The court deferred
under the “great weight” standard, finding that the WPSC had sufficed its
responsibility to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the
coal plants.361 However, this finding was based largely on a monitoring
study conducted thirty years prior.362
In contrast to the majority opinion, the concurrence was not convinced
by the WPSC’s finding, failing to see how the mortality of millions of fish
and other aquatic life “is of no consequence, irrelevant and lacking impor-
tance.”363 Likewise, the dissent thoroughly questioned the majority’s accept-
ance of the open-cycle CWIS, contending that the WPSC did not seriously
consider the substantial environmental and technological changes regarding
closed-cycle CWIS over the last three decades.364 Nevertheless, the major-
356. Id. at 801.
357. See Scanlan, supra note 291, at 140–47.
358. Clean Wis., 700 N.W.2d at 853.
359. Id. at 801. Compare the WPSC’s determination on the cost effectiveness of wind
without any health externalities (or other externalities of interest, such as climate change
externalities) to the monetization of coal’s externalities. Including these externalities would
necessarily increase the cost of coal substantially. See Paul R. Epstein et al., Full Cost Account-
ing for the Life Cycle of Coal, 1219 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 73, 91 (2011) (claiming a best
estimate for the monetization of coal’s externality would near 18 cents per kWh); cf. PUB.
SERV. CO M M’N OF WIS., NO. 5-EI-144, HARNESSING WISCONSIN’S ENERGY RESOURCES: AN INITIAL
INVESTIGATION INTO THE GREAT LAKES DEVELOPMENT 19 (2009) (finding that offshore wind en-
ergy in the Great Lakes is technologically feasible).
360. Clean Wis., 700 N.W.2d at 831–32.
361. Id. at 835.
362. Id. at 831–32.
363. Id. at 855 (Butler, J., concurring).
364. Id. at 858–60 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Justice Bradley also argued that the court
should not have deferred to the WPSC order. Id. at 863.
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ity emphasized the role of agency expertise and discretion in balancing vari-
ous social and environmental values.365
In hindsight, Clean Wisconsin could have benefited from reframing its
challenge under the public trust doctrine, given that Wisconsin Courts have
more closely scrutinized agency actions under this doctrine. As there were
several WDNR permits required prior to the WPSC’s certificate ap-
proval,366 Clean Wisconsin could have utilized the WDNR’s public trust
obligations as a basis to challenge the construction of the coal plants.367 The
WDNR has the affirmative duty beyond any statutory requirements, to pro-
tect public trust resources.368 By connecting the public trust to the WPSC
order, the plaintiffs could have gained the advantage of a stricter standard of
review and a more serious consideration of the impacts of open-cycle
CWIS.369 Additionally, connecting the benefits of renewable energy, such
as mitigating other adverse impacts, including mercury bioaccumulation and
climate change, would have encouraged the prioritization of renewable en-
ergy under the EPL.
By granting the WPSC great weight deference, the Court neglected to
seriously investigate the environmental impacts of the two coal plants. If
Clean Wisconsin had instead challenged the DNR by citing its trust obliga-
tions, the court would likely have scrutinized each of the potential impacts
of the coal plants and the conclusion that coal was the most “cost-effective”
and “technologically feasible” option.
In spite of the recent limitations on the doctrine in Rock-Koshkonong,370
the public trust can still be readily applied to electricity production deci-
sions, such as those presented in Clean Wisconsin. At worst, Rock-Koshkonong
365. Id. at 841 (majority opinion).
366. Id.
367. The WPSC cannot grant approval to the permit without the required regulatory
approvals from the WDNR (though they can grant conditional approval of the permit). See
id. at 823. While the WPSC is the primary agency for electricity decisions, the WDNR has
been designated as the primary agency for managing the public trust. See Scanlan, supra note
291, at 171–72. Because the WPSC requires supplementary approval and permit information
from the WDNR before granting a permit, Clean Wisconsin could challenge the WPSC’s
decision by arguing the WDNR failed to faithfully discharge its fiduciary duty to consider
the impacts of the proposed action on public trust resources, and thus the WPSC did not
acquire the requisite regulatory approvals from the WDNR before approving the permit. If
the WPSC grants conditional approval of the CPCN, the permit applicant must still receive
approval from the WDNR, including an analysis of the public trust doctrine.
368. See Hilton v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 717 N.W.2d 166, 174 (Wis. 2006).
369. Given the substantial environmental impacts of open-cycle CWIS, as shown supra
in Sections IV.A–B, the plaintiffs could have argued that the WDNR was jeopardizing pub-
lic trust resources, and Wisconsin courts have generally closely scrutinized such actions. See
Scanlan, supra note 291, at 294.
370. Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 833 N.W.2d 800 (Wis. 2013).
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has narrowed the doctrine’s application to exclusively navigable waters.371
However, because the impacts from electricity production directly impact
navigable waters and wildlife, there is little question that the public trust
doctrine applies. For example, the two coal plants in Clean Wisconsin di-
rectly withdrew waters from Lake Michigan, a navigable water body.372
Furthermore, coal plants constitute only a portion of the cumulative elec-
tricity production that impacts water. Because the majority of thermal
plants employ open-cycle CWIS, electricity production in the Great Lakes
watershed accounts for 86% of Wisconsin’s total annual water
withdrawals.373
Given these facts and the growing concern of continued water diver-
sions from the Great Lakes,374 a less deferential standard of review would
likely challenge the conclusion that impacts from open-cycle CWIS are in-
consequential, especially considering the comprehensive and cumulative im-
pacts on water and wildlife trust resources. Likewise, given the feasibility of
closed-cycle CWIS and the significant reductions in impacts to trust re-
sources, Clean Wisconsin could have made a much more convincing argu-
ment that the WDNR, not the WPSC, must require such a system. While
both state agencies argued that the WDNR does not have authority under
the CWA to do so, this argument ignores the fact that the coal plant’s ripa-
rian rights to withdraw water from Lake Michigan are qualified and
subordinate to public trust rights.375
Going forward, environmental groups could encourage the reprioritiza-
tion of renewable energy under the EPL by citing the public’s interest in
trust resources. After Lake Beulah, the WDNR must consider any potential
adverse, scientifically supported impacts to trust resources.376 In terms of
371. Eickelberg, supra note 337, at 60–62.
372. Clean Wis., 700 N.W.2d at 788.
373. GREAT LAKES CO M M’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GREAT LAKES REGIONAL WATER USE
DATABASE: REPRESENTING 2013 WATER USE DATA 36 tbl.19 (2014), http://projects.glc.org/
waterusedata/annualreports.php (summarizing total water withdrawal data, divided by sec-
tor, including for “Self-Supply Thermoelectric Power Production (Once-through cooling)”
and “Self-Supply Thermoelectric Power Production (Recirculated cooling”)). Combined,
self-supply thermoelectric power plants withdrew about 3.6 billion gallons of water per day
in 2013. See Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Res. Council, Create Your Own
Query, WATER USE BASELINE DATABASE, http://projects.glc.org/waterusedata/query.php (last
visited Nov. 13, 2015) (selecting “Wisconsin” for “Jurisdiction”, “2013” for “Year”, and both
“Self-Supply Thermoelectric Power Production (Once-through cooling)” and “Self-Supply
Thermoelectric Power Production (Recirculated cooling)” under “Water Use Sector” pro-
duces plant-specific withdrawal data in millions of gallons per day).
374. See generally Hall & Stuntz, supra note 214 (claiming climate change poses a severe
threat to Great Lakes water resources, especially if diversions are not held in check).
375. R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 628 N.W.2d 781, 788 (Wis. 2001).
376. Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 799 N.W.2d 73, 92 (Wis. 2011).
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electricity production, there are two impacts in addition to CWIS that have
scientifically-proven connections between electricity production and trust
resources: mercury emissions377 and climate change.378 Mercury emissions
impact wildlife resources and water quality in the Great Lakes region, and
climate change is expected to “lead to lower lake levels, impacts on fisheries
and wildlife, changes in Great Lakes shorelines, and reduction of ground-
water supplies.”379 These impacts from electricity production are the same
impacts that the Rock-Koshkonong court was concerned that WDNR over-
looked.380 Moreover, unlike the interests at issue in Rock-Koshkonong, cli-
mate change also adversely impacts wildlife, wetlands, aesthetics, and water
quality concerns protected by the public trust doctrine. Therefore, even in
light of Rock-Koshkonong, climate change, mercury, and CWIS impacts from
electricity production, especially coal, must be considered by the WDNR.
Given the weight of the scientific evidence, it is hard to fathom how the
WDNR could not conclude that such impacts negatively impact the public
trust. As such, construction or renewal of these plants would not be in the
public’s interest.
While the WPSC is not required to choose renewable electricity under
the EPL if the environmental benefits are outweighed by other values,381
decisionmaking under the EPL could be rebalanced by arguing that under
the public trust doctrine, the WDNR’s paramount obligation is to protect
the public interest in trust resources. For example, notably absent from
Clean Wisconsin and another recent case authorizing construction of a wind
farm382 is a discussion of the larger social benefit of encouraging develop-
ment of renewable energy.383 The application of the public trust doctrine to
the EPL and the decisionmaking process of the WPSC and WDNR would
encourage the development of this discussion. While the literature has con-
nected the public trust implications of wind, specifically the environmental
and aesthetic impacts of offshore wind,384 there have been no contextual
377. See Evers et al., supra note 177.
378. See Hall & Stuntz, supra note 214.
379. Id. at 676.
380. Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 833 N.W.2d 800, 809–10
(Wis. 2013).
381. See Clean Wis., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 700 N.W.2d 768, 829 (Wis. 2005).
382. Wis. Indus. Energy Grps. v. Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 819 N.W.2d 240 (Wis.
2012).
383. Compare these decisions to the California intermediate court’s opinion in Center for
Biological Diversity v. FPL Group, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 601–02 (Ct. App. 2008), which was
cognizant of the larger benefits of wind energy, despite the potential impacts of avian
mortality.
384. Bynum II, supra note 349, at 1570.
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comparisons between the public trust implications of renewable and con-
ventional electricity.
It may be useful to apply the five-point test developed in the Wisconsin
public trust doctrine case law.385 Consider the choice between a potential
coal plant and a potential offshore wind farm. Under the first point, neither
the coal plant nor the offshore wind farm would truly control the use of an
area: instead they would control the use of trust resources, such as water
resources, for the purposes of cooling or the “use” of wildlife via mercury
bioaccumulation in the case of the coal plant or avian mortality in the case
of the offshore wind.386 On the other hand, offshore wind would likely
exclude other public uses by obstructing navigation and impacting the aes-
thetic landscape.387 Second, neither the coal plant nor the offshore wind
farm’s purpose in using the trust resource is to directly benefit the public at
large; both would likely be closed to the public. Third, the overall diminu-
tion of trust resources by coal-fired plants is orders of magnitude higher
than navigation, wildlife and aesthetic impacts from offshore wind, meaning
coal diminishes a larger portion of the public trust resource as a whole than
a properly sited wind farm.388 Fourth, cumulatively, coal has substantially
impaired wildlife and water resources, whereas it is unlikely that offshore
wind would impair navigation, wildlife, or aesthetic trust resources beyond
minor impacts.389 Fifth, neither the coal plant nor the wind farm would
provide direct public trust benefits, but both would create the public benefit
385. Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 19 (Ill. 1970) (citing and summariz-
ing City of Madison v. State, 83 N.W.2d 674, 680 (Wis. 1957) and State v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71, 73–74 (Wis. 1957)). The five point guide, while informative, does
not translate perfectly in the application to electricity production because it is used more to
test the alienation of submerged lands and title, rather than the permitting of usufructuary
rights.
386. While in both cases the state retains the authority to control the use of the area,
both the coal plant and the offshore wind farm would necessarily occupy land and waters to
the exclusion of other users. See Vasilis Fthenakis & Hyung Chul Kim, Land Use and Electric-
ity Generation: A Life-Cycle Analysis, 13 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 1465, 1466–69
(2009).
387. Navigational interests may only be excluded at the turbine itself and a small buffer
around it, but still allowing navigation and other interests in between the turbines. MINERALS
MGMT SERV. (MMS), U.S. DEP ’T OF INTERIOR, CAPE WIND ENERGY PROJECT: FINAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL IMPACT STATEMENT 3-15, 5-266 (2009).
388. See supra Part IV.
389. For example, while there are continued concerns over the population impacts from
mercury bioaccumulation for certain wildlife species and the future risks of extinction of
wildlife and substantial alteration of water resources due to climate change, it unlikely that
offshore wind poses a population risk to avian populations, often considered the most signifi-
cant impact of offshore wind. However, if substantial amounts of offshore wind are con-
structed, there may be cumulative risks to navigation and to wildlife from habitat
displacement. See supra notes 191–207 and accompanying text.
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of electricity production.390 Assuming equivalent benefits of electricity and
the substantially larger consequences of utilizing coal, it is clear that off-
shore wind in the Great Lakes, using the five-point test, would be the supe-
rior choice under the public trust doctrine. This conclusion could be
weighed against the WPSC’s findings of “cost-effectiveness” and “techno-
logically feasibility” and could encourage the reprioritization of renewable
energy under the EPL.
Because the WDNR has been granted broad statutory and constitu-
tional authority to protect the public trust whenever feasible,391 and Wis-
consin courts have generally given “great weight” deference to the WDNR
when acting to protect trust resources, the WDNR has the capability to
take actions that would promote renewable energy development. The courts
have often required the WDNR to give full and careful consideration to all
public trust interests, especially non-economic interests, a consideration
that is currently lacking in Wisconsin electricity planning and policy. Scan-
lan argues that WDNR employees, especially Water Management Special-
ists (WMSs), have not fully utilized the public trust doctrine.392 Scanlan
continues that the public trust doctrine can authorize WMSs and the
WDNR to take action on water quality.393 For example, WMSs have the
ability to use the public trust doctrine to fill regulatory gaps left by other
laws, such as the Clean Water Act (CWA), including regulating activities
that cause non-point source pollution.394
Likewise, it is entirely reasonable given the scope of the Wisconsin
public trust doctrine that the same argument can be made in favor of grant-
ing WDNR the ability to use the public trust doctrine to fill in the gaps left
by other laws to regulate the impacts of electricity production beyond statu-
tory requirements. Like any other riparian user, the rights of electricity
producers to use water and to adversely impact wildlife and water through
emissions are entirely subject to the power of the WDNR, whether WDNR
employees act on that power or not. The WPSC’s prioritization of cheap
electricity over environmentally beneficial electricity emphasizes a common
theme in electricity permitting decisions. The current structure of electric-
ity laws in many states is primarily concerned with protecting ratepayers’
interests in low electricity rates without regard to externalities, including
those that impair trust resources. Nevertheless, citizen groups like Clean
390. Moreover, the offshore wind farm would provide further public benefits by displac-
ing coal and natural gas. See supra Section IV.D.
391. See supra notes 327–32 and accompanying text.
392. Scanlan, supra note 291, at 169–72.
393. Id. at 173–77.
394. Id. at 177 (arguing that the WMSs have such authority despite the limited statutory
authority in the CWA).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA104.txt unknown Seq: 60  4-JAN-16 9:52
228 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 5:1
Wisconsin or WDNR employees can utilize the broad authority and general
duty of the state of Wisconsin under its well-developed public trust doc-
trine to shift the focus and encourage protection of environmental resources
and development of renewable electricity.
C. Hawaii
1. Current Electricity System
Hawaii overwhelmingly relies on fossil fuel for power generation, ne-
cessitating the importation of oil.395 In 2013, 18% of Hawaii’s net electricity
generation came from renewable sources, mainly comprised of wind, resi-
dential solar PV, biomass, and geothermal.396 The other 82% of generation
came from fossil fuel sources, more than three quarters of which was oil-
based and the remainder from coal.397 Though the percentage of fossil fuel
generation has decreased from 91% over the last ten years,398 Hawaii’s de-
pendence on oil and coal has negative consequences, including contributing
to climate change and ocean acidification.399 This dependence requires sig-
nificant quantities of cooling water and emits a substantial amount of mer-
cury.400 As a result, Hawaii has perhaps the most environmentally
damaging electric grid of the four states investigated in this Article,401 al-
395. HAW. PUB. UTIL. CO M M’N (HPUC), ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 16, 21
(2014), http://puc.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/PUC-FY-2014-Annual-Report
.pdf.
396. HAW. STATE ENERGY OFFICE, ENERGY RESOURCES COORDINATOR’S ANNUAL REPORT 2014,
at 20 (2014), http://energy.hawaii.gov/resources/hawaii-state-energy-office-publications. In
addition, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) recently received two unsolic-
ited offshore wind lease applications proposing offshore wind facilities off the coast of Oahu.
See Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Hawaii Activities, RENEWABLE ENERGY PROGRAMS, http://
www.boem.gov/State-Activities-Hawaii (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
397. HPUC, supra note 395, at 21. Note this does not include the HPUC’s estimated
role of energy efficiency on reducing overall generation needs, which HPUC determined
accounted for a 12% reduction in demand. See also EIA, supra note 281 (84% of electricity
generated in Hawaii came from fossil fuels in 2014 through November).
398. HPUC, supra note 395, at 21.
399. See William Moomaw et. al., Annex II: Methodology, in IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON
RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 982 (O. Edenhofer et al. eds.,
2011).
400. See Fthenakis & Kim, supra note 170, at 2043; see also MATS Rule, 77 Fed. Reg.
9304, 9368 (Feb. 16, 2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 60, 63) (setting mercury emission
standards for Hawaiian oil plants that are double the standards for continental oil plants).
401. Because Hawaii overwhelmingly relies on oil and coal for its electricity generation,
the system as a whole can be considered more environmentally damaging than other grids
considered in this paper for several reasons, including higher carbon intensity, mercury emis-
sions, and water consumption. See Moomaw et al., supra note 399, at 982 (higher carbon
intensity); MATS Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9368 (higher mercury emission standards);
Fthenakis & Kim, supra note 170, at 2043 (relatively high water use); see also supra Subsection
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though it is also moving most aggressively towards a 100% renewable energy
target.402
2. Public Trust Doctrine in Hawaii
Along with California, Hawaii is recognized for having one of the two
most progressive public trust doctrines in the nation.403 While compara-
tively well developed,404 the public trust doctrine’s history in Hawaii is
complicated, winding through four separate governance and judicial re-
gimes. The common law regarding natural resource management developed
though these four legal regimes, becoming a confluence of Hawaiian cus-
toms, American common law public trust doctrine, and American influences
of privatization.405
Early Hawaiian water law recognized both the appurtenant and riparian
doctrines.406 In contrast, the public trust doctrine was not recognized by the
Supreme Court of Hawaii until 1899, when the court recognized the then-
Republic’s ownership and trusteeship over submerged lands.407
As Hawaii transitioned into a U.S. Territory at the turn of the 20th
century, Hawaiian courts continued to recognize the Territory’s authority
over water resources.408 Likewise, the court acknowledged that all fisheries
belonged to the Territory in trust for the people, and the trustee’s authority
continually subjugates private fisheries to the Territory when acting for the
V.A.1 (describing California’s electric grid, relying more on natural gas, implying lower
emissions); supra Subsection V.B.1 (describing Wisconsin’s electricity grid, relying on coal
for only 54% of generation and little oil generation, substantially less than Hawaii’s 82% of
generation); infra Subsection V.D.1 (describing New Jersey’s electricity grid, which relies on
natural gas and nuclear instead of the more-damaging coal and oil for its generation).
402. In fact, earlier this year Hawaii amended its renewable portfolio standard to 100%
by 2045. See Act 97, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2015), 2015 Haw. Sess. Laws *3 (to be
codified at HAWAII REV. STAT. § 269-92) (amending subsection (a) to include a 100% target by
2045).
403. Kylie Wha Kyung Wager, In Common Law We Trust: How Hawai’i’s Public Trust
Doctrine Can Support Atmospheric Litigation to Address Climate Change, 20 HASTINGS W.-NW. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 55, 77 (2014).
404. On the other hand, Hawaiian courts have not spent as much time on the state’s
public trust obligations regarding wildlife resources, especially independent of the water
aspects of the public trust. See, e.g., id. at 95–96.
405. See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1339–45 (Haw. 1973).
406. An appurtenant right is a water right that is connected to a specific parcel of land,
conveyed by the King of Hawaii, which were to be used only for cultivation of food and other
basic needs. See id. Riparian rights, similar in that it is connected to property, are constrained
to the bounds of reasonable use and also include the right to construct wharves. See id.
407. King v. Oahu Ry. & Land Co., 11 Haw. 717, 725 (1899).
408. Territory of Hawaii v. Kerr, 16 Haw. 363, 376 (1905); see also County of Hawaii v.
Sotomura 517 P.2d 57, 61–62 (Haw. 1973) (holding that the state owns all lands below the
high water mark as shown by the vegetation line even if due to erosion).
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common good.409 However, the public trust doctrine was noticeably absent
in judicial opinions of the Territorial Hawaiian Court in its discussion of
water rights. Indeed, in a series of cases, the Territorial Court consistently
found in favor of private water rights and made no mention of the public
interest in the waters.410
However, “despite this long line of cases treating water as a private
property,” the Supreme Court of Hawaii, which was constituted after state-
hood in 1959, held that all freshwater within the state is “held in trust by the
state for the common good of its citizens.”411 Overturning previous court
decisions supporting private ownership of water, the court held that because
water in its natural state de facto belongs to the State in trust, surplus storm
and fresh water is reserved to the State for the common good.412 The court
also applied similar logic to Hawaii’s land. In the first and only public trust
case to deal with the question of new lands caused by lava overflow, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii ruled that all lands, in their natural state, includ-
ing newly lava-formed lands, belong to the “people of Hawaii, held in public
trust by the government for the benefit, use and enjoyment of all the
people.”413
The public trust doctrine was transformed in 1978 when the Hawaii
Constitution was amended.414 First and foremost, the public trust was ap-
plied to all natural resources
[f]or the benefit of present and future generations[.] [T]he State
and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii’s
natural beauty and all natural resources, including land, water, air,
minerals and energy sources, and shall promote the development
and utilization of these resources in a manner consistent with their
conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State.
All public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the
benefit of the people.415
409. Bishop v. Mahiko, 35 Haw. 608, 640–47 (1940).
410. Marie Kyle, The “Four Great Waters” Case: An Important Expansion of Wai’ahole Ditch
and the Public Trust Doctrine, 17 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 21, 25 (2013) (citing Hawaiian
Commercial & Sugar Co. v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 15 Haw. 675, 680 (1904) (holding surplus
water belonged to the konohikis and they could do whatever he pleases regardless of down-
stream impacts); Territory of Hawaii v. Gay, 31 Haw. 376, 377 (1930) (holding normal
surplus water belongs to the private owner and the Territory cannot enjoin its use)).
411. Id. (citing McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1345–46 (Haw. 1973).
412. McBryde Sugar, 504 P.2d at 1345–46.
413. State v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725, 734–35 (Haw. 1977).
414. See Wager, supra note 403, at 90–98.
415. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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The amendment also explicitly mentioned water use, adding that the “State
has an obligation to protect, control and regulate the use of Hawaii’s water
resources for the benefit of its people.”416 It also required the Legislature to
set up a water resources agency to manage and conserve, as well as establish
procedures for, the uses of Hawaii’s waters, which became the Commission
on Water Resources Management (CWRM).417 Less than a decade later,
the Legislature adopted the State Water Code, which recognized “that the
waters of the State are held for the benefit of the citizens of the State.”418
The Code requires every water use permit applicant to establish reasonable-
beneficial use.419
Thus, the Hawaiian public trust doctrine has not only a complex and
pluralistic common law history but also a detailed constitutional and statu-
tory one. Moreover, an important effect of incorporating the public trust as
a constitutional provision is that the courts became the ultimate authority to
interpret and protect natural resources, especially water use.420 This greatly
heightened the scrutiny of the court’s judicial review in public trust cases.
Since the public trust doctrine was constitutionally codified, the Supreme
Court of Hawaii has declined to draw a distinction between surface water
and groundwater, holding that any diversion, whether from the surface or
the ground, is subject to other protected rights, including public and native
Hawaiian rights.421
The development of the Hawaiian public trust doctrine culminated at
the turn of the millennia in the seminal Hawaiian public trust doctrine case,
Waiahole I.422 In that case, “native Hawaiians and local farmers sought to
restore streams that had been diverted by the State’s most powerful private
interests, including former sugar plantations who had participated in the
overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy during the late 1800s.”423 Despite the
substantial authority and duty delegated to the CWRM, it continued to
stumble to adequately protect the state’s water resources.424 Noting that the
416. Id. § 7.
417. Id.
418. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-2(a) (2011).
419. Id. § 174C-49(a)(2); see also Waiahole I, 9 P.3d 409, 442–47 (Haw. 2000) (discuss-
ing the definition of a reasonable and beneficial use, which includes the purpose of the use,
its economic value, the potential damages to society, and potential mitigation of waste or
harm).
420. See Waiahole I, 9 P.3d at 442–47; see also In re Wai’ola O Moloka’i Inc., 83 P.3d
664, 684 (Haw. 2004).
421. Reppun v. Bd. of Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57, 73 (Haw. 1982).
422. Waiahole I, 9 P.3d at 433.
423. Kyle, supra note 410, at 22 (citations omitted); see also Waiahole I, 9 P.3d at 423–24
(discussing plantation owners involved in the case, but not their predecessors).
424. Waiahole I, 9 P.3d at 454, 467.
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public trust doctrine has been elevated by the people of the Hawaii to the
level of a constitutional mandate,425 the Waiahole I court condensed its pub-
lic trust jurisprudence into a couple of essential principles. First, the consti-
tutional amendment embodies both the protection and the maximum
reasonable and beneficial use of water resources.426 Second, the CWRM is
required to make plans and decisions regarding water “from a global, long-
term perspective”427 while protecting and preserving “the rights of present and
future generations in the waters of the state”428 as well applying the precau-
tionary principle to trust resources.429
In the face of water use permit applications, the court held that the
CWRM must begin with a presumption in favor of public trust resources—
applicants have the burden of justifying their water uses in light of the
purposes protected by the public trust.430 Likewise, the state is compelled
to consider the water use application in the context of the cumulative im-
pact of current and proposed diversions, potential alternatives, and the pro-
motion of maximum beneficial use.431 The court summarized that the state
can only compromise public rights in trust resources in decisions made with
a “level of openness, diligence, and foresight commensurate with the high
priority these rights command under the laws of our state.”432
After Waiahole I, the Supreme Court of Hawaii used the public trust
doctrine to hold groundwater well permit applications subject to native Ha-
waiian water reservations.433 In addition, the Court has recognized the role
of the public trust doctrine in protecting wildlife habitat434 and water qual-
ity that was jeopardized by soil erosion.435 In each case, the Court required
the petitioners to show that a public trust violation had occurred but con-
cluded that the petitioner had been unable to demonstrate a threshold level
of harm to trust resources.436 Though the courts denied the public trust
425. Id. at 433.
426. Id. at 451. This requires the CWRM to both protect and develop waters to the
maximum extent practicable.
427. Id. at 455 (emphasis added).
428. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
429. Id. at 467.
430. Id. at 454.
431. Id. at 455–58.
432. Id. at 455.
433. See In re Wai’ola O Moloka’i Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 692–94 (Haw. 2001).
434. See, e.g., Morimoto v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 113 P.3d 172, 184 (Haw. 2005).
435. See, e.g., Kelly v. 1250 Ocean Side Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 989–90 (Haw. 2006).
436. See, e.g., Morimoto, 113 P.3d at 184 (finding the state had provided “substantial
evidence” there would be minimal impacts to wildlife and included mitigation measures);
Kelly, 140 P.3d at 1013 (finding the petitioners failed to meet their burden of demonstrating
that the State failed to uphold the public trust).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA104.txt unknown Seq: 65  4-JAN-16 9:52
Fall 2015] Public Trust Doctrine Implications of Electricity Production 233
claims in each case, they were careful to reiterate that the state and every
political subdivision thereof has a non-discretionary, affirmative duty to
protect all public trust resources.437
In 2012, the Supreme Court of Hawaii further expanded its jurisdic-
tional authority, recognizing the role of the public to utilize the public trust
doctrine to challenge any important water decisions on due process
grounds.438 The court held that, despite the lack of a statutory requirement
or authority for judicial review, the public can challenge interim instream
flow standards set by the CWRM under the public trust doctrine, citing the
importance of considering public water use rights, even in temporary stan-
dards.439 This opened the door for the public to challenge a myriad of State
actions and decisions concerning water resources.440
Hawaiian courts also have required permit applicants to demonstrate
that there is an “absence of practicable alternatives.”441 In addition, in a
recent public trust case regarding the bottling and sale of water, the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii affirmed the state’s manifest duty to require permit
applicants to demonstrate that their actions will have no adverse impacts on
the principles and purposes of the public trust doctrine.442 Emphasizing
that private commercial uses are not protected by the public trust and that
public rights in trust resources are superior to private developmental inter-
ests,443 the court distilled a framework of the public trust doctrine detailing
the trust obligations of the state, based on prior case law:
a. The agency’s duty is to maintain the purity and flow of [state]
waters for future generations and to assure that the waters . . .
are put to reasonable and beneficial use.
b. The agency must determine whether the proposed use is consis-
tent with the trust purposes:
i. the maintenance of waters in their natural state;
ii. the protection of domestic water use;
437. Morimoto, 113 P.3d at 184; Kelly, 140 P.3d at 1006–10.
438. In re Iao Ground Water Mgmt. Area High-Level Source Water Use Permit Appli-
cation & Petition (Four Great Waters), 287 P.3d 129, 145 (Haw. 2012).
439. Id. at 163.
440. Kyle, supra note 410, at 37; see also Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 183 (Acoba, J.,
concurring) (noting that a “public trust claim can be raised by members of the public who are
affected by potential harm to the public trust” and arguing for further expansion of the
Court’s jurisdiction regarding public trust cases).
441. In re Contested Case Hearing On the Water Use Permit Application Filed By
Kukui (Molokai), Inc. (Kukui (Molokai)), 174 P.3d 320, 334–35 (Haw. 2007).
442. Kauai Springs, Inc. v. Planning Comm’n, 324 P.3d 951, 984 (Haw. 2014).
443. Id. at 983.
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iii. the protection of water in exercise of Native Hawaiian and
traditional and customary rights; and
iv. the reservation of water enumerated by the State Water
Code.
c. The agency is to apply a presumption in favor of public use,
access, enjoyment, and resource protection.
d. The agency should evaluate each proposal for use on a case-by-
case basis, recognizing that there can be no vested rights in the
use of public water.
e. If the requested use is private or commercial, the agency should
apply a high level of scrutiny.
f. The agency should evaluate the proposed use under a “reasona-
ble and beneficial use” standard, which requires examination of
the proposed use in relation to other public and private uses.444
The Hawaiian public trust doctrine, through its confluence of origins,
has developed into a powerful constitutional and statutory tool that pro-
vides comprehensive protection for water resources. Furthermore, the pub-
lic trust doctrine has provided “the judiciary with broad authority to
mandate concrete, substantive results and grants them wide latitude in fash-
ioning outcomes that adequately protect State’s trust resources.”445 Given
the doctrine’s strength, it is surprising that Hawaiian courts have not found
a single wildlife trust violation in any case they have heard.446 Instead,
courts have focused on stringent protection on the water aspect of the pub-
lic trust doctrine. Despite the robust protection of water resources, there
has been no application of the public trust doctrine to Hawaii’s electricity
production.
3. Overview of Current Hawaii Electricity Laws
Given the high economic and environmental costs of fossil fuels, Ha-
waii has set lofty goals for renewable energy initiatives and developed a
number of renewable energy laws. Hawaiian law requires the statewide re-
duction of GHG emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2020.447 To accom-
plish this goal, Hawaii enacted an RPS, requiring 15% generation come
from renewable sources by 2015, increasing to 25% by 2020, and rising to an
444. Id.
445. Kyle, supra note 410, at 50.
446. See, e.g., Morimoto v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 113 P.3d 172, 184 (Haw. 2005).
447. Douglas A. Codiga, Hawaii Clean Energy Law and Policy, 13 HAW. B.J. 4 (2009); see
also HAW. REV. STAT. § 342B-72(a)(1) (2010) (instructing the Department of Health Director
to establish measures to “achieve the maximum practically and technically feasible and cost-
effective reductions in greenhouse gas emission”).
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ambitious 40% by 2030.448 In addition to the RPS, Hawaii has also devel-
oped an energy efficiency portfolio standard (EEPS), requiring a 30% re-
duction in energy use by 2030.449 While Hawaii is currently ahead of both
their interim RPS and EEPS goals,450 as of January 1, 2015, energy effi-
ciency measures stopped counting towards the RPS.451 Combining the
EEPS and the RPS, Hawaii seeks to accomplish a 70% reduction in fossil
fuel use and climate change emissions by 2030.452
Hawaii has developed a specific permitting process for renewable en-
ergy projects, known as section 201N, including a full-time Renewable En-
ergy Facilitator position to streamline the development of renewable energy
projects.453 Likewise, the state of Hawaii offers residents an investment tax
credit of 35% of total capital costs of solar projects and 20% of capital costs
of wind projects.454 The Hawaiian Public Utilities Commission (HPUC)
has also implemented a feed-in tariff (“Hawaii FIT”), guaranteeing any-
where from 12 to 31.5 cents per kWh, depending on the technology, for new
renewable energy projects, though the program is constrained to projects
less than or equal to 5 MW in capacity.455 Thus far, the Hawaii FIT has
largely been used for local or residential solar PV projects.456
448. HAW. REV. STAT. § 269-92(a) (2007 & Supp. 2013).
449. Id. § 269-96 (2007 & Supp. 2013). As an aside, there may be public trust implica-
tions of energy efficiency programs, such as the use of seawater to provide air conditioning.
See JONATHAN LILLEY ET AL., CENTER FOR SUSTAINABLE COASTAL TOURISM, POTENTIAL BENEFITS, IM -
PACTS, AND PUBLIC OPINION OF SEA WATER AIR CONDITIONING IN WAIKIKI (2013), http://
seagrant.soest.hawaii.edu/sites/default/files/publications/web_final_swac_public_report_2
.pdf.
450. HPUC, supra note 395, at 26–29. In fact, in 2013, the HPUC found that Hawaii
was ahead of schedule, already at its required 2015 levels. Id. at 26.
451. HAW. REV. STAT. § 269-92(b)(2). Before this change, energy reductions counted to-
wards the renewable energy production goals. HPUC, supra note 395, at 26.
452. Codiga, supra note 447, at 6–7.
453. HAW. REV. STAT. § 201N-1 to 201N-33 (2001 & Supp. 2013); see also HAW. REV.
STAT. § 201-12.5 (2001 & Supp. 2013) (establishing the duties of the Renewable Energy
Facilitator).
454. Id. § 235-12.5. However, this incentive is capped at $5,000 and $1,500 for solar and
wind projects, respectively. Id.
455. Haw. Elec. Co., Feed-In Tariff Program, CLEAN ENERGY (2015), http://www.heco
.com/heco/Clean-Energy/Clean-Energy-Generation (follow “Feed-in Tariff (FIT)” hyper-
link). Briefly, a feed-in tariff is a policy mechanism that guarantees a price for renewable
electricity that is provided to the grid, often at rates much higher than the retail price of
electricity. See generally Toby Couture & Yves Gagnon, An Analysis of Feed-in Tariff Remuner-
ation Models: Implications for Renewable Energy Investment, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 955 (2010).
456. Codiga, supra note 447, at 10.
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4. Applications of the Public Trust Doctrine in Hawaii
Despite lofty renewable energy goals and electricity production that is
dominated by fossil fuels and large water use, Hawaiian courts have not
been called upon to consider substantive legal challenges to the state’s elec-
tricity policy. Because the state has not faced any significant legal challenges
to its renewable energy plans, it does not yet need to utilize the public trust
doctrine as a legal defense, though it may need to in the future as renewable
energy penetration increases. However, at present, the public trust doctrine
provides a tool for Hawaiian citizens to accelerate the state’s transition to
renewable energy, thus affording further protection of trust resources.
First, the Hawaiian public could utilize the strict protections on public
trust water resources to attempt to force conventional electricity production
plants to retrofit their open-cycle CWIS to closed-cycle. In 2013, pumps
associated with electricity production comprised approximately 14 to 20% of
Hawaii’s overall water withdrawals.457 Furthermore, the overwhelming ma-
jority of these power plants utilize open-cycle CWIS despite Hawaii’s pro-
tectionist water resource laws.458 Applying the framework from the public
trust case law regarding water use to the electricity production’s current
water use clearly implicates the continued operation of open-cycle CWIS.
Courts have repeatedly emphasized that while private commercial uses of
water are not forbidden, they must meet a high level of scrutiny and maxi-
mize benefits to society, including mitigation measures and a lack of any
practicable alternative.459
While this logic has typically been applied to private parties that have
to bear increased capital costs to access alternative sources of water,460 there
457. Email from Neal Fujii, State Drought and Water Conservation Coordinator to
Lance Noel, (Mar. 2, 2015) (on file with author) (providing well-pumping data from the
Comm’n on Water Resources Management (CWRM) demonstrating that total withdrawals
associated with electricity production in Hawaii in 2013 were 63.8 million gallons per day
(mgd) and total Hawaiian withdrawals were 462 mgd, including brackish water); CTR. FOR
ISLAND CLIMATE ADAPTATION & POLICY (ICAP), WATER RESOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTA-
TION IN HAWAI’I: ADAPTIVE TOOLS IN THE CURRENT LAW AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 10 (2012), http://
islandclimate.net/publications/ (total Hawaiian water withdrawals in 2010, the most recent
year available, were 316.4 mgd, not including brackish water). Moreover, since the CRWM
does not keep track of CWIS that use ocean water, these figures and impacts are conserva-
tive and do not include all power plants.
458. See HAW. ELEC. CO., HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY IMPROVEMENT PLAN 5–62
(2014), http://dms.puc.hawaii.gov/dms/ (search for docket number 2014-0183, which directs
you to Power Supply Improvement Plans for Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc., Docket No.
2014-0183 (Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n Aug. 26, 2014), switch to “Documents” tab, and look
for the Improvement Plan document).
459. Waiahole I, 9 P.3d 409, 454–55 (Haw. 2000).
460. Id. at 427–28; see also Kukui (Molokai), 174 P.3d 320, 495–96 (Haw. 2007).
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is no reason this cannot or should not be applied to the capital costs to
implement alternative technologies, such as a CWIS, to greatly reduce water
demand. In accordance with the public trust doctrine, the state should re-
quire permittees to demonstrate an absence of any practicable mitigating
measures, such as retrofitting to a closed-cycle CWIS, especially given the
reliance on limited water and wildlife resources of the islands.
Beyond the direct water and wildlife impacts of the continued use of
conventional electricity, Hawaii faces substantial impacts from climate
change on its resources due to its island nature and low-lying topography.461
One of the impacts of climate change that is of particular concern to Hawaii
is sea-level rise and salt water intrusion, decreasing fresh groundwater dis-
charge.462 Because climate change, through sea-level rise, will affect the pre-
sent and future generations’ interest in the use of groundwater, the state has
the authority and duty to minimize these impacts under the public trust
doctrine.
Furthermore, Hawaiian courts have adopted a perspective on the public
trust that is highly conducive to the connection between climate change and
public trust waters. For example, the courts have advised state agencies to
adopt a global, intergenerational perspective and ignore “artificial distinc-
tions” not borne out of the present practical realities or current knowl-
edge.463 These principles, combined with the scientific knowledge of
climate change’s impact on Hawaii’s natural resources, give the state a clear
authority under the public trust doctrine to regulate sectors that contribute
to climate change and thereby protect all waters of the state, especially
those reserved for public trust and native Hawaiian uses.
Despite the state’s commitment to large-scale development of renewa-
ble energy and the enactment of section 201N to facilitate renewable energy
permitting, the permitting process continues to be seen as the main barrier
for renewable energy development in Hawaii.464 Confounding this issue,
461. Wager, supra note 403, at 64–65.
462. Michael et al., supra note 216, at 2230–38 (finding that the areas most likely to be
vulnerable to these impacts are topography-limited, whereas other areas of Hawaii are
recharge-limited and unlikely to be as vulnerable to the impacts from sea-level rise); see also
ICAP, supra note 457, at 16 (discussing the rate of sea level rise in Hawaii and noting the
impact on salt water intrusion).
463. Waiahole I, 9 P.3d at 447 (determining that the scope of the sovereign should not be
constrained to “artificial distinctions neither recognized by the ancient system nor borne out
in the present practical realities of the state” while recognizing that the public trust doctrine
“does not remain fixed for all time, but must conform to changing needs and circumstances”).
464. S. BUSCHE ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., RENEWABLE ENERGY PERMITTING BAR-
RIERS IN HAWAI’I: EXPERIENCE FROM THE FIELD 11 (2013), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/
55630.pdf (“The permitting process continues to be a main barrier to the development of
renewable energy projects in Hawai’i[.]”).
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the Hawaiian Department of Business, Economic Development & Tourism
(DBEDT), which the legislature charged with implementing section 201N,
recently conducted a study urging the legislature to repeal section 201N.465
Specifically, the DBEDT argues that section 201N fails to streamline re-
newable energy permitting and may actually prolong permitting time, in-
cluding the perception that the DBEDT has become an unnecessary
“middleman” that agencies are reluctant to commit to deadlines with, which
in turn makes the process undesirable to renewable energy developers.466
On the other hand, repealing section 201N potentially reduces community
involvement by creating the public perception that DBEDT no long sup-
ports renewable energy development and by decreasing opportunities for
public engagement during project development.467
Essentially, section 201N is an imperfect statute with several useful
provisions that may be lost in the inefficacy of other provisions. Connecting
the public trust doctrine to Hawaii’s energy planning decisions can help
alleviate these concerns with section 201N and guide developers and per-
mitting agencies under established expectations while the permitting stat-
utes are repealed or amended, especially since the Hawaiian courts have
ruled that the public trust can never be subsumed.468 It may be useful for
the State, in the absence of section 201N, to apply the public trust frame-
work as laid out in Kauai Springs to electricity permitting.469
The deployment of renewable electricity would increase the purity and
flow of waters and return water to its source from private commercial
CWIS. This would return waters back to the presumably favored uses of
the public, while also reducing climate change and mercury pollution. This
implies that the state has an affirmative obligation to implement renewable
energy to properly discharge its fiduciary duty. This affirmative obligation
also could work to facilitate DBEDT’s streamlining of renewable energy
permitting without the agency having to rely on the burdensome and inef-
fective section 201N.
465. DEP ’T OF BUS., ECON. DEV., & TOURISM, HAWAII STATE ENERGY OFFICE, RENEWABLE
ENERGY FACILITATION ACTIVITIES AND THE RENEWABLE ENERGY FACILITY SITING PROCESS (2014),
http://energy.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Act-208-201N-Facilitator-Report_11-
20-14_FINAL.pdf; see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 201N-1 to -33 (2001 & Supp. 2013).
466. DEP ’T OF BUS., ECON. DEV., & TOURISM, supra note 465, at 11–12.
467. Id. at 14–15. While the DBEDT has made “considerable effort to notify and engage
communities in its everyday operations,” repealing section 201N would require DBEDT to
engage stakeholders further for the other resources still available through DBEDT outside of
section 201N. Id.
468. Waiahole I, 9 P.3d at 442–43 (finding the “suggestion that such a statute could
extinguish the public trust, however, contradicts the doctrine’s basic premise, that the state
has certain powers and duties which it cannot legislatively abdicate”).
469. See Kauai Springs, Inc. v. Planning Comm’n, 324 P.3d 951, 984 (Haw. 2014).
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Conversely, since Hawaiian courts have highly scrutinized agencies
when they appear to abdicate their public trust duties and have recognized
the public’s right to judicial review, the public will have assurance that the
DBEDT will continue to implement policies to encourage renewable en-
ergy. Any failure to uphold its duties could then result in judicial interven-
tion to force DBEDT to protect public trust resources.470 Therefore, should
section 201N be repealed, the public trust doctrine could work to advance
the best of both worlds—the DBEDT could effectively encourage renewable
energy in the absence of an effective statutory regime, and the citizens of
Hawaii would be assured that the DBEDT will continue to implement re-
newable energy policies.
The comprehensive framework provided by Hawaii’s public trust doc-
trine also protects against renewable energy deployment needlessly im-
pacting public trust resources. For example, while wind energy provides
significant benefits to public trust resources, there are growing concerns
about its impacts to the endangered Hawaiian Hoary Bat.471 Because the
Hawaiian public trust doctrine authorizes and requires state agencies to
continually reassess previous public trust-related permitting decisions, espe-
cially if the nature of the impact or possible alternatives on trust resources
have changed,472 the state can require all electricity production, including
wind energy, to implement further mitigation at any time, even if the state
has already granted the operator a permit. Such flexibility ensures that the
state implements the most reasonable and beneficial electricity production
while concomitantly maximizing protection of trust resources and value to
society.
The public trust doctrine can ensure that Hawaii continues to imple-
ment renewable energy in a way that maximizes value to society in accor-
dance with its trust duties, benefiting both the state and its citizens.
Through the public trust doctrine, citizens are granted a legal tool to force
the state to continually implement environmental protections in electricity
planning. Likewise, the state is authorized under the trust to take broad
470. Although DBEDT was not originally burdened with any public trust duties by
statute, nor has it been burdened by the courts, Hawaii’s Constitution dictates that all politi-
cal subdivisions of the State shall conserve and protect all natural resources of Hawaii, which
would necessarily include the DBEDT. See HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
471. See Edward B. Arnett & Erin F. Baerwarld, Impacts of Wind Energy Development on
Bats: Implications for Conservation, in BAT EVOLUTION, ECOLOGY, AND CONSERVATION 435, 444–45
(Rick A. Adams & Scott C. Pedersen eds., 2013). While current impacts on the bats are
minimal, increased penetration of wind energy may be cause for concern. Id. (stating that
there have been somewhere between 4 and 8 Hawaiian hoary bats found at wind facilities
and that wind power expansion may increase mortality for various endangered bat species).
472. See Waiahole I, 9 P.3d at 461.
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action to streamline permitting and implementation of renewable energy,
which Hawaii may find particularly useful in the coming years as RPS goals
become potentially more difficult to accomplish. In conclusion, legislative
recognition of the public trust doctrine’s application to Hawaiian electricity
planning and policy will improve decisionmaking, increase regulatory cer-
tainty, allow further community involvement, and maximize protection of
the environment.
D. New Jersey
1. Current Electricity System
New Jersey relies almost entirely on natural gas and nuclear electricity
generation. Together, these sources comprised nearly 93% of electric gener-
ation in 2014.473 The remaining 7% came primarily from coal, solar, landfill
gas, and oil.474 Conventional electricity dominates the New Jersey grid, gen-
erating 97% of all electricity.475 Minimal coal usage and high penetrations of
nuclear and natural gas results in fewer toxic and climate change emissions,
especially in comparison to other grids such as Wisconsin and Hawaii that
rely on coal or oil.476 However, reliance on thermal power plants, especially
nuclear, has substantial negative effects on water resources and aquatic orga-
nisms. Thus, the absence of renewable energy poses threats to New Jersey’s
water and aquatic wildlife resources and, to a lesser extent, to the mitigation
of climate change and toxic emissions.
2. Public Trust Doctrine in New Jersey
New Jersey has developed a unique perspective on the public trust doc-
trine. New Jersey was the one of first states to recognize and apply the
public trust doctrine in Arnold v. Mundy,477 a hallmark case that “arose from
a dispute in New Jersey over just a few bushels of oysters.”478 Arnold fo-
cused on ownership of and access to oysters located on the bed of a naviga-
ble river, and the New Jersey Supreme Court seized the opportunity to
broadly enunciate public rights.479 The Arnold court first found that title to
473. EIA, supra note 281 (detailing plant-specific monthly generation in New Jersey for
the year of 2014).
474. Id. New Jersey has one wind farm, which represents only 0.3% of generation. Id.
475. Id.
476. On the other hand, New Jersey imports a substantial amount of its electricity, at
least 25% of demand, most of which is coal-generated. N.J. BD. OF PUB. UTIL., NEW JERSEY
ENERGY MASTER PLAN 26 (2011).
477. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
478. Timothy M. Mulvaney & Brian Weeks, “Waterlocked”: Public Access to New Jersey’s
Coastline, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 579, 587 (2007).
479. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 12–13.
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submerged lands under navigable rivers and the sea, as well as the exclusive
right to fish, are reserved to the sovereign power of the state, which “hold[s]
them subject to the common right of fishery of the citizens at large, of
which they cannot deprive them.”480 The court went on to note that any
such deprivation “would be a grievance which never could be long borne by
a free people.”481
Though Arnold would become an influential case, impacting public trust
cases in numerous jurisdictions for years to come,482 its broad language did
not immediately produce a broad public trust doctrine in New Jersey. De-
spite the lofty language used in Arnold, the New Jersey public trust doctrine
“remained relatively quiet from the second half of the nineteenth century
through the first half of the twentieth century.”483 However, in 1972, in its
first major action on the public trust since Arnold, the New Jersey Supreme
Court lifted the public trust doctrine out of the water, expanding it to guar-
antee the public’s right to enjoy beach access.484 The court ruled that the
public trust doctrine is sufficiently broad to include “public accessibility to
and use of such lands for recreation and health, including boating and asso-
ciated activities.”485 In finding that the public rights in tidal lands extend to
“recreational uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore activities,”
the court stressed that the “public trust doctrine, like all common law prin-
ciples should not be considered fixed or static, but should be molded and
extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created
to benefit.”486
The New Jersey Supreme Court next expanded the scope of the public
trust to include municipally-owned upland sand areas adjacent to the tidal
480. Id. at 30–31.
481. Id. at 78.
482. The first U.S. Supreme Court public trust cases relied on Arnold. Martin v. Wad-
dell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 417–18 (1842) (discussing Arnold as being “entitled to great
weight”); id. at 419 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (concluding that the “majority of the court
seem[s] to have adopted the doctrine of Arnold . . .”); Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,
456 (1892) (reiterating Waddell’s Lessee’s reliance on Arnold); see also BLUMM & WOOD, supra
note 19, at 693–95 (discussing Waddell’s Lessee and Illinois Central and their reliance on
Arnold).
483. Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 478, at 587. The cases until that point generally
focused on questions of title of submerged lands. See, e.g., Bailey v. Driscoll, 111 A.2d 265,
267 (N.J. 1955) (holding that the title of riparian owners only extended to the high-water
mark, and anything below that title belonged to the state in trust).
484. Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 53 (N.J. 1972); see also
David Carboni, Rising Tides: Reaching the High-Water Mark of New Jersey’s Public Trust Doc-
trine, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 95, 102 (2012).
485. Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 306–07. It is worth noting that the Court went on to cite
Sax, supra note 28, as an authority in the expansion of the public trust doctrine. Id. at 310.
486. Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 309.
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waters.487 The court then moved to beach access to dry sand uplands owned
by a quasi-public, quasi-private entity in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement
Association.488 The Bay Head Improvement Association prohibited access to
the waters via their beach, as well as the use of their foreshore for recrea-
tional purposes, but did not restrict use of the water itself.489 However, the
court held that “[w]ithout some means of access the public right to use the
foreshore would be meaningless” and would effectively eliminate the rights
of the public trust doctrine.490 Thus, the court held that private dry sand
uplands are, to some degree, subject to the public trust doctrine and devel-
oped a four point framework to determine when privately-owned dry sand
uplands must be made available to satisfy the public.491 The four points
include:
1) Location of the dry sand area in relation to the foreshore.
2) Extent and availability of publicly-owned upland sand areas.
3) Nature and extent of the public demand.
4) Usage of the upland sand by the owner.492
Two decades after Matthews, the New Jersey Supreme Court revisited
the access rights of the public, this time considering an entirely privately-
owned, dry sandy upland in Raleigh Avenue Beach Association v. Atlantis
Beach Club.493 Reaffirming that “reasonable access to the sea is integral to
the public trust doctrine,”494 the court applied the Matthews four-point
framework, concluding that the each point was satisfied and thus the public
has a right to use and access these private lands in question.495 Most re-
cently, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the public trust doctrine to
deny a takings claim that arose due to an expansive beach replenishment
program.496 The New Jersey courts also have held that even when the state
conveys riparian lands, riparian rights are subject to the public trust, and the
487. See Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 573 (N.J. 1978).
488. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
489. Id. at 359–60.
490. Id. at 364.
491. Id. at 365.
492. Id. The Court provided this framework to help guide future applications of the
public trust doctrine to privately-owned sandy uplands but did not speak to the relative
importance of the four points. In addition, the Court declined to rule that all private beaches
are subject to the public trust, and to what extent, only deciding that private lands are not
immune from public trust claims. Id. at 369.
493. Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005).
494. Id. at 120.
495. Id. at 121–24.
496. See City of Long Branch v. Liu, 4 A.3d 542 (N.J. 2010).
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state “never waives its rights to regulate the use of the public trust
property.”497
Despite a robust public trust doctrine in relation to beach access, there
have only been a few modern applications to water or wildlife resources.
The case of most relevance to electricity production498 is New Jersey Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., which
held that fish and wildlife are trust resources.499 The court held that the
State not only has the right, but more substantially, has an affirmative fidu-
ciary obligation to ensure that the public’s rights are protected, as well as a
duty to seek compensation for any diminution of trust resources.500
The court also recently emphasized trust language in ZRB, LLC v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, a case regarding endangered
species, finding that the legislative policy underlying the regulation of en-
dangered and threatened species “is to ‘manage all forms of wildlife to
insure their continued participation in the ecosystem’ and to ‘accord special
protection’ to endangered species.”501 The court continued that “[w]ildlife is
the common property of all and held in trust by the State for all its peo-
ple.”502 Nevertheless, this constitutes merely dicta, and the New Jersey
courts have not since addressed whether wildlife is part of the public trust
doctrine, much less detailed the fiduciary duties of the state to protect
wildlife.
New Jersey courts have applied the public trust doctrine to water in two
other contexts: wetlands and drinking water. The court rejected a public
trust claim that a permit to fill wetlands would damage the public interest,
concluding that the petitioner failed to show that a public trust violation
had occurred.503 It found that compensatory mitigation of other wetland
areas not only does not violate the public trust doctrine but indeed serves
the public interest by promoting tidally flowing and fresh waters.504 A New
Jersey court also stated that because water is essential for human life, the
497. Karam v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 205 A.2d 1221, 1228 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1998) (citations omitted).
498. See supra notes 123–28 and accompanying text.
499. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 336 A.2d 750 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev’d on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976).
500. Id.
501. ZRB, LLC v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 959 A.2d 866, 879 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2008) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:2A-2 (West 1997)).
502. Id. (citation omitted).
503. In re Proposed Xanadu Redev. Project, 955 A.2d 976, 1002 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2008).
504. Id. The court also granted substantial deference to the state agencies in this deci-
sion, despite the potential impairment to public trust resources. Id. at 998.
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public trust doctrine applies with “equal impact upon the control of our
drinking water reserves.”505
Despite these examples, the New Jersey public trust doctrine is un-
derutilized and underdeveloped outside the context of beach access. Indeed,
although it was once considered to be a public trust doctrine pioneer, “New
Jersey now finds itself behind the curve in protecting the public’s right to
common ecological resources.”506 Furthermore, despite the notoriety of the
New Jersey public trust doctrine, the state lacks any constitutional provi-
sions codifying the public trust doctrine, and proposals to introduce such a
provision have not been successful.507 Although the state statutes make it
clear that water resources are held in trust for the public,508 no court has
been called upon to adjudicate the scope and depth of the responsibilities
that this statute places on the State. Therefore, the application of the New
Jersey public trust doctrine to electricity production will rely largely on the
common law, especially as it relates to the public’s right to recreation.
3. Overview of Current New Jersey Electricity Laws
New Jersey’s renewable electricity laws are largely comprised of its RPS
standards and the associated Renewable Energy Credits (RECs).509 The
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (NJBPU) adopted a schedule that re-
quires, by May, 2015,510 that all electricity providers achieve an RPS of
11.3%, rising to a total of just over 20% by end of 2020.511 In addition to the
overall RPS, there are also two carve-outs requiring a certain amount of
solar and offshore wind.
The solar carve-out requires that a portion of all generation come from
distributed solar energy using Solar Renewable Energy Credits (SRECs),
505. City of Clifton v. Passaic Valley Water Comm’n, 539 A.2d 760, 765 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1987), aff’d, 557 A.2d 299 (N.J. 1989).
506. Carboni, supra note 484, at 106.
507. Id. at 122.
508. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:1A-2 (West 2009 & Supp. 2015) (“[W]ater resources of the
State are public assets of the State held in trust for its citizens . . . .”).
509. Id. § 48:3-49 (West 2009 & Supp. 2015); see also Joshua S. Wirtshafter, The Solar
Resurrection: Keeping New Jersey’s Solar Industry Alive at the Expensive of Ratepayers, 38 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 189, 193–94 (2013) (detailing the history of the New Jersey RPS law and its
amendments).
510. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-51 (West 2009 & Supp. 2015). This statute was chal-
lenged in PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3rd Cir. 2014), where the Third
Circuit found a different section, New Jersey Statutes section 48:3-98.2(b), was preempted
by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulations, without preempting section 48:3-51.
The court explicitly stated that “states may select the type of generation to be built—wind or
solar, gas or coal,” essentially protecting the New Jersey RPS in section 48:3-51. PPL
Energyplus, 766 F.3d at 255.
511. See N.J. STAT. ANN.  § 48:3-87(d) (West 2009 & Supp. 2015).
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which can be obtained for every megawatt hour (MWh) of solar energy
produced.512 As a result of New Jersey’s carve-out for solar, their SREC
market is by far the largest in the nation, comprising nearly three-quarters
of all national SREC trading.513 However, the SREC market has fluctuated
substantially since its inception in 2005, including a recent crash of SREC
prices in 2012.514 To save the SREC market, the New Jersey Legislature
passed the Solar Resurrection Law in 2012, which has had mixed levels of
success.515
The second carve-out requirement under the New Jersey RPS directs
the NJBPU to establish a program to authorize offshore renewable energy
credits (ORECs) to support the construction of 1,100 megawatts of quali-
fied wind projects.516 The NJBPU also adopted rules on what constitutes a
qualified offshore wind project, requiring applicants to show, among other
things, a complete financial analysis of the offshore wind developer and of
the project, a cost-benefit test demonstrating net benefits to the State, and a
proposed OREC price, along with whatever other information the NJBPU
requires.517 However, unlike the RPS and the solar carve-out, there is no
time constraint on the state to achieve the 1,100 megawatts of qualified
wind projects. The NJBPU has full discretion to approve qualified offshore
wind projects.518 To date, the NJBPU has not done so and has not required
any OREC obligations.519
512. Id. § 48:3-87(d)(3). 2.45% of all generation in energy year (EY) 2015 must come
from distributed solar energy, rising to 4.01% by EY 2028. Id.
513. LORI BIRD, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., NREL REPORT NO. TP-6A20-52868, SO-
LAR RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATE (SREC) MARKETS: STATUS AND TRENDS 3, 19 (2011), http://
www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/52868.pdf.
514. Wirshafter, supra note 509, at 198. In 2012 the SREC price decreased from a high
of $650 to a low of $50, largely due to an oversupply of SRECs in comparison to require-
ments. Id.
515. Id. at 202–03. As of October 2015, prices have slightly rebounded to $170 per
SREC. See N.J. Clean Energy Program, Current SREC Trading Statistics Energy Year 2015,
SREC PRICING, http://www.njcleanenergy.com/renewable-energy/project-activity-reports/
srec-pricing/srec-pricing (last visited Oct. 14. 2015).
516. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-87(d)(4) (West 2009 & Supp. 2015).
517. N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 14:8-6.5(a)(1) to 14:8-6.5(a)(16) (2015); see N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 48:3-87.1(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2015).
518. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-6.2 (2015).
519. See, e.g., Brief of Respondent New Jersey Board of Public Utilities at 8, In re Peti-
tion of Fishermen’s Atlantic City Windfarm, LLC (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 15, 2015)
(No. A-3932-13T3) [hereinafter NJBPU Brief] (A recent offshore wind application by the
developer Fishermen’s Energy has been denied several times and faced substantial
difficulties.).
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4. Applications of the Public Trust Doctrine in New Jersey
Because New Jersey overwhelmingly relies on conventional sources of
electricity, particularly nuclear, the state’s electricity production causes sub-
stantial damage to water and wildlife resources through water withdrawals.
For example, in 2009, the most recent data available, the New Jersey De-
partment of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) estimated that nearly half
of all withdrawals in the state were from power plants, most of which used
an open-cycle CWIS.520 Such withdrawals damage not only water quality,
but also aquatic organisms that are killed as a result of impingement and
entrainment (I&E).521 Additionally, reliance on natural gas also contributes
to climate change. With this in mind, there are two potential applications of
the public trust doctrine to the impacts from electricity production. First, it
may be applied directly to the public interest in wildlife and water re-
sources, and second, it may be applied to water and wildlife impacts indi-
rectly through the public’s right to enjoy beaches and recreation.
As developed above, there is some precedent for the direct application
of the public trust doctrine to the wildlife impacts of electricity produc-
tion522 as well as statutory support for a similar application regarding water
impacts.523Although less developed than access to dry sand beaches, the
relative silence of New Jersey jurisprudence on the public trust’s application
to wildlife and water does not necessarily imply that the courts will not
apply it robustly in the future. In fact, New Jersey courts have generally
treated the scope of the trust doctrine as expansive, implying that it should
be extended or fashioned in accordance to the public interest.524 Given the
public’s growing concern for wildlife and the environment, especially as
they are impacted by climate change,525 it is reasonable to see how New
Jersey courts could mold the heavily beach-access orientated public trust
precedent to address the public’s current needs: protecting local wildlife and
520. JEFFREY L. HOFFMAN, WATER WITHDRAWALS IN NEW JERSEY FROM 2000 TO 2009 (2014),
http://www.state.nj.us/dep/njgs/enviroed/infocirc/withdrawals2009.pdf.
521. See supra Section IV.B.
522. See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 336 A.2d 750,
759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev’d on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976).
523. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:1A-2 (West 2006 & Supp. 2015).
524. E.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12 (1821); see also Carboni, supra note 484, at 126
(“[T]he overall trend of the public trust doctrine in New Jersey has been to progressively
recognize the public’s changing needs . . . .”); see also Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d
571, 573 (N.J. 1978).
525. See, e.g., Michael R. Greenberg et al., Public Support for Policies After Hurricane
Sandy, 34 RISK ANALYSIS 997, 1007 (finding 64% of surveyed New Jersey residents felt that
climate change is a risk to them and their families).
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water resources from the direct impacts of conventional electricity
production.
In fashioning such an application, the New Jersey judiciary might look
to public trust doctrine jurisprudence in jurisdictions beyond its boundaries,
as it has in the past. In Neptune City, for example, the court reviewed case
law from Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Oregon, and California to come to the
conclusion that beach access is required under the public trust doctrine.526
By looking to other jurisdictions, as well as the expansiveness and flexibility
of its own public trust doctrine, New Jersey courts could, and indeed
should, readily conclude that water and wildlife resources that are impacted
by New Jersey’s electricity system are included in the public trust res.
The direct application of the public trust doctrine to wildlife and water
resources is not its only possible application to electricity production. Elec-
tricity production may directly reduce the public’s ability to enjoy New
Jersey’s beaches by reducing opportunities to view wildlife and by degrading
water quality.527 The more substantial concern, however, is that New
Jersey’s electricity system will continue to significantly threaten beaches by
contributing to climate change, causing “severe long-term erosion and de-
struction associated with major storm events.”528 In addition to destruction
from hurricanes and other storm events, the New Jersey coast also faces the
“looming threat of migrating shorelines due to sea level rise” from climate
change.529 Taking these factors together, it is appropriate for the state to act
to protect the public interest in beach access and recreation from the dam-
ages caused by conventional electricity production. David Carboni has ar-
gued that the public trust should be used to facilitate adaptation to sea level
rise, suggesting the public has a right to preserve trust lands from destruc-
tion—“[O]therwise, there would be no lands for the public to enjoy.”530
If the public has such a right, it follows that the state has the authority
and duty to actively prevent this destruction. Thus far, the New Jersey leg-
islature has failed to take action to mitigate rising sea levels. In the absence
of legislative action, the judiciary may well be the only effective guardian to
prevent the harm of public trust resources caused by sea level rise.531 Given
that public access to its priceless beach areas will be endangered by sea level
526. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J.
1972).
527. Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 478, at 613.
528. Id. at 600–01; Lauren Mudd et al., Assessing Climate Change Impact on the U.S. East
Coast Hurricane Hazard: Temperature, Frequency and Track, 15(3) NAT. HAZARDS REV. 04014001
(2014).
529. Carboni, supra note 484, at 97.
530. Id. at 126.
531. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA104.txt unknown Seq: 80  4-JAN-16 9:52
248 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 5:1
rise, the New Jersey courts themselves have recognized that “[p]rompt and
decisive action by the Court is needed.”532 Without significant state action,
New Jersey’s beaches will be substantially impaired, begging the question:
“What is the value of perpendicular public access to New Jersey’s coast-
line . . . if the public cannot enjoy themselves when they get there?”533
New Jersey courts can and should use the public trust doctrine to incen-
tivize renewable electricity to protect the public’s interest in water, wildlife,
and beaches. The public trust doctrine can alleviate two current renewable
energy problems in New Jersey: the underperforming SREC market,534 and
the persistent denial of offshore wind permit applications.535
The public trust doctrine could be utilized by citizen groups interested
in solar energy implementation to require the NJBPU to update the RPS,
cognizant of the public trust benefits, such that the SREC market would no
longer be debilitated. The New Jersey courts, if convinced that the NJBPU,
as a subdivision of the state,536 has public trust responsibilities, could order
the NJBPU to adopt higher RPS standards in accordance with the protec-
tion of public trust resources to the maximum extent practicable, while en-
suring that the NJBPU only requires climate change mitigation measures
that are cost effective.537
Assuming that NJBPU is burdened by the public trust doctrine, it also
would be useful to apply the public trust to the recent controversy regarding
the potential construction of a 25 MW offshore wind farm near Atlantic
532. Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 574 (N.J. 1978) (emphasis added).
533. Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 478, at 618.
534. Wirtshafter, supra note 509, at 213–14.
535. See In re Petition of Fishermen’s Atlantic City Windfarm, LLC for the Approval of
the State Waters Wind Project and Authorizing Offshore Wind Renewable Energy Certifi-
cates, No. A-3932-13T3, at 37 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).
536. Since New Jersey has not fully developed the obligations of the public trust doc-
trine, no New Jersey court has addressed whether any state agencies other than the NJDEP
and municipalities have the fiduciary duties of a trustee. However, many other states hold
that the public trust doctrine applies to all political subdivisions of the state. See, e.g., supra
note 470 and associated text (Hawaiian courts have held all political subdivisions of the state
have public trust duties under their Constitution.).
537. The NJBPU is required by statute to periodically consider increasing the RPS and
accounting for the reductions of air and water pollution. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-87(o)(1)
(West 2009 & Supp. 2015). Using a threshold of “maximum extent practicable” implies that
the NJBPU is not required to ignore the costs of raising the RPS but rather should only raise
the RPS to the extent that it is practicable, though it will depend on the definition of
“practicable.” A threshold of “maximum extent feasible” might permit or force substantially
higher increases to the RPS. Compare Waiahole I, 9 P.3d 409, 451 (Haw. 2000) (requiring the
CWRM to protect waters to the maximum extent practicable) with Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v.
Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983) (requiring protection of water and wildlife
resources so far as feasible).
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City by developer, Fishermen’s Energy.538 To briefly summarize the con-
tentious last three years of the project development process, Fishermen’s
Energy proposed to construct five 5-MW wind turbines as a demonstration
project 2.8 miles offshore from Atlantic City.539 As required by statute,
Fishermen’s Energy submitted an OREC price for the NJBPU to consider
as part of their permit application.540 After a remand from the New Jersey
Superior Court, the NJBPU denied the Fishermen’s Energy application,
saying that its proposal did not provide a net economic benefit to the
state.541 Fishermen’s Energy has since appealed the permit denial.542 Fish-
ermen’s Energy has mostly focused on arguing that NJBPU acted arbitrarily
and capriciously by refusing to use Fishermen’s proposed OREC price
while largely ignoring the NJBPU’s decision not to include environmental
benefits in their calculations.543 The public trust doctrine would be useful to
the efforts of Fishermen’s Energy in their appeal process in two ways. First,
the public trust doctrine could be used to force the NJBPU to consider the
monetized environmental benefits in the net benefits test. This would nec-
essarily increase the calculated benefits to the state under the net benefits
test, which, when added to the other benefits, would in turn likely outweigh
the costs of the project, regardless of which OREC price was selected. Also
at issue in Fishermen’s appeal is the degree of deference the court should
accord NJBPU.544 The NJPBU argues that the court must confine its re-
view exclusively to whether there exists “a reasonable basis for the Board’s
action.”545 Had the NJBPU been burdened by trustee responsibilities Fish-
538. In re Petition of Fishermen’s Atlantic City Windfarm, No. A-3932-13T3, at 37.
539. NJBPU Brief, supra note 519.
540. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-6.5(a)(1)–(16); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-87.1(a)(5)
(West 2009 & Supp. 2015). In their application, Fishermen’s Energy originally proposed an
OREC price of $454.78, but after switching turbine designs and receiving subsidies, reduced
the proposed OREC price to $199.17. See Brief on Behalf of the Petitioner/Appellant, Fish-
ermen’s Atlantic Windfarm, LLC at 14, In re Petition of Fishermen’s Atlantic City
Windfarm, LLC (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 15, 2014) (No. A-3932-13T3) [hereinafter
Fishermen’s Energy Brief].
541. NJBPU Brief, supra note 519, at 42. The NJBPU did not use Fishermen’s Energy’s
reduced OREC price, but rather used a price of $263 per MWh, citing uncertainty that
Fishermen’s Energy would receive the subsidies. Fishermen’s Energy argues that the refusal
to use the $199.17 OREC price out of concern of the project’s viability if they do not receive
the tax credit is capricious, because this would only result in Fishermen’s Energy’s rate of
return on the project decreasing from 9.78% to 7.49%, nowhere near the viability threshold,
especially from the ratepayer’s perspective. See Fishermen’s Energy Brief, supra note 540, at 56,
61.
542. Id. at 1.
543. Id. at 49–58.
544. NJBPU Brief, supra note 519, at 46.
545. Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
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ermen’s Energy would be able to argue that since NJBPU’s decision is dam-
aging trust resources, the court is burdened with a duty to take a “hard look”
at NJBPU’s decision, not grant it broad deference. One of the main pur-
poses of judicial review regarding the public trust doctrine is to provide a
check on other branches of the government, which works to prevent the
state from continuing to damage resources, resources which it holds in trust
for the benefit of the public.546
While New Jersey has not incorporated the public trust doctrine sub-
stantially beyond common law applications to beach access, the doctrine is
readily applicable to the impacts of New Jersey’s electricity production grid.
Not only would such application improve the resources held in trust for the
public, it would also benefit the energy policy and planning of the state,
ensuring reasonable development of renewable electricity.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
As seen in these four case studies,547 the public trust doctrine can pro-
vide a flexible legal tool to both citizens and governments to help advance
546. Instead, the Superior Court rejected Fishermen’s Energy’s proposition to grant
NJBPU little or no deference, and instead granted NJBPU its usual level of deference. As a
result, the court ruled that the NJBPU had not acted “unreasonably” and affirmed their
decision to deny the Fishermen’s Energy application. In re Petition of Fishermen’s Atlantic
City Windfarm, LLC for the Approval of the State Waters Wind Project and Authorizing
Offshore Wind Renewable Energy Certificates, No. A-3932-13T3, at 37 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2015).
547. In addition to the four states analyzed in-depth, the vast majority of states have
developed the constitutional, statutory, and common law bases for the public trust doctrine
in ways similar to the four states on which this Article focuses. See Robin Kundis Craig, A
Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrine: Public Values, Private Rights and
the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 81 (2010) (neither Ne-
braska nor Nevada have fully developed their public trust law); see also Robin Kundis Craig,
A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights
and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 24 (2007) (Alabama, Missouri, and West
Virginia have limited their public trust doctrines). Underscoring this point, a recent Penn-
sylvania case expanded the public trust doctrine to natural gas exploitation and development
and could serve as a model for other states to follow. Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.
3d 901 (Pa. 2013). Despite having constitutionalized the public trust doctrine, Pennsylvania
had minimally extended public rights beyond the traditional navigation and fishing interests.
However, in Robinson Township, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down under the
public trust doctrine a state law that pressured local governments to maximize oil and gas
development. Id. at 913, 1000. While doing so the court enunciated three principles based on
the doctrine: first, people have a right to an undamaged environment; second, the state is
burdened with the public trust doctrine and has an affirmative duty to protect trust re-
sources; and third, the state must protect trust resources in such a way that is impartial to all,
including both present and future generations. Id. at 957–59. To fulfill these fiduciary obliga-
tions, the court held that the state must “prevent degradation, diminution, or depletion of
public natural resources, and . . . act affirmatively to protect the environment . . . with the
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and shape renewable energy development. At present, each of the four
states remains beset with conventional sources of electricity production that
continue to pose substantial environmental risks to the public interest.
While each state’s sense of justice has produced a varied public trust doc-
trine, electricity production impacts all trust resources, whether they are the
traditional triad, or the emerging ecological aspects of the trust. As a result
of its general applicability across states, the public trust doctrine is uni-
formly available to states that are aggressively transitioning to renewable
electricity generation or those that have failed to advance renewable
production.
As illustrated in the four case studies, the public trust doctrine can
serve as: (1) a tool for citizens to force states to act on renewable electricity
development; (2) a legal defense for states to validate actions encouraging
renewable electricity development; (3) a means for courts to take a closer
look at legislation, rulemaking, and decisions in individual matters (such as
licenses, permits, and applications) made by the state that affect sources of
electricity generation in the state; and (4) an opportunity for state agencies
to supplement and guide imperfect statutes. Together, these four purposes
of the public trust can ensure reasonable and timely development of renew-
able electricity as well as sufficient protection of trust resources.
First, the public trust doctrine provides a greater role for the judiciary
to safeguard environmental concerns in the context of electricity produc-
tion. Given the urgency of climate change and the magnitude of the un-
checked impacts of electricity production, it is essential for the judiciary to
fill the void of government inaction and force governments “to fulfill their
fiduciary duty to the trust beneficiaries.”548 However, in environmental law,
the judiciary has lost its potency as a check on administrative agencies as a
result of its tendency to give substantial deference to agency decisions in
implementing their statutory and regulatory mandates.549 While adminis-
trative deference is an essential principle of the judiciary, the procedural
evident goal of promoting sustainable development.” Id. at 957–58 (emphasis added). Dozens of
other states have public trust provisions akin to the one found in Pennsylvania’s Constitu-
tion, and thus, the reasoning of Robinson Township could be applied in those states, including
application to electricity production’s impacts on water, wildlife, and climate change. Given
the trend of the public trust doctrine and the strong foundation of public trust statutory and
constitutional provisions across the nation, many states should be capable of expanding their
public trusts to electricity production in the coming years.
548. Torres & Bellinger, supra note 141, at 313–15.
549. Mary Christina Wood, “You Can’t Negotiate with a Beetle”: Environmental Law for a
New Ecological Age, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 167, 193 (2010); see also Citizens Climate Lobby v.
Cal. Air Res. Bd., CGC-12-519554, 2013 WL 861396 (Cal. Super. 2013) (implying that
California courts will likely continue to defer to CARB’s expertise regarding climate change
mitigation); Clean Wis., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wis., 700 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. 2005)
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nature of the public trust allows courts to review agency action with high
scrutiny without second-guessing agency expertise and allows the
reemergence of a more potent judiciary in environmental and energy law.
Because the judiciary is only applying procedural scrutiny to the actions of
the executive and legislative branches, the public trust doctrine does not
require any specific result.550 That is, the public trust doctrine does not
mandate a certain amount of renewable electricity to be built. This flexibil-
ity maximizes the benefit to the public by forcing states to weigh both the
benefits and costs of electricity development in their full context.551
This balancing of the true costs and benefits of electricity production is
in stark contrast to the strong emphasis of state public utility commissions,
and associated case law, on minimizing direct out-of-pocket costs to rate-
payers. Admittedly, conventional electricity production does have some
public benefits, including delivering electricity to consumers at low cost, if
one ignores externalities. Nonetheless, the duty of government in electricity
regulation “is not to us as consumers but to us as citizens.”552 Moreover, no
public benefit, even cheap electricity, makes any project immune to the
public trust doctrine.553 Furthermore, the public trust doctrine can compel
full consideration of the non-monetized benefits of renewable electricity,
such as the reductions in fish deaths and greenhouse gas emissions. While
current environmental law provides little consideration of these non-market
costs and benefits, the flexible nature of the public trust doctrine allows it
“to leap ahead of societal norms and meet changing needs.”554 As Professor
Takacs argues, Sax invoked the public trust doctrine precisely for this pur-
(Wisconsin court refused to overturn PSC decision based on a high level of deference);
NJBPU Brief, supra note 519 (NJBPU requests the court to defer to its expertise).
550. By applying procedural, as opposed to substantive, scrutiny, this obviates a major
concern of the judiciary: that not granting agencies a high level of deference would either
“second-guess” their expertise, or replace the agency’s expertise with the court’s own
opinions.
551. Cf. Clean Wisconsin, 700 N.W.2d at 828–41 (glossing over the negative impacts of
CWIS and entirely ignoring the larger social benefits of renewable electricity); supra notes
541–42 (NJBPU ignored the contextual benefits of Fishermen’s Energy offshore wind pro-
ject.). Conversely, under the public trust doctrine, Wisconsin courts have rigorously en-
forced the state’s duties to fully consider these impacts. See, e.g., Scanlan, supra note 291, at
140–47 (Wisconsin courts tend to closely scrutinize any proposed trustee action that appears
to jeopardize trust resources); see also Waiahole I, 9 P.3d 409, 454–56 (Haw. 2000) (under the
public trust doctrine, courts have a responsibility to review state actions with heightened
degrees of judicial scrutiny).
552. Torres & Bellinger, supra note 141, at 285.
553. See Lake Michigan Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 450
(N.D. Ill. 1990) (finding that a conveyance of public trust lands to a university, no matter
their reputability or good intentions, is still subject to the public trust doctrine).
554. Jeffrey Thaler & Patrick Lyons, supra note 157, at 284.
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pose: to recognize the true value of what has previously been considered
valueless.555
Similarly, the public trust doctrine can help ensure that states ade-
quately monitor and manage wildlife takings to ensure sustainable popula-
tion levels. Under the public trust doctrine, states have the fiduciary duty to
prevent substantial impairment to wildlife resources. However, a state will
be unable to ensure this duty is being upheld if it does not know the base-
line populations of wildlife resources under its jurisdiction. While develop-
ers have the duty to ensure that their proposed projects do not substantially
impair these resources, the obligation to the public resides strictly in the
state. The state, under its trust obligations, cannot grant a permit without
reasonably knowing whether a proposed project will cause undue damage to
trust resources. Essentially, it is the duty of a state to know how much of
the population must be preserved in the face of electricity production ap-
propriation, ensuring sustainable use of wildlife resources.556
Despite more significant impacts to wildlife, the impacts from conven-
tional electricity are largely unknown, and when known, have been ig-
nored.557 Conventional electricity plant operators are not burdened by their
plants’ external effects as renewable electricity developers are, despite the
greater impacts the former have on wildlife resources. Furthermore, the
wildlife law that currently regulates electricity production is a patchwork of
isolated statutes that neglect to provide sufficient overall protection to wild-
life populations. For example, the CWA has “failed to consider the benefit
of 98% of aquatic species that are not commercially or recreationally valua-
ble.”558 Similarly, other rules, such as those recently promulgated related to
mercury emissions,559 were not calibrated to consider the potential wildlife
impacts of the rule, despite the substantial and sustained history of coal
555. David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights and the Future
of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 716 (2008). This can give economic value,
comparable to private property, to these resources that had been overlooked, such as the fish
species ignored by CWA § 316(b) analysis.
556. This would require the state to develop total population estimates for the wildlife
impacted by electricity production to see if the proposed facility’s impact on wildlife would
constitute substantial impairment of that resource.
557. See supra Section IV.B.
558. Nicole M. Magdziak, The Debate over Regulation Alternatives for Cooling Water Intake
Structures Is Heating Up, 38 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 413, 442–43 (2014). In addition, despite
twenty years having passed since the courts firsts intervened and created a timetable for
promulgation of rules to regulate CWIS, the EPA’s efforts remain lacking, and as a result it
has been rightly criticized for “becoming more and more sensitive to the industry and less
concerned with the environmental impacts that result from the alternatives [proposed in
promulgations of rules].” Id. at 444–45.
559. See supra notes 174–90.
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damaging wildlife resources with little to no restrictions. Likewise, in spite
of “a powerful dual mandate” in the ESA, the federal agencies have essen-
tially ignored their authority to actively promote and recover wildlife popu-
lations, not just prevent extinction.560 On the other hand, the obstinate
MBTA presents a regulatory conundrum by criminalizing the take of any
migratory bird without a permit while “simultaneously granting no permits
whatsoever for incidental take,” preventing reasonable consideration and
protection of migratory birds impacted by electricity production.561 Worse
yet, “none of the bat species currently known to be affected in large num-
bers by wind turbines are protected by federal conservation laws,” other
than the ESA, meaning there is no “mandate to either monitor or take con-
servation actions toward bat fatalities at wind turbines.”562
While these regulatory gaps have brought specific criticism in their ap-
plication to wind power, they are pertinent to all electricity production.
Many wildlife populations impacted by electricity production are lost in the
“millions of leaks in the membrane of environmental law” and “[t]o fix them,
even a few of them, is a terribly complex endeavor.”563 It would appear
unlikely that federal wildlife law, especially in the current political environ-
ment, will be substantially amended to afford reasonable and comprehensive
protections to the wildlife lost in these regulatory gaps.
The public trust doctrine can appropriately fill the gaps of current stat-
utory wildlife law, affording the legal authority and duty to the state to
protect wildlife populations. Although the wildlife branch of the public
trust doctrine is nascent and its application to electricity production novel,
utilization of the public trust doctrine to fill regulatory gaps in current wild-
life law can serve the purpose of common law: “to fill gaps left in the [statu-
tory] legal framework.”564 The public trust doctrine can provide a legal
framework that affords protection to all types of wildlife and, in the context
560. Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Wildlife: A Reinterpretation of Section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act, 34 ENVTL. L. 605, 633 (2004).
561. Lilley & Firestone, supra note 194, at 1181. By not allowing incidental take permits,
which could require mitigation measures, the MBTA makes any and all migratory bird takes
illegal, regardless of their impacts on populations, implicating wind farms.  However, the
Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 668–668(d) (2014), like the
MBTA, provides no statutory means to take eagles incidentally; yet the U.S. Fish and Wild-
life Service (FWS) has since promulgated rules for incidental take permits under the
BGEPA for wind energy farms. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 22.26 to .28 (2014); Samuel J. Panarella,
For the Birds: Wind Energy, Dead Eagles, and Unwelcome Surprises, 20 HASTINGS W.-NW. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 3, 20–24 (2014). The FWS presumably could act similarly pursuant to the
MBTA. Until such time, the public trust doctrine can provide a helpful guide.
562. Cryan, supra note 186, at 367–68.
563. Wood, supra note 549, at 198.
564. Babcock, supra note 155, at 405.
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of electricity production, can provide “the type of foresight needed to help
drive scientific advances that allow us to better predict and deal with emerg-
ing threats to migratory wildlife.”565 Under the public trust doctrine, the
state could weigh impacts contextually by comparing relative impacts of
alternative means of electricity production, and make the most informed
and beneficial decision regarding bat populations.
Finally, the public trust doctrine can offer “normative management
standards that can guide resource managers.”566 Any perceived flaws in fed-
eral wildlife law can be buttressed by the public trust doctrine. For example,
“[t]rust principles provide a normative anchor for [Endangered Species Act]
interpretation” and they “are basic, logical, and geared towards sustaining
society for generations to come.”567 Furthermore, applying these trust prin-
ciples to the Endangered Species Act (ESA) would offer a foundation for
government trustees to act affirmatively under section 7 “to restore the
wildlife trust where it has been damaged or depleted.”568 Gaps in the CWA
could also be addressed by the normative basis of trust principles. Under
trust principles, government agencies would be obligated to act on behalf of
the oft-ignored 98% of fish species in section 316(b) analyses and to require
extra protections of all wildlife trust resources.569 Lastly, applying trust
principles would bolster the protections of the MBTA in a manner that is
rational with the overarching purpose and spirit of the statute, while simul-
taneously offering reasonable expectations to all electricity developers who
impact migratory birds.570
565. Cryan, supra note 186, at 370.
566. Babcock, supra note 155, at 408. To clarify, this normative guide can be useful to
both federal and state resource managers. Either of these managers could rely on the poten-
tial federal public trust doctrine (though its existence is at the moment questionable, as
discussed supra in Section III.C), or rely on the public trust doctrine of the state in which the
electricity project would occur. Likewise, either federal or state natural resource managers
could use either the federal or a state public trust doctrine to fill the gaps in wildlife regula-
tion. However, because state natural resource managers, and state agencies in general, fre-
quently address wildlife and electricity decisions, and because a state public trust doctrine is
a more concrete legal tool than the federal public trust doctrine, focusing on the state may be
more useful.
567. Wood, supra note 606–07.
568. Id. at 631.
569. See, e.g., Clean Wis. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wis., 700 N.W.2d 768, 832–34
(Wis. 2005) (largely ignoring the substantial impacts of a coal plant’s CWIS).
570. While one could argue that the stringent rules of the MBTA and continual threat
of FWS prosecution afford substantial protection, or that the promulgation of rule creating
an incidental take permit would afford greater protection to migratory birds than the public
trust doctrine, the purpose of the trust is not to displace these protections but rather to
normatively guide these protections in a reasonable way. Nor does the MBTA subsume (at
least in theory) the public trust doctrine and its normative standards. See Waiahole I, 9 P.3d
409, 442 (Haw. 2000).
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The public trust doctrine can be utilized both to fill regulatory gaps and
buttress current wildlife and environmental law. It is a more reasonable,
more flexible, and more intuitive legal framework than the status quo and
can both improve and advance current environmental laws. The dual prongs
of the trustee’s duty—to prevent substantial impairment, and to act affirma-
tively to minimize harm to trust resources, when either practicable or feasi-
ble—present the best of both worlds.
This Article demonstrates the suitability of applying the public trust
doctrine to state electricity planning and policy. While the public trust doc-
trine has evolved over decades, there has been minimal application to elec-
tricity production despite the substantial benefits its application would
provide. Such an application, however, would serve the important common
law function of filling gaps in regulatory regimes, and here would benefit
wildlife populations, conserve water, and advance electricity planning and
policy more generally. This Article encourages its application, finding the
public trust doctrine to be a fitting and useful tool to better calibrate elec-
tricity planning for the protection of natural resources and to incentivize
the development of renewable electricity production.
